The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume XII Part 29

Congress will recollect, that I expressly stipulated to take no part in past transactions. My attention to the public debts, therefore, arose from the conviction, that funding them on solid revenues was the last essential work of our glorious revolution. The accomplishment of this necessary work is among the objects nearest my heart, and to effect it, I would sacrifice time, property, and domestic bliss.

Many late circ.u.mstances have so far lessened our apprehensions from the common enemy, that my original motives have almost ceased to operate. But other circ.u.mstances have postponed the establishment of public credit in such a manner, that I fear it will never be made. To increase our debts, while the prospect of paying them diminishes, does not consist with my ideas of integrity. I must, therefore, quit a situation which becomes utterly insupportable. But lest the public measures might be deranged by any precipitation, I will continue to serve until the end of May. If effectual measures are not taken by that period, to make permanent provision for the public debts of every kind, Congress will be pleased to appoint some other man to be the Superintendent of their Finances. I should be unworthy of the confidence reposed in me by my fellow citizens, if I did not explicitly declare, that I will never be the minister of injustice.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Finance, February 26th, 1783.

Sir,

A number of those who have contracted engagements with me will, I know, place a personal reliance on me for the fulfilment of them, As the time approaches very fast when I am to quit this office, it is proper for me to make the necessary preparations. Among these, I must place the due and seasonable information, which as an honest man I must convey to those who have confided in me. I am, therefore, to pray that the injunction of secrecy, contained in the order of the 24th of January last, may be taken off. At the same time, I take the liberty to suggest to Congress, that the early appointment of my successor, will give him opportunity to take such measures as may prevent many inconveniences that might otherwise happen.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

TO GEORGE WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

Office of Finance, February 27th, 1783.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to enclose to you the copy of a letter to the President of Congress, which was written on the 24th of last month. I should have transmitted it to you on the next day, but contrary to my expectations, Congress enjoined secrecy. I yesterday wrote a letter, of which I also enclose a copy, and in consequence of it I am this instant informed that the injunction of secrecy is taken off. I seize, therefore, the earliest moment to give you the information.

I do a.s.sure you, Sir, that nothing would have induced me to take this step, but a painful conviction that the situation of those to whom the public are indebted is desperate. I believe, sincerely, that a great majority of the members of Congress wish to do justice; but I as sincerely believe that they will not adopt the necessary measures, because they are afraid of offending their States. From my soul I pity the army, and you, my Dear Sir, in particular, who must see and feel for their distresses, without the power of relieving them.

I did flatter myself that I should have been able to procure for them that justice to which they are ent.i.tled; and in the meantime, I labored to make the situation as tolerable as circ.u.mstances would permit. For the a.s.sistance which you have kindly afforded me, I pray you to accept my thanks, and to be a.s.sured that I shall ever retain on that account the most grateful emotions. My thanks are due also to all our officers, for I know that unwearied pains have been taken to give them disagreeable impressions, and I am, therefore, doubly indebted for the just sentiments, which amid so many misrepresentations they have constantly entertained. I hope my successor will be more fortunate than I have been, and that our glorious revolution may be crowned with those acts of justice, without which the greatest human glory is but the shadow of a shade.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

TO WILLIAM CARMICHAEL, IN MADRID.

Office of Finance, March 4th, 1783.

Sir,

You will probably recollect that Mr Jay protested ten bills of exchange, each for two hundred and twentyfive Mexican dollars, of which the list is enclosed. These bills, with the addition of twenty per cent damages, amount to two thousand seven hundred dollars, for which I have this day signed a set of bills on you, which, to avoid the dangers to which communication is liable, are extended to the eighth bill. This draft is at six months' sight, and I am to desire that you will honor it, and take your reimburs.e.m.e.nt on Mr Grand. The length of sight may probably place it at a considerable discount on the exchange of Madrid, and it is probable, also, that you may draw on Mr Grand to advantage; if so, I conceive it would be best to have the bill bought.

Draw on Mr Grand at the common usance, and close the transaction; which I hope may be the last of the kind, which the American government will be concerned in. An additional reason for suggesting this is, that should this bill go through hands ignorant of the whole transaction, it may give rise to conjectures, that the former practice of drawing is about to be revived. I should have drawn on France or paid in cash, but as the party is at Boston, and the rate of the exchange unfixed, it is more conformable to mercantile usage to give a new bill for the princ.i.p.al and damages.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Finance, March 8th, 1783.

Sir,

I received yesterday afternoon a report, which is to be considered on Monday the 10th instant, and with it I received an order to transmit my observations. The shortness of the time obliges me to ask indulgence for deficiencies or inaccuracies. I have always believed that Congress were disposed to do _justice_ to the public creditors, and I shall presume that the _power_ of Congress will be exerted for that purpose.

There appear, therefore, two princ.i.p.al points to be considered.

I. What justice requires; and,

II. What Congress have power to do.

To the first I answer. _Justice requires that the debt be paid._ The _principles_ of justice require that from a government, which a _court_ of justice exacts from an individual. Government have no right to oblige creditors to commute their debts for anything else. Any revenues, therefore, to be pledged for the restoration of public credit must be such, that money may be borrowed on them to pay those to whom it is due; any plan which falls short of that object will not do justice. And no plan will embrace that object unless it be such that under it individuals would prefer government security to any other. In our particular situation it appears clear, that such public creditor has a complete right to demand his whole debt from Congress, and to name the terms on which he will forego it, and that Congress have a similar right in regard to the States.

In order to determine on the second question, viz. the _power_ of Congress, we must resort to the confederation. By the eighth article it will appear, that Congress have a right to determine on the sum to be paid by the States, and the time of payment; and that this sum is to be paid by the States in proportion to their respective value, or an estimation to be made in the mode to be appointed by Congress. It is, therefore, in the _power_ of Congress to call for payment of the whole debt by any day; such for instance as the 1st of January; and to have a valuation made some previous day; such for instance as the 1st of September. _The right of Congress is perfect, and the duty to pay absolute._ It appears necessary that this power be exerted in the most _decisive form_, and that whatever _general plan_ of finance may be adopted, the concurrence of each State in such plan should be admitted _as an alternative_ for not paying her apportioned quota of the whole debt. My reasons are these.

1st. It will not be believed, that Congress have no power to do justice until the power which they have is exerted.

2dly. The public creditors have a right to expect that exertion.

3dly. Until it be made, a compliance with the demands of Congress will be considered by the States as a matter of favor and not of right.

4thly. Congress having a right to the whole money, it follows that they have the _exclusive_ right to name those precise terms on which they will commute it.

5thly. Hence it follows that their plan, (be it what it may) must be adopted by the States in all its parts, because none of them can have a right to make amendments.

6thly. The objections heretofore raised against the impost will by this means be totally done away, because each State may at its option either comply with the general plan or pay her particular share of the whole debt.

7thly. If the plan proposed as an alternative be adopted, it will from the nature of the case be an express national compact between the United States and each individual State. The revenue will have been purchased by Congress and they will have a perfect right to insist on their bargain.

8thly. The plans of Congress will by this means be greatly facilitated in the States, because the arguments will apply to men's feelings, and they will at once perceive, that it is better to give a permanent revenue of six, than make immediate payment of a hundred. Every term and condition in the plan will then be fair, because if the revenues be such as in the judgment of the Legislature will fall too heavy on their const.i.tuents, they can adopt others, borrow on their own account, and pay in their share at the day named. So that the United States will either receive the whole money, and pay all their debts, or they will get solid revenues to fund the whole, or they will receive a part and have such revenues for the remainder.

It also appears to me that our situation requires the utmost despatch, and therefore I wish much that the days named should be shorter than those above mentioned. The Act of the 17th of last month has been duly forwarded to the several States, but there will be no impropriety in taking a shorter mode of valuation for apportioning the debt, and leaving the valuation by the Act of the 17th to apply to the yearly apportionments subsequent to the last year. Various modes of making a speedy valuation might be suggested; such for instance, as that Congress should appoint a commissioner for each State, directing them to meet at this place on the 1st of June and determine, that the valuation made by the majority of those who do meet should be conclusive. If such a line of conduct as this be pursued, those suspicions as to the integrity of Congress, which ill designing men have endeavored to raise must immediately cease. And if justice be not done, public indignation will be pointed to the proper persons.

With respect to the alternative which may be proposed, I am sorry to find that my ideas as to the objects of revenue have not met with the approbation of Congress. I must be indulged in observing, that let the revenues be what they may, it is indispensable that all the collectors be appointed by the authority of the United States, and for the following reasons.

1st. Experience has shown, that the taxes heretofore laid in the States have not been collected.

2dly. It is evident from a consideration of their modes of taxation, (which they are all very obstinately attached to,) that they never will be punctually collected.