The Victory At Sea Part 18

But these were not the only large battles.h.i.+ps which the United States had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and were accomplis.h.i.+ng most decisive results upon the battlefield. A successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it would probably have improved German _moral_ and possibly have injured that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip out to sea and a.s.sail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland--the _Nevada_, Captain A. T. Long, afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the _Oklahoma_, Captain M. L. Bristol, afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the _Utah_, Captain F. B. Ba.s.sett, the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers.

This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast.

For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the Germans never attempted the adventure.

II

A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing s.h.i.+p was ever struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two areas of the Atlantic through which American s.h.i.+pping could reach its European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth parallel of lat.i.tude, the French city of Brest representing its most familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the dangers of its coast, and the st.u.r.dy and independent character of the people on its sh.o.r.es. The other distinct area to which the map calls attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 miles.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES

This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting more than 2,000,000 American soldiers to France without loss because of submarines. The Atlantic was divided into two broad areas--shown by the shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area were sent practically all the merchant s.h.i.+ps with supplies of food and materials for Europe. The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to the forty-ninth parallel, was used almost exclusively for troops.h.i.+ps.

The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the same time in the eastern Atlantic; they thus were forced to choose whether they should devote these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text explains why, under these circ.u.mstances, they were compelled to use nearly all their forces against merchant s.h.i.+ps and leave troop transports practically alone.

Emery Walker Ltd. sc]

Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to the north pa.s.sed practically all the merchant s.h.i.+pping which was destined for the Allies. Consequently, as I have described, it was the great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every s.h.i.+p which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least 100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my first report to the Department I described the princ.i.p.al scene of submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French island of Ushant--which lies just westward of Brest--to the tip of Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end.

Along much of the coastline south of Brest the waters were so shallow that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long distance from the German bases; the s.h.i.+pping consisted largely of coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little purpose, and meanwhile the s.h.i.+ps and cargoes which they were above all ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into British ports.

The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were so different in character was what made it possible to send our 2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March, 1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The s.h.i.+pment of food and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale.

With the pa.s.sing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this great transportation system had become almost automatic. s.h.i.+pping from America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great "trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines.

Our earliest troop s.h.i.+pments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we sent to England, from which country they were transported across the Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a s.h.i.+p of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918 followed simple and well-defined lines. We sent mercantile convoys in what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern "lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem.

For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question: Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo s.h.i.+ps or most of them against troops.h.i.+ps. Which should it be? If it were decided to concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troops.h.i.+ps, then the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense, to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with 4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however--and that was the only consideration which influenced the Germans--it is hard to see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the course of the war. The destruction of merchant s.h.i.+pping in large quant.i.ties, however, represented the one way in which the Germans could win. There were at least a hundred merchant s.h.i.+ps to every one of our troops.h.i.+ps; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk, Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for "tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still represented the one logical mission of the submarine.

The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean pa.s.sage-way was really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched across that expanse and hunting for troops.h.i.+ps. At this rate the Germans would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface s.h.i.+ps, as they were when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the coast of France by another route.

At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting troops. s.h.i.+ps which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed safe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or more. Now one of the greatest protections which a s.h.i.+p possesses against submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only eight knots when submerged--and it must submerge immediately if its attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the G.o.d of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troops.h.i.+ps began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and take good aim. I believe that these circ.u.mstances in themselves--the comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which I have yet mentioned--the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five large troops.h.i.+ps would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat commanders.

When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element which they call the factor of safety. It is their usual procedure to estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to bear under any conceivable circ.u.mstances and then they make it strong enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to a.s.sure the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some of the mercantile convoys--and properly so. This was done whenever the arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended by a cruiser or a battles.h.i.+p whose business it was to protect them against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of which were American, was for the most part un.o.btrusive and unspectacular, but it const.i.tutes a particularly fine example of efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts, momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the most minute precautions were taken by the transports.

The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats.

But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports; fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable circ.u.mstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a pa.s.sage in General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troops.h.i.+ps; public opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to sink troops.h.i.+ps. It was not possible to direct the submarines against troops.h.i.+ps exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only on certain routes; but whether the troops.h.i.+ps would choose the same routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of submarines anywhere he could always send the s.h.i.+ps new orders by wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troops.h.i.+ps.

The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce was therefore continued with all the vigour possible."

Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, as I have said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant s.h.i.+pping and leave the American troops.h.i.+ps practically alone--at least those bound to Europe.

Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over, the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk, as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these happily only three were sunk.

III

The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said, "at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough s.h.i.+pping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount of s.h.i.+pping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, food, and equipment."

It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the most embarra.s.sing questions. What had become of their submarines? Had the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any American troops.h.i.+ps that attempted to cross the ocean? As the s.h.i.+pments increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their people that the submarines would certainly win the war--speeches that were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a tremendous effect upon German _moral_. When the great British liner _Justicia_ was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that it was the _Leviathan_, filled with American soldiers; and the jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann, therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking a single east-bound troops.h.i.+p. The only result accomplished was the one which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall in the sinking of merchant s.h.i.+ps. In August, 1918, these sinkings amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and 110,000 tons.

Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the commanders of the cruisers and battles.h.i.+ps that escorted them from America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamans.h.i.+p displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights while continuously manoeuvring in close formation. Moreover, their cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea.

On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading, day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true light--as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of evil in all history.

FOOTNOTE:

[8] These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1919, page 207.

THE END

APPENDIX I

OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA"

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

14 June 1919.

From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of the U.S. Navy during The Great War.

Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States.

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War.

2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style, ill.u.s.trated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams indicating the nature of our activities.

[s] WM. S. SIMS.

9 July 1919.

APPROVED.

[s] Josephus Daniels.

HWS-MEF

2nd Indors.e.m.e.nt.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.

11 July 1919.

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.

To: President Naval War College.