Superstition Unveiled Part 2

_The incomprehensible is not to be defined._ It is difficult to give _intelligible_ account of an Immense Being confessedly mysterious and about whom his wors.h.i.+ppers admit they only know, they know nothing, except that

'He is good, And that themselves are blind.'

Spinoza said, _of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other_; and to me it seems eminently unphilosophic to believe a Being having nothing in common with anything, capable of creating or causing everything. 'Only matter can be touched or touch;'

and as the Christian's G.o.d is not material, his adorers are fairly open to the charge of superst.i.tion. An unknown Deity, without body, parts or pa.s.sions, is of all idols the least tangible; and they who pretend to know and reverence him, are deceived or deceivers.

In this Christian country, where men are expected to believe and called 'Infidel' if they _cannot_ believe in a 'crucified Saviour,' it seems strange so much fuss should be made about his immateriality. All but Unitarian Christians hold as an essential article of faith, that in him dwelt the fulness of the G.o.dhead bodily; in other words, that our Redeemer and our Creator, though two persons, are but one G.o.d. It is true that Divines of our 'Reformed Protestant Church,' call everything but gentlemen those who lay claim to the equivocal privilege of feasting periodically upon the body and blood of Omnipotence. The pains taken by Protestants to show from Scripture, Reason and Nature, that Priests cannot change lumps of dough into the body, and b.u.mpers of wine into the blood, of their G.o.d, are well known and appreciated. But the Roman Catholics are neither to be argued nor laughed out of their 'awful doctrine' of the real presence, to which they cling with desperate earnestness.

Locke wrote rather disparagingly of 'many among us,' who will be found upon Inquiry, to fancy G.o.d in the shape of a man fitting in heaven, and have other absurd and unfit conceptions of him.' As though it were possible to think of shapeless Being, or as though it were criminal in the superst.i.tious to believe 'G.o.d made man after his own image.'

That Christians as well as Turks 'really have had whole sects earnestly contending that the Deity was corporeal and of human shape', is a fact, so firmly established as to defy contradiction. And though every sincere subscriber to the Thirty Nine Articles must believe, or at least must believe he believes in Deity without body, parts, or pa.s.sions, it is well known that 'whole sects' of Christians do even now 'fancy G.o.d in the shape of a man sitting in heaven, and entertain other absurd and unfit conceptions of him.'

Mr. Collibeer, who is considered by Christian writers 'a most ingenious gentleman', has told the world in his Treatise ent.i.tled 'The Knowledge of G.o.d,' that Deity must have some form, and intimates it may probably be the spherical; an intimation which has grievously offended many learned Theists who considered going so far an abuse of reason, and warn us that 'its extension beyond the a.s.signed boundaries, has proved an ample source of error.' But what the 'a.s.signed boundaries' of reason are, they don't state, nor by whom 'a.s.signed.' That if there is a G.o.d he must have _some_ form is self-evident and why Mr. Collibeer should be ostracized by his less daringly imaginative brethren, for preferring a spherical to a square or otherwise shaped Deity, is to my understanding what G.o.d's grace is to their's.

But admitting the unfitness, and absurdity, and 'blasphemy' of such conceptions, it is by no means clear that any other conceptions of the 'inconceiveable' would be an improvement upon them. Undoubtedly, the matter-G.o.d-system has its difficulties, but they are trifles in comparison with those by which the spirit-G.o.d system is encompa.s.sed; for, one obvious consequence of faith in bodiless Divinity is an utter confusion of ideas in those who preach it, as regards possibilities and impossibilities.

The universe is an uncaused existence, or it was caused by something before it. By universe we mean matter, the sum total of things, whence all proceeds, and whither all returns. No truth is more obviously true than the truth that matter, or something not matter, exists of itself, and consequently is not an effect, but an uncaused cause of all effects.

From such conviction, repugnant though it be to vulgar ideas, there is no rational way of escape; for however much we may desire, however much we may struggle to believe there was a time when there was nothing, we cannot so believe. Human nature is const.i.tuted intuitively or instinctively to feel the eternity of something. To rid oneself of that feeling is impossible. Nature or something not Nature must ever have been, is a conclusion to which what poets call Fate--

Leads the willing and drags the unwilling.

But does this undeniable truth make against Universalism? Far from it--so far, indeed, as to make for it. The reason is no mystery. Of matter we have ideas clear, precise, and indispensable, whereas of something not matter we cannot have any idea whatever, good, bad, or indifferent. The Universe is extraordinary, no doubt, but so much of it as acts upon us is perfectly conceivable, whereas, any thing within, without, or apart from the Universe, is perfectly inconceivably.

The notion of necessarily existing matter seems fatal to belief in G.o.d; that is, if by the word G.o.d be understood something not matter, for 'tis precisely because priests were unable to reconcile such belief with the idea of matter's self-existence or eternity, that they took to imagining a 'First cause.'

In the 'forlorn hope' of vanquis.h.i.+ng the difficulty of necessarily existing _Matter_, they a.s.sent to a necessarily existing _Spirit_, and when the nature of spirit is demanded from these a.s.sertors of its existence, they are constrained to avow that it is material or nothing.

Yes, they are constrained to make directly or indirectly one or other of these admissions; for, as between truth and falsehood, there is no middle pa.s.sage; so between something and nothing, there is no intermediate existence. Hence the serious dilemma of Spiritualists, who gravely tell us their G.o.d is a spirit, and that a spirit is not any thing, which not any thing or nothing (for the life of us we cannot distinguish between them) 'framed the worlds' nay, _created_ as well as framed them.

If it be granted, for the mere purpose of explanation, that spirit is an ent.i.ty, we can frame 'clear distinct ideas of'--a real though not material existence, surely no man will pretend to say an uncreated Spirit, is less inexplicable than uncreated Matter. All could not have been caused or created unless nothing can be a Cause, the very notion of which involves the grossest of absurdities.

_Whatever is produced, without any cause, is produced by nothing; or, in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing never can be a cause no more than it can be something or equal to two right angles. By the same intuition that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive that it can never be a cause, and consequently must perceive that every object has a real cause of its existence. When we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence, and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions except to prove the absurdity of that exclusion.

If everything must have a cause, it follows that upon the exclusion of other causes, we must accept of the object itself or nothing as causes.

But it is the very point in question whether everything must have a cause or not, and therefore, according to all just reasoning ought not to be taken for granted_. [29:1]

This reasoning amounts to logical demonstration (if logical demonstration there can be) of a most essential truth, which in all ages has been obstinately set at nought by dabblers in the supernatural. It demonstrates that something never was, never can be, caused by nothing, which can no more be a cause, properly so called, than it can be something, or equal to two right angles; and therefore that everything could not have had a cause, which, the reader has seen, is the very point a.s.sumed by Theists--the very point on which as a pivot they so merrily and successfully turn their fine metaphysical theories and immaterial systems.

The universe, quoth they, must have had a cause, and that cause must have been First Cause, or cause number one, because nothing can exist of itself. Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion! How, in consistency, can they declare nothing can exist without a cause in the teeth of their oft repeated dogma that G.o.d is uncaused. If G.o.d never commenced to be, _He_ is an uncaused existence, that is to say, exists without a cause. [29:2]

The difference on this point between Theists and Universalists is very palpable. The former say, Spirit can exist without a cause, the latter say Matter can exist without a cause. Whole libraries of theologic dogma would be dearly purchased by Hume's profound remark--_if everything must have a cause, it follows that upon the exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes._

Saint Augustine, more candid than modern theologians, said 'G.o.d is a being whom we speak of but whom we cannot describe and who is superior to all definitions.' Universalists, on the other hand, as candidly deny there is any such being. To them it seems that the name G.o.d stands for nothing, is the archetype of nothing, explains nothing, and contributes to nothing but the perpetuation of human imbecility, ignorance and error. To them it represents neither shadow nor substance, neither phenomenon nor thing, neither what is ideal nor what is real; yet is it the name without senseless faith in which there could be no superst.i.tion.

If Nature is all, and all is Nature, nothing but itself could ever have existed, and of course nothing but itself can be supposed ever to have been capable of causing. To cause is to act, and though body without notion is conceivable, action without body is not. Neither can two Infinites be supposed to tenant one Universe. Only 'most religious philosophers' can pretend to acknowledge the being of an infinite G.o.d co-existent with an infinite Universe.

Universalists are frequently asked--What moves matter? to which question _nothing_ is the true and sufficient answer. Matter moves matter. If asked how we know it does, our answer is, because we see it do so, which is more than mind imaginers can say of their 'prime mover.' They tell us mind moves matter; but none save the _third sighted_ among them ever saw mind, and if they never saw mind, they never could have seen matter pushed about by it. They babble about mind, but nowhere does mind exist save in their mind; that is to say, nowhere but nowhere. Ask these broad-day dreamers where mind is _minus_ body? and very cutely they answer, body is the mind, and mind is the body.

That this is neither joke nor slander, we will show by reference to No.

25 of 'The Shepherd,' a clever and well known periodical, whose editor, [30:1] in reply to a correspondent of the 'chaotic' tribe, said 'As to the question--where is magnetism without the magnet? We answer, magnetism is the magnet, and the magnet is magnetism.' If so, body is the mind and the mind is body; and our Shepherd, if asked, 'Where is mind without the body?' to be consistent, should answer, body is the mind and the mind is the body. Both these answers are true, or both are false; and it must be allowed--

Each lends to each a borrowed charm, Like pearls upon an Ethiop's arm.

Ask the 'Shepherd' where is mind without the body? and, if not at issue with himself, he _must_ reply, mind is the man and man is the mind.

If this be so,--if the mind is the man and the man is the mind, which none can deny who say magnetism is the magnet and the magnet magnetism--how, in Reason's name, can they be different, or how can the 'Shepherd' consistently pretend to distinguish between them; yet he does so. He writes about the spiritual part of man as though he really believed there is such a part. Not satisfied, it would seem, with body, like Nonent.i.tarians of vulgar mould, he tenants it with Soul or Spirit, or Mind, which Soul, or Spirit, or Mind, according to his own showing, is nothing but body in action; in other terms, organised matter performing vital functions. Idle declamation against 'facts mongers'

well becomes such self-stultifying dealers in fiction. Abuse of 'experimentarians' is quite in keeping with the philosophy of those who maintain the reality of mind in face of their own strange statement, that magnetism is the magnet and the magnet magnetism.

But we deny that magnetism is the magnet. These words magnetism and magnet do not, it is true, stand for two things, but one thing: that one and only thing called matter. The magnet is an existence, _i.e._, that which moves. Magnetism is not an existence, but phenomenon, or, if you please, phenomena. It is the effect of which magnetic body is the immediate and obvious cause.

To evade the charge of Materialism, said Dr. Engledue, we (Phrenologists) content ourselves with stating that the immaterial makes use of the material to show forth its powers. What is the result of this? We have the man of theory and believer in supernaturalism quarrelling with the man of fact and supporter of Materialism. We have two parties; the one a.s.serting that man possesses a _spirit_ superadded to, but not inherent in, the brain--added to it, yet having no necessary connection with it--producing material changes, yet immaterial--dest.i.tute of any of the known properties of matter--in fact an _immaterial something_ which in one word means _nothing_, producing all the cerebral functions of man, yet not localised-not susceptible of proof; the other party contending that the belief in spiritualism fetters and ties down physiological investigation--that man's intellect is prostrated by the domination of metaphysical speculation--that we have no evidence of the existence of an _essence_, and that organised mutter is all that is requisite to produce the mult.i.tudinous manifestations of human and brute cerebration.

We rank ourselves with the second party, and conceive that we must cease speaking of 'the mind,' and discontinue enlisting in our investigations a spiritual essence, the existence of which cannot be proved, but which tends to mystify and perplex a question sufficiently clear if we confine ourselves to the consideration of organised matter--its forms--its changes--and its aberrations from normal structure. [31:1]

The eccentric Count de Caylus, when on his death-bed, was visited by some near relation and a pious Bishop, who hoped that under such trying circ.u.mstance he would manifest some concern respecting those 'spiritual'

blessings which, while in health, he had uniformly treated with contempt. After a long pause he broke silence by saying, _'Ah, my friends, I see you are anxious about my soul;'_ whereupon they p.r.i.c.ked up their ears with delight; before, however, any reply could be made the Count added, _'but the fact is I have not got one, and really my good friends you must allow me to know best.'_

If people in general had one tenth the good sense of this _impious_ Count, the fooleries of Spiritualism would at once give place to the philosophy of Materialism, and none would waste time in talking or writing about non-ent.i.ties. All would know that what theologians call sometimes spirit, sometimes soul, and sometimes mind, is an imaginary existence. All would know that the terms _immaterial something_ do in very truth mean _nothing_. Count de Caylus died as became a man convinced that soul is not an ent.i.ty, and that upon the dissolution of our 'earthly tabernacle', the particles composing it cease to perform vital functions, and return to the sh.o.r.eless ocean of Eternal Being.

Pietists may be shocked by such _nonchalance_ in the face of their 'grim monster;' but philosophers will admire an indifference to inevitable consequences resulting from profoundest love of truth and contempt of superst.i.tion. Count de Caylus was a Materialist, and no Materialist can consistently feel the least alarm at the approach of what superst.i.tionists have every reason to consider the 'king of terrors.'

Believers in the reality of immaterial existence cannot be 'proper'

Materialists. Obviously, therefore, no believers in the reality of G.o.d can be _bona fide_ Materialists; for 'G.o.d' is a name signifying something or nothing; in other terms matter or that which is not matter.

If the latter, to Materialists the name is meaningless--sound without sense. If the former, they at once p.r.o.nounce it a name too many; because it expresses nothing that their word MATTER does not express better.

Dr. Young held in horror the Materialist's 'universe of dust.' But there is nothing either bad or contemptible in dust--man is dust--all will be dust. A _dusty_ universe, however, _shocked_ the poetic Doctor, whose writings a.n.a.logise with--

Rich windows that exclude the light, And pa.s.sages that lead to nothing.

A universe of nothing was more to his taste than a universe of dust, and he accordingly amused himself with the 'spiritual' work of imagining one, and called its builder 'G.o.d.'

The somewhat ungentle 'Shepherd' cordially sympathises with Dr. Young in his detestation of the Materialist's universe of dust, and is sorely puzzled to know how mere dust contrives to move without the a.s.sistance of 'an immaterial power between the particles;' as if he supposed anything could be between everything--or nothing be able to move something. Verily this gentleman is as clever a hand at 'darkening counsel by words without knowledge' as the cleverest of those he rates so soundly.

The names of Newton and Clarke are held in great esteem by all who are familiar with the history of mechanical and metaphysical philosophy. As a man of science, there is no individual, ancient, or modern, who would not suffer by comparison with Sir Isaac Newton; while common consent has a.s.signed to Dr. Samuel Clarke the first place among religious metaphysicians. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to cite any other Theists of better approved reputation than these two, and therefore we introduce them to the reader's notice in this place; for as they ranked among the most philosophic of Theists, it might be expected that their conceptions of Deity, would be clear, satisfactory, and definite.--Let us see, then, _in their own writings_, what those conceptions were.

Newton conceived G.o.d to be one and the same for ever, and everywhere, not only by his own virtue or energy, but also in virtue of his substance.--Again, 'All things are contained in him and move in him, but without reciprocal action' (_sed sine muta pa.s.sione_) G.o.d feels nothing from the movements of bodies; nor do they experience any resistance from his universal presence. [33:1]

Pause, reader, and demand of yourself whether such a conception of Deity is either clear, satisfactory, or definite,--G.o.d is _one_. Very good--but one _what?_ From the information, 'He is the same for ever and everywhere,' we conclude that Newton thought him a Being. Here, however, matter stops the way; for the idea of Being is in all of us inseparably a.s.sociated with the idea of substance. When told that G.o.d is an 'Immense Being,' without parts, and consequently unsubstantial, we try to think of such a Being; but in vain. Reason puts itself in a _quandary_, the moment it labours to realise an idea of absolute nothingness; yet marvellous to relate, Newton did distinctly declare his Deity 'totally dest.i.tute of body,' and urged that _fact_ as a _reason_ why He cannot be either seen, touched, or understood, and also as a _reason_ why he ought not to be adored under any corporeal figure!

The proper function of 'Supernaturality or Wonder,' according to Phrenologists, is to create belief in the reality of supernatural beings, and begets fondness for news, particularly if extravagant. Most likely then, such readers of this book as have that organ 'large' will be delighted with Newton's rhodomontade about a G.o.d who resists nothing, feels nothing, and yet with condescension truly divine, not only contains all things, but permits them to move in His motionless and 'universal presence;' for 'news' more extravagant, never fell from the lips of an idiot, or adorned the pages of a prayer-book.

By the same great _savan_ we are taught that G.o.d governs all, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord and sovereign of all things: that it is in consequence of His sovereignty He is called the Lord G.o.d, the Universal Emperor--that the word G.o.d is relative, and relates itself with slaves--and that the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty of G.o.d, not over his own body, as those think who look upon G.o.d as the soul of the world, but over slaves--from all which _slavish_ reasoning, a plain man who had not been informed it was concocted by Europe's pet philosopher, would infallibly conclude some unfortunate lunatic had given birth to it. That there is no creature now tenanting Bedlam who would or could scribble purer nonsense about G.o.d than this of Newton's, we are well convinced--for how could the most frenzied of brains imagine anything more repugnant to every principle of good sense than a self-existent, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent Being, creator of all the worlds, who acts the part of 'universal emperor,' and plays upon an infinitely larger scale, the same sort of game as Nicholas of Russia, or Mohammed of Egypt, plays upon a small scale. There cannot be slavery where there is no tyranny, and to say, as Newton did, that we stand in the name relation to a universal G.o.d, as a slave does to his earthly master, is practically to accuse such G.o.d, at reason's bar of _tyranny_.

If the word G.o.d is relative, and relate itself with slaves, it incontestably follows that all human beings are slaves, and Deity is by such reasoners degraded into the character of universal slave-driver.

Really, theologians and others who declaim so bitterly against 'blasphemers,' and take such very stringent measures to punish 'infidels', who speaks or write of their G.o.d, should seriously consider whether the worst, that is, the least superst.i.tious of infidel writers, ever penned a paragraph so disparaging to the character of that G.o.d they effect to adore, as the last quoted paragraph of Newton's.

If even it could be demonstrated that there is a super-human Being, it cannot be proper to clothe Him in the n.o.blest human attributes--still less can it be justifiable in pigmies, such as we are, to invest Him with odious attributes belonging only to despots ruling over slaves.

Besides, how can we imagine a G.o.d, who is 'totally dest.i.tute of body and of corporeal figure,' to have any kind of substance? Earthly emperors we know to be substantial and common-place sort of beings enough, but is it not sheer abuse of reason to argue as though the character of G.o.d were at all a.n.a.logous to theirs; or rather, is it not shocking abuse of our reasoning facilities to employ them at all about a Being whose existence, if we really have an existence, is perfectly enigmatical, and allowed to be so by those very men who pretend to explain its character and attributes? We find no less a sage than Newton explicitly declaring as incontestible truth, that G.o.d exists necessarily--that the same necessity obliges him to exist always and everywhere--that he is all eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, all action--that he exists in a mode by no means corporeal, an yet this same sage, in the self-same paragraph, acknowledges G.o.d is _totally unknown to us_.

Now, we should like to be informed by what _reasonable_ right Newton could pen a long string of 'incontestible truths,' such as are here selected from his writings, with respect to a Being of whom, by his own confession, he had not a particle of knowledge. Surely it is not the part of a wise man to write about that which is 'totally unknown' to him, and yet that is precisely what Newton did, when he wrote concerning G.o.d.

So much for the Theism of Europe's chief religious philosopher. Turn we now to the Theism of Dr. Samuel Clarke.