Lessons of the War Part 5

On Monday French with his cavalry brigade seized a drift or ford across the Riet ten or a dozen miles above Jacobsdal, and the two infantry divisions were so close behind him that on Tuesday Lord Roberts could report them both encamped beyond the river. On Tuesday French was off again to the north with a cavalry brigade, a mounted infantry brigade, and a horse artillery brigade, a second cavalry brigade, under Colonel Gordon moving on his right. By half-past five French was across the Modder River, having forced a drift and seized the hills beyond so as to secure the pa.s.sage for the infantry, while Gordon had seized two drifts further to the west. Between them the two cavalry commanders had captured five Boer laagers, and the slightness of the opposition they encounter proves that the Boers were completely surprised. On Wednesday morning the sixth division was on the march to follow the cavalry, and the seventh division was to take the same direction on Wednesday afternoon.

These are all the facts reported until now, Thursday afternoon. Let us see what they mean. First of all, Lord Roberts has chosen his objective, the Boer force before Kimberley, on the right flank of the Boer front Stormberg--Colesberg--Magersfontein. A blow delivered here and followed by a march into the Free State places Lord Roberts on the communications of the Boers now at Stormberg and Colesberg and between the two halves of the Boer army, of which one is on the border of Cape Colony and the other in Natal. The objective, therefore, has been chosen with strategical insight. In the next place forces have been concentrated for the blow. Lord Roberts has four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and at least one brigade of mounted infantry, his total strength amounting to at least fifty thousand men. Then there has been a skilful and successful attempt to distract the enemy's attention, to conceal from him the nature of the movement and the force to be employed, and last, but not least, there has been the suddenness and the rapidity of movement essential to surprise. These are the proofs of that breadth and simplicity of conception and of that mastery in execution which are the marks of the best generals.h.i.+p.

But there is in the best work more than breadth of mind and strength of hand. The details fit in with the design and repay the closest scrutiny.

The march of twenty-five thousand men round Jacobsdal towards the Modder tactically turns the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need not be carried by a frontal attack. But it also places the British force on the direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and if Commandant Cronje values these communications he must either make a precipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process to attack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions on their march from the Riet to the Modder. But in either case he has to reckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned in the telegrams, but which are a.s.suredly not idle. Lord Methuen has long held a crossing on to the peninsula or Doab between the two rivers, and the advance of a division into this peninsula must compel the prompt evacuation of Jacobsdal or bring about the ruin of any Boer force there, while at the same time it would increase the weight of troops that intervene between Magersfontein and Bloemfontein. A single division is a more than ample force to cover the British railhead at Modder River.

Commandant Cronje may elect to fight where he is, which would be to court disaster, for he would be attacked from the east in great force, with no retreat open except to the west away from his base, and with a considerable river, the Vaal, to cross. Such a retreat after a lost battle and under the pressure of pursuit would be ruin to his army. He may move off by Boshof, but that would be impracticable unless the start were made soon after the first news of the British advance. On Wednesday he would have only the mounted troops to deal with; even on Thursday (to-day) the sixth division could hardly be used with effect on the north bank of the Modder, but on Friday he would have the sixth and seventh divisions to reckon with. Probably his best course would be to retire before he can be attacked to Barkly, on the right bank of the Vaal. He would there be in a position most difficult to attack, and yet his presence there on the flank of any British advance either to the north or to the east would make it impossible to neglect him. His decision has been taken before now, or this opinion would have been suppressed out of deference to the anxiety of those who imagine that strategical advice is telegraphed from London to the Boer headquarters.

Of the effect of the new move upon the general course of the war it would be premature to enlarge. We must wait and see the close of the first act. The most effective issue of this week's movements would be a battle leading to the thorough defeat, the military destruction, of the Boer army before Kimberley. A less valuable result would be the raising of the siege of Kimberley without fighting, a result which is not to be preferred, because a force that retires before battle has to be fought later on. For this reason the true Boer game is to retreat in time.

It will be interesting to watch the effect of the new campaign upon the ripening resolve of the British Nation to have, its Army set in order.

Upon many minds, and no doubt upon Ministers and their adherents, the impression made by success in the field will be that reform is needless.

The true impression would be that it is as urgent as before, and that the right way to begin is to give authority to the right man, the commander who is now revealing his strength.

CRONJE'S SEDAN

_February 22nd_, 1900

A week ago the news was that Lord Roberts had begun his movement, that he was moving with fifty thousand men against Commandant Cronje, and that General French with the cavalry division had crossed the Modder, the sixth and seventh divisions following him between the Riet and the Modder.

The great object was to strike down Cronje's force before it could receive help, and the design must have been to cut off his retreat to the eastward. On Thursday, the 15th, French marched from the Modder to Alexandersfontein, attacked the rear of the Boer line investing Kimberley, and in the evening entered the town. He had left the sixth division at the drifts of the Modder. This movement of French's appeared to imply that Cronje's army was known to be retreating to the west or north-west, and that French took the road through Kimberley as the shortest way to reach a position where that retreat could be intercepted. It could hardly be imagined that the move was made for the sake of Kimberley, of which the relief was a.s.sured whether Cronje stood to fight or retreated in any direction. The essential thing was to find where Cronje's force was--if it was at Magersfontein to surround it or drive it to the west; if elsewhere to delay it with the cavalry and pursue it with the infantry. But Cronje was not found. When French was in Kimberley, Cronje, retreating eastwards, pa.s.sed through the fifteen miles gap between the town and Kelly-Kenny. Kelly-Kenny on Friday discovered this and set off in pursuit while French was following a Boer force retreating northwards, probably part of the force that had invested Kimberley. Kelly-Kenny sh.e.l.led the Boer laager and captured a number of waggons, but the Boers retreated eastwards along the north bank of the Modder with Kelly-Kenny at their heels. To a.s.sist Kelly-Kenny French was recalled from the north, and Macdonald with the Highland Brigade pushed out by a forced march from Jacobsdal. Accounts differ as to the site of the fighting, but there was a three days'

running fight, during which Cronje may have crossed the Modder and approached Paardeberg or may have been stopped on the north bank. The Boer reports, which imply at least that Cronje was hard pressed, were sent off before the finish, and the first British official reports, consisting only in a list of officers killed and wounded, show that each of the three infantry brigades had hard fighting with considerable losses.

Of eight infantry brigades with which Lord Roberts began his movement three were engaged against Cronje; one has probably been sent to Kimberley, with which town railway communication has been re-opened, so that it will be soon an advanced base for the Army. Lord Roberts, therefore, who was at Paardeberg on Monday evening, may have had with him four brigades or two divisions, representing twenty thousand men, besides the three brigades engaged, which represented before the battle something like fifteen thousand.

Of French and the cavalry division there is no report. The Boers publish a telegram from Commandant de Wet, who seems to have brought up reinforcements while Cronje's action was in progress on Sunday.

The Boer commander evidently counted on reinforcements from all quarters; a party from Colesberg cut off a British waggon train at the Riet on or about Friday, the 16th, and reinforcements from Natal arrived during Cronje's action. Lord Roberts has thus drawn the Boers away from the circ.u.mference towards the centre. He has lightened the tasks of Buller, Clements, Gatacre, and Brabant, but has thereby brought the chief load on to his own shoulders. It seems a misfortune that Cronje was able to escape eastwards from Magersfontein, though it would be wrong until full knowledge of what took place is obtained to a.s.sume that this could have been avoided.

Cronje, however, has not been able to make good his escape. A Renter's telegram from Paardeberg dated. Tuesday explicitly states that Cronje's force was enclosed and remained enclosed. Lord Roberts on Tuesday reported that after examination of the enemy's position by reconnaissance in force, he decided to avoid the heavy loss involved in an a.s.sault, but to bombard the enemy and to turn his attention to the approaching reinforcements. The result was that the reinforcements were driven off and dispersed with heavy loss to them and trifling loss to the British. This seems to have been effected on Tuesday. Boer prisoners reported that they have come from Ladysmith, and the commander of the reinforcements is said to have been Commandant Botha, who was last heard of at Spion Kop. On Tuesday also the sh.e.l.ling of Cronje's position is said to have induced him to ask for an armistice, which must be a.s.sumed to be the prelude to a surrender; at any rate the request would hardly be granted except to settle the terms of a capitulation or to enable the Boer general to be told that unconditional surrender was the only alternative to a continuance of the bombardment.

The advance into the Free State implied that Lord Roberts meant to take the benefit of acting on "interior lines," that is, in plain English, of getting in between his enemies and striking them in turn before they can unite or combine. This plan required him with his main body to attack the enemy's reinforcements in detail as they came up. In that way he secured time for the completion of the action against Cronje, and upon its favourable issue he will be master of the situation.

In Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts.

The two Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or fall together. Either the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike at Lord Roberts, in which case he must move the bulk of his force into the Free State, or he hopes to be in time to resist Lord Roberts after making an end of Sir George White. In the former case he must raise the siege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry it on without a strong covering force to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then there will be forty thousand British troops in Natal, whose advance will be almost as dangerous as that of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be little chance of a successful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance northwards from Bloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the Boer army.

The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been taken.

Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of his divisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guard looks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficial telegram, describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held by the Boers to cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is again trying to lead his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Each case has its favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege the forces of Buller and White will in a few days be united, and need only good leading to force the pa.s.ses and invade either the Free State or the Transvaal. If the Boers are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, they cannot effectively check the advance of Lord Roberts.

While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces in order. The Militia should be formed into divisions for the field and be s.h.i.+pped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought home as soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers could soon be formed into an army if the War Office would carry out the measures which have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers.

The first step is to give the officers the authority which has. .h.i.therto been withheld from them, so that by its exercise they may form their characters; the second to give them the best instruction and encouragements to learn; the third to find them ground for ranges, for field firing and for manoeuvres. A minister of war who combined knowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious purpose would be able in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with the right ideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to transform them into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure the four months that are needed.

THE BOER DEFEATS

_March 1st_, 1900

February has made up for the blunders of August and September, and retrieved the disasters of October, November, and December.

On Tuesday the 27th, Commandant Cronje with four thousand men, the remains of his army, surrendered to Lord Roberts at Paardeberg; the same day, Sir Redvers Duller attacked and carried the Boer position near Pieters, in front of Ladysmith, and on Wednesday the 28th, Lord Dundonald with two mounted regiments, entered Ladysmith.

The fighting in the Free State and in Natal has been simultaneous, and it may be worth while briefly to review the two campaigns. Lord Roberts set out from Modder River on Monday the 12th. On that day began the march of his force to the attack of Cronje. French with the cavalry seized Dekiel's Drift on the Riet and was followed by two infantry divisions. Next day, Tuesday the 13th, French was holding the drifts of the Modder, and on Thursday morning the sixth division was at Klip Drift. Thereupon French pushed on with his cavalry to Kimberley. The same night Cronje marched off between Kimberley and Klip Drift, making eastwards along the north bank of the Modder, which he was to cross near Paardeberg. But his march was discovered. He was followed and attacked on Friday the 10th by the advance guard of the sixth division, which detained him at the crossing of the river. The Highland Brigade made a forced march to intercept him on the south bank, and between Friday and Sunday, the 16th and 18th, he was surrounded and driven back into a position formed by the river banks. Here, from the 17th to the 27th, he held out against a bombardment, while the British forces, pus.h.i.+ng their trenches gradually nearer, were preparing for an a.s.sault. Lord Roberts had brought up the bulk of his force, and parried with ease the attacks of two or three parties of Boers who came up in succession to Cronje's a.s.sistance; some of them having been sent for the purpose from Northern Natal. On Tuesday, February 27th, the anniversary of Majuba, Cronje surrendered.

The effects of this campaign against Cronje were felt at once in various parts of the theatre of war. The advance of Lord Roberts and the retreat of Cronje carried with them the relief of Kimberley. It drew away the Boers from the Colesberg district, so that on the 26th General Clements was able to enter Colesberg, which had been evacuated, and on the 27th, to move his troops forward from Arundel to Rensburg.

Lord Roberts had arranged for other action simultaneous with his own. On Friday, the 16th, General Brabant with his Cape Mounted Division attacked the Boers near Dordrecht and defeated them. A week later he was in Jamestown, the Boers were retreating towards the Orange River, and the rebels in Barkly East were asking for terms, receiving the answer that there were no terms but unconditional surrender.

On Wednesday the 14th, while French was leading the advance from Dekiel's Drift to the Modder, Sir Redvers Buller took Hussar Hill, north-east of Chieveley. Four days later, on Sunday the 18th, he fought a considerable battle at Monte Cristo, a point of the Inhlawe range, the capture of which turned Hlangwane Hill and led to its capture next day, Monday the 19th. On Tuesday the 20th, Buller's advance guard crossed the Tugela near Colenso. On Wednesday the 21st, the river was bridged, and three brigades crossed to the north bank. The fighting then became continuous. On Friday there was a determined attack by the Irish brigade upon a Boer position west of the railway near Pieters. The a.s.sault failed and the troops suffered heavily, but the British force maintained the general line of front which it had gained. On Monday the 26th, a fresh bridge was thrown across the Tugela, a mile or two east of the railway line, and on Tuesday the 27th, Pieters Hill, east of Pieters Station, in the prolongation of the Boer front, was stormed by General Barton, whereupon the whole British force renewed the attack in front upon the Boer positions west of the railway and carried them, dispersing the enemy. It now seems that this was the decisive attack, for the next evening, Wednesday the 28th, Dundonald with two mounted regiments was in Ladysmith, and to-day Sir Redvers Buller with his Army Corps moved forwards towards Nelthorpe, the last railway station before Ladysmith.

On Wednesday morning Sir Redvers Buller reported a considerable force of the enemy still on and under Bulwana Mountain, to the east of Ladysmith.

His task and that of his Army Corps is to inflict what damage he can upon that force of the enemy, taking from Sir George White whatever a.s.sistance that officer and his troops can give, and leaving to the auxiliary services the work of attending to the sick and wounded in Ladysmith and the provisioning of the troops and the town. A part of Sir George White's force is, no doubt, still fit for action so soon as its supply of cartridges can be renewed. The most effective plan would probably be to leave a strong rearguard at Nelthorpe, and to push on with the main body and the bulk of the artillery through Ladysmith to the a.s.sault of one of the Boer positions on the north side of the town.

This would compel the Boers to abandon Bulwana, perhaps to leave behind their heavy guns; would, if successful, prevent their retreat by the direct road into the Free State, and might greatly embarra.s.s or, at least, hara.s.s their retreat through the Biggarsberg.

The defeat of the Boer army in Natal and the relief of Ladysmith is a great blow to the Boer cause. It frustrates the hopes of the Boers for the one great success on which they were to some extent justified in counting, and makes an end of their plan of campaign.

A few days will be needed to repair the railway from the Tugela to Ladysmith, and to build a temporary railway bridge at Colenso. By that time the force of Sir George White and Sir Redvers Buller will be rested, refreshed, and reorganised, forming an army of from thirty-five thousand to forty thousand men. In the Free State Lord Roberts has probably forty-five thousand. The collapse of the Boer invasion of Cape Colony points to the early reopening of the railways from Naauwpoort and Sterkstrom to Norval's Pont and Bethulie, the repair of the railway bridges over the Orange River, and the concentration at Bloemfontein of sixty thousand men, with the railway from the Orange River working and guarded behind them, possibly with a new line of railway from Modder River or Kimberley to Bloemfontein as an additional resource. The advance of Lord Roberts with sixty thousand men to the Vaal River must open to Sir Redvers Buller the pa.s.ses of the Drakensberg range from Van Reenen's to Lang's Nek, and between the two forces the Boer army must be crushed. The Boers may abandon the attempt at resistance by battle, and may confine themselves to the defence of Pretoria, to raids on the British communications, and to the various devices of irregular warfare.

But the British forces will shortly have at their disposal as many mounted men as the Boers, so that even irregular warfare can but lead to their destruction in detail.

The only hope for the Boer cause now rests upon the intervention of other Powers, and the crucial moment for the British Government is at hand. That the Nation is resolved to brook no intervention is absolutely certain, and that it is ready to make great sacrifices and great efforts to resist any attempt at intervention seems equally beyond doubt. Has the Government appreciated either the needs of the situation or the temper of the Nation? Intervention if offered will be proposed suddenly, and foreign action, if it is contemplated at all, will follow upon the heels of the rejection of the proposals. If, then, fleets have still to be completed for sea, plans of campaign to be matured and adopted, and a Volunteer Army to be improvised, the great war will find us as unready and as much surprised as did the supposed small war five months ago.

The measures required are, first of all, to settle the distribution of fleets for all eventualities, to commission every s.h.i.+p in the navy and to have all the fleets ready in their intended stations, so that only an order by cable may be needed to set them to work; secondly, to have all the coast defences manned and ready thirdly, to have the volunteer brigades encamped in the defensive positions round London, for which they are destined; and, lastly, but not least, to have the rest of the forces at home encamped near great railway centres as field divisions of regulars, field divisions of militia, and field divisions of volunteers, with ammunition, transport and supplies attached to them. If these measures had already been carried out there would be no intervention. If they are now carried out without loss of time, intervention may be prevented. If they are much longer postponed intervention becomes probable; the great war may be expected, and no man can foretell whether the British Empire, if again taken by surprise and unready, can weather the storm.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER

_March 8th_, 1900

Lord Roberts yesterday defeated the Boers near Poplar's Drift. In order to measure the importance of the event it may be well to begin by a rough general survey of the condition of affairs.

There have long been signs that the Boer Power was subjected to a very great strain by the effort made to hold, against ever-increasing British forces, a number of points upon the circ.u.mference of a very large area.

The Boers were attacking Mafeking and Kimberley, and covering their action at both points by forces intended to delay the relieving columns.

They were also endeavouring to support rebellion throughout a great tract of country in the Cape Colony, extending from Prieska on the west to the Basuto border on the east, and covering the rebels by parties posted to resist the advance of Gatacre and French along the railways from the south coast to the Orange River. These two groups of enterprises were but the subordinate features of a campaign in which the princ.i.p.al undertaking was the reduction of Ladysmith, which involved a prolonged and stubborn resistance to the repeated a.s.saults of Sir Redvers Buller.

Thus the Boer Governments, or their commander-in-chief, set out at the beginning to do many things at the same time. There were few British troops in the country, and there was the possibility of great success, at least in the shape of the occupation of territory, before the British forces could be a.s.sembled. But shortly after the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller's Army Corps it began to be evident that the Boer forces were balanced by the British. There was a pause in the movements. The British made little headway and the Boers none. Yet, as both sides were doing their best, it was clear that the Boers required the utmost exertion of all their energies to maintain the equilibrium. This condition may be said to have lasted from about the middle of December to the middle of February. During those two months, however, while the Boers were at full tension, the British were gathering new forces behind their front line, which itself was all the time receiving gradual accessions of strength.

When Lord Roberts with fifty thousand men burst through the Boer cordon and destroyed the force with which Cronje had been covering the siege of Kimberley, the Boers had no reserve of force with which to fill up the gap. Every man sent to Cronje's a.s.sistance had to be taken from some other post where he was sorely needed. The detachments sent from Natal into the Free State left the Natal Army, already wearied by its long unsuccessful siege of Ladysmith, and by Buller's persistent attacks, too weak to continue at once the siege and the resistance to Buller. But the two tasks were inseparable, and when Buller renewed his attack and drove the Boers from their posts south of the Tugela, the Boer army of Natal found itself able to cover its retreat only by a last desperate rearguard action at Pieters.

Defeat in the Free State and collapse in Natal were accompanied by the abandonment of the effort to support the rebellion in Cape Colony.

This general breakdown following upon prolonged over-exertion, and accompanied in the two princ.i.p.al regions by complete defeat, must have had its effects on the spirits of the troops. Hope must be gone and despair at hand, and the consequent diminution of power is sure to be considerable. There is no sign as yet of any strong leaders.h.i.+p such as could to some extent restore the fortunes of the Boer army. The retreat beyond the Orange River has been gradual; the siege of Mafeking has not been abandoned, and there is no sign of a determined concentration of forces to oppose Lord Roberts.