Why We Are At War Part 14

[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Amba.s.sadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmans.h.i.+p. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, partic.i.p.ate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows:

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to partic.i.p.ate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.

"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia".

On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:

"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not a.s.sume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.

"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures. .h.i.therto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves."

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening att.i.tude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]

Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed and c.u.mulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization.

Acc.u.mulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St.

Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser:

"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of G.o.d, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

"Your cordially devoted

"Nicolas."

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:

"Upon Your appeal to my friends.h.i.+p and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.

The friends.h.i.+p for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing.

Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]

After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]

At the same time the Imperial Amba.s.sador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M.

Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.

With the aid of G.o.d it must be possible to our long tried friends.h.i.+p to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.

Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Amba.s.sador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circ.u.mstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]

The German Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.