The Evidence in the Case Part 11

The evidence of the _Yellow Book_ is fuller in scope and greater in detail than the other governmental publications, and while largely c.u.mulative in its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light certain phases of this extraordinary controversy.

It has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was the French Amba.s.sador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de Margerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 doc.u.ments, cla.s.sified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods of time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.

The French _Yellow Book_ confirms the impression that France was most fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a diplomat as M. Jules Cambon.

Throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply impressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany are themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in its incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to isolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him as effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated this war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.

In the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due to the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--_une pet.i.te gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide_, as Bismarck once described them--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly or unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany, consolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them simultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not wise statecraft. The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset these blundering disciples of Machiavelli.

Russia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their representatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual distinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in various capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Was.h.i.+ngton, already knew, what the doc.u.ments in the French _Yellow Book_ so clearly reveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability.

With acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful events, in which he was a partic.i.p.ant. To his calm and well-poised intellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.

On more than one occasion he spoke "in the name of humanity," and in his constant attempt to convince the German Foreign Office as to its clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world, he became the representative, not merely of France, but of civilization itself.

In this great diplomatic controversy, one of the greatest in the history of the world, the three representatives, who stand out with the greatest intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, Grey, and Cambon.

The first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very outset the real purposes of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the diplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia apparently the aggressor.

Sir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in the absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on the one hand with the efforts of Russia and France to align England on their side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the other, to continue friendly negotiations with Germany and Austria, without in any respect unfairly misleading them as to England's possible ultimate action.

The French Amba.s.sador will justly receive the approval of posterity for the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon the German Foreign Office the inevitable consequences of its acts.

The first chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ consists largely of communications written from Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year 1913. Its most interesting doc.u.ment is his report from Berlin under date November 22, 1913, as to a conversation between the Kaiser and the King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the pacific att.i.tude, which Cambon had previously imputed to the Kaiser.

To the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the source of the information had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules Cambon, however, will have a reasonable confidence that when he states that he received the record of this conversation "from an absolutely sure source," more than usual credence can be given to the statement.

Reading between the lines, the implication is not unreasonable that the source of Cambon's authority was King Albert himself, but this rests only on a plausible conjecture.

The fact that so trained an observer as the French Amba.s.sador had seen in the Kaiser a marked change as early as 1913 is significant, and history may justify Cambon in his shrewd conjecture that "the impatience of the soldiers," meaning thereby the German General Staff, and the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, the Crown Prince, had appreciably modified the pacific att.i.tude of the Kaiser, which had served the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. Cambon's recital of the incident in question, written on November 22, 1913, justifies quotation _in extenso_.

I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago--a conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created, which corresponds with that made on me some time ago.

Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did everybody, that William II., whose personal influence has been exerted in many critical circ.u.mstances in favor of the maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind.

This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes in the crus.h.i.+ng superiority of the German army and in its a.s.sured success.

General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of success. "For," said he to the King, "this time we must put an end to it" (_cette fois il faut en finir_), "and your Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which on that day will carry away the whole German people."

The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the intentions of the French Government in this manner was to travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.

The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less persisted in their point of view.

During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings of the Court, and, above all, _the impatience of the soldiers_, are gaining more ascendency over his mind.

Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the pa.s.sions of the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last increase in the German army, the object of which was to place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King of the Belgians, and _to lead him not to resist in case a conflict with us should arise_[37]....

[Footnote 37: French _Yellow Book_, No. 6.]

This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.

Germany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the Kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his somewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a war, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose policy. Until that time he had been quite content to _play_ the part of Caesar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire to _be_ a Caesar. To describe himself metaphorically as "clad in s.h.i.+ning armor" and to shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose.

"And so he played his part." As long as the world was content to take this imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial _impresario_ found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus on the boards of the Berlin Theater.

The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning of a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the torch to civilization itself.

Prior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too recent to be ignored.

In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to a.s.sent to all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally, presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases, and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.

The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who had expected a more warlike att.i.tude from the knight "clad in s.h.i.+ning armor," and the expression "William the Peaceful" was bandied about with increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose pa.s.sions the Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely from the pedestal of popularity--was a.s.siduously fanning.

While the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer believes that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance and gave his consent to the policy of that _coup_ in the hope that it would somewhat restore his diminished prestige. He probably followed this policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as it had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any reasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate interests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.

Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had determined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and the German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately shutting the door upon any possibility of peace.

To withdraw under these circ.u.mstances from an untenable position meant a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A Was.h.i.+ngton would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a Was.h.i.+ngton.

Another most illuminating feature of this chapter of the _Yellow Book_ is a report from the French Emba.s.sy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on the public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, as disclosed by the reports of the French consular representatives in Germany. It gives an extraordinary a.n.a.lysis of conditions in Germany prior to the war, and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were contributory to the creation of a powerful war party in Germany. As it is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, it is not embodied in the text of this book, but its value as an acute a.n.a.lysis of conditions in Germany--made before the pa.s.sions of the war had clouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration.

The second chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ deals with the events which took place between the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian ultimatum and presents new and c.u.mulative evidence of substantial value.

The French Consul General at Budapest, in a report to his Foreign Office under date July 11, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, had refused to disclose, even to the Hungarian Chamber, the results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo murder and the decision taken by the Austrian Cabinet, proceeds to show how the suppression of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme to make the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would be open to Servia and Europe other than an immediate and unconditional surrender.

Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the ma.s.s of the public believes in war and fears it.... The Government, whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be _preparing a coup_, is now doing everything it can to allay this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo.

The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception, have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never been quoted since the first issue.[38]

[Footnote 38: French _Yellow Book_, No. 11.]

Simultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the military party in Vienna. The _Militarische Rundschau_, a few days before the ultimatum to Servia, said:

"The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three years at the latest will be begun in circ.u.mstances much less propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.

_Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us provoke it at once._"[39]

[Footnote 39: _Ibid._, No. 12.]

Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some preliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the latter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample reparation "provided that she did not demand judiciary cooperation,"

and the Servian Minister at Berlin warned "the German Government that it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (_i.e._, by the partic.i.p.ation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage the prestige of Servia."[40]

[Footnote 40: French _Yellow Book_, No. 15.]

It thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were included it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate this war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by the fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would not be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and finally became the princ.i.p.al outstanding difference after Servia had accepted substantially all the other demands of Austria. This was reported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum was issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one demand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept.

In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had already issued the "preliminary warning of mobilization, which places Germany in a sort of _garde-a-vous_ during periods of tension."[41]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._, No. 15.]

A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French Minister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it reached any capital except Berlin and Belgrade. He writes:

The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity positive pessimism.

_The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the present situation appeared to him none the less to be very grave._[42]

[Footnote 42: French _Yellow Book_, No. 21.]