The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha Part 30

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,

"The wise have called grammar the first _a?ga_ of the Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the wors.h.i.+pful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Varttika], "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and a.s.surance."[319]

Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Katyayana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the _sastra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."

Thus (they say)--

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;

"But those who use such false forms as _achikramata_ must trudge thither on foot."[320]

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"

since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great G.o.d.

For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great G.o.d enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"

mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, _la?_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"

(_v?ishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varsha?a_), _i.e._, from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"

_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the great G.o.d enters mortals,"--the "great G.o.d," _i.e._, speech,--enters mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, called _spho?a_, without parts, and the cause of the world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhart?ihari in the part of his book called the Brahmaka??a--

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,

"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakir?aka--

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

Helaraja interprets the fivefold division as including _karmapravachaniyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaniyas_ distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (_upasargas_).[324]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called _spho?a_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _spho?a_, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a _spho?a_ by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _spho?a_ is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphu?yate_) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called _spho?a_, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called _spho?a_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the wors.h.i.+pful Patanjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word '_cow_' _gau?_? It is that word by which, when p.r.o.nounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiya?a in the pa.s.sage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in p.r.o.nouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The _Vakyapadiya_ has established at length that it is the _spho?a_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the _spho?a_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _spho?a_ is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that _spho?a_ conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _spho?a_." This has been said by Bha??a in his Mima?sa-sloka-varttika--

"The grammarian who holds that _spho?a_ is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Pa?ini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sut. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional a.s.sociation of ideas which they help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _dina_ as in _nadi_, in _mara_ as in _rama_, in _raja_ as in _jara_, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautat.i.ta--

"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called _spho?a_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]

could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately p.r.o.nounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pa.s.s away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"

power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of _spho?a_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called _spho?a_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible _spho?a_, and each successive letter makes this _spho?a_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repet.i.tion; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repet.i.tion, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhart?ihari has shown in his first book that the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to a.s.sume the existence[330] of an indivisible _spho?a_ as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahabhashya) on "genus"

(_jati_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]

(Brahman).

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonis.h.i.+ng result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony--

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.

This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Pa?ini v. 1, 119).

"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and _asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (_pratipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses _bhava_;[333] now, as _bhava_ is "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriya_); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line--

"Others say that action (_kriya_) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Pa?ini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (_bhava_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _ta_ [as _asvatva_ and _asvata_] are used in the sense of _bhava_, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in s.p.a.ce, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."

Such is the meaning of Hari's two _karikas_ quoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."[336]

So, too, the author of the Mahabhashya, when explaining the Varttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"

in the pa.s.sage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vaj.a.pyayana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"

we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pa?hati_, "he reads," &c., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

In the doctrine of Vya?i, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not cla.s.ses or genera], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pa?ini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular is used to express the cla.s.s the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Brahman is to be honoured,"

which may equally run, "Brahmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Rama and Rama, and the plural means Rama, and Rama and Rama; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all a.s.semblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.

Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said--

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, s.h.i.+nes out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the nature of this true meaning--

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says--

"_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they call the Supreme Nature."