From Isolation to Leadership, Revised Part 7

Number 8, declaring that the Reparations Commission should not be understood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany or from Germany to the United States without an act or joint resolution of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 54 to 40.

Number 9, declaring that the United States should not be under any obligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the League without an act of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 10, providing that if the United States should at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war," was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 11, reserving the right of the United States to permit the nationals of a Covenant-breaking State residing within the United States to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 41.

Number 12, relating to the very complicated question of private debts, property rights and interests of American citizens, was adopted by a vote of 52 to 41.

Number 13, withholding the a.s.sent of the United States from the entire section of the treaty relating to international labor organization until Congress should decide to partic.i.p.ate, was adopted by a vote of 54 to 35.

Number 14 declared that the United States would not be bound by any action of the Council or a.s.sembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregate more than one vote. This reservation was adopted by a vote of 55 to 38.

A number of other reservations were offered and rejected. Under the rules of the Senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may be adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by a two-thirds vote. A number of senators who were opposed to the treaty voted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat. When the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken November 19, it stood 39 for and 55 against. A motion to reconsider the vote was then adopted, and Senator Hitchc.o.c.k, the Democratic leader, proposed five reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, the Monroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the employment of the naval and military forces of the United States in any case arising under Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers of self-governing colonies or dominions. These reservations were rejected, the vote being 41 to 50. Another vote was then taken on the treaty with the Lodge reservations, the result being 41 for and 51 against. Senator Underwood then offered a resolution to ratify the treaty without reservations of any kind. The vote on this resolution was 38 for and 53 against.

It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the ratification of the treaty without compromise. On January 8, 1920, a letter from the President was read at the Jackson Day dinner in Was.h.i.+ngton, in which he refused to accept the decision of the Senate as final and said: "There can be no reasonable objection to interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But when the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we have ratified or rejected it. We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then, after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany." In conclusion he declared: "If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate."

During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by an informal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter saying he would accept the Hitchc.o.c.k reservations, but Lodge refused to accept any compromise. On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back immediately with the reservations previously adopted. After several weeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy for Ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of 38 to 36. It was as follows: "In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is obtained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations."

With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally put to the vote March 19, 1920. The result was 49 votes for and 35 against. On the following day the secretary of the Senate was instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the President and to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it.

The treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign, but unfortunately it was not the only issue. The election proved to be a referendum on the Wilson administration as a whole rather than on the treaty. The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, attacked the Wilson administration for its arbitrary and unconst.i.tutional methods and advocated a return to "normalcy." He denounced the Wilson League as an attempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored an a.s.sociation of nations and an international court. Governor c.o.x, the Democratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularly during the latter part of his campaign. The result was an overwhelming victory for Harding. President Wilson had been too ill to take any part in the campaign. His administration had been the chief issue, and the people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it. He accepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments, content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairs to the verdict of history. In December, 1920, the n.o.bel Peace Prize was awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he had rendered to humanity.

XII

THE WAs.h.i.+NGTON CONFERENCE

After the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate, President Wilson withdrew as far as possible from partic.i.p.ation in European affairs, and after the election of Harding he let it be known that he would do nothing to embarra.s.s the incoming administration. The public had been led to believe that when Harding became President there would be a complete reversal of our foreign policy all along the line, but such was not to be the case. The new administration continued unchanged the Wilson policy toward Mexico and toward Russia, and before many months had pa.s.sed was seeking from Congress the authority, withheld from Wilson, to appoint a member on the Reparations Commission. On the question of our rights in mandated areas, Secretary Hughes adopted in whole the arguments which had been advanced by Secretary Colby in his note to Great Britain of November 20, 1920, in regard to the oil resources of Mesopotamia. By the San Remo agreement of April 25, 1920, Great Britain and France had agreed upon a division of the oil output of Mesopotamia by which France was to be allowed 25 per cent. and Great Britain 75 per cent. The British Government had intimated that the United States, having declined to join the League of Nations, had no voice in the matter. On this point Secretary Colby took sharp issue in the following statement: "Such powers as the Allied and a.s.sociated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers. The United States, as a partic.i.p.ant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful issue, cannot consider any of the a.s.sociated Powers, the smallest not less than herself, debarred from the discussion of any of its consequences, or from partic.i.p.ation in the rights and privileges secured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace."

j.a.pan likewise a.s.sumed that we had nothing to do with the disposition of the former German islands in the Pacific. When the Supreme Council at Paris decided to give j.a.pan a mandate over the islands north of the equator, President Wilson reserved for future consideration the final disposition of the island of Yap, which lies between Guam and the Philippines, and is one of the most important cable stations in the Pacific. The entire question of cable communications was reserved for a special conference which met at Was.h.i.+ngton in the autumn of 1920, but this conference adjourned about the middle of December without having reached any final conclusions, and the status of Yap became the subject of a very sharp correspondence between the American and j.a.panese governments. When Hughes became Secretary of State, he restated the American position in a note of April 2, 1921, as follows:

"It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the Allied and a.s.sociated Powers, and it is also believed that there is no disposition on the part of the j.a.panese Government to deny the partic.i.p.ation of the United States in that victory. It would seem to follow necessarily that the right accruing to the Allied and a.s.sociated Powers through the common victory is shared by the United States and that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the a.s.sent of the United States."

The discussion between the two governments was still in progress when the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference convened, and at the close of the Conference it was announced that an agreement had been reached which would be embodied in a treaty. The United States recognized j.a.pan's mandate over the islands north of the equator on the condition that the United States should have full cable rights on the island of Yap, and that its citizens should enjoy certain rights of residence on the island. The agreement also covered radio telegraphic service.

During the presidential campaign Harding's position on the League of Nations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect, but when Hughes and Hoover were appointed members of the Cabinet, it was generally expected that the new administration would go into the League with reservations. This expectation was not to be fulfilled, however, for the President persistently ignored the existence of the League, and took no notice of the establishment of the permanent Court of International Justice provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant.

Meanwhile Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State had instructed our delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 to propose the establishment of such a court, had been invited by the Council of the League to be one of a commission of distinguished jurists to draft the statute establis.h.i.+ng the court. This service he performed with conspicuous ability. As another evidence of Europe's unwillingness to leave us out, when the court was organized John Ba.s.sett Moore, America's most distinguished authority on international law, was elected one of the judges.

Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and American troops were still on the Rhine. On July 2, 1921, Congress pa.s.sed a joint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to reserve to the United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" to which it was ent.i.tled under the terms of the Armistice, or by reason of its partic.i.p.ation in the war, or which had been stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or to which it was ent.i.tled as one of the Princ.i.p.al Allied and a.s.sociated Powers, or to which it was ent.i.tled by virtue of any act or acts of Congress. On August 25 the United States Government, through its commissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a separate treaty of peace with Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the joint resolution of Congress. About the same time a similar treaty was signed with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senate of the United States October 18. The proclamation of peace produced no immediate results of any importance. American troops continued on the Rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been carried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses.

If mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the events leading up to the World War should have exploded the fallacy that the way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. Compet.i.tion in armament, whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead to nothing else. And yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war, the race for armaments continued with increased momentum. France, Russia, and Poland maintained huge armies, while the United States and j.a.pan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs in the history of the world. Great Britain, burdened with debt, was making every effort to keep pace with the United States.

This naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united in the war against Germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probable outcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming. We had no quarrel with England, but England was the ally of j.a.pan, and relations between j.a.pan and the United States in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia were far from rea.s.suring. The question of the continuance of the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial Conference, which met at London in the early summer of 1921. The original purpose of this compact was to check the Russian advance in Manchuria. It was renewed in revised form in 1905 against Germany, and again renewed in 1911 against Germany for a period of ten years. With the removal of the German menace, what reasons were there for Great Britain to continue the alliance? It bore too much the aspect of a combination against the United States, and was of course the main reason for the naval program which we had adopted. So long as there were only three navies of importance in the world and two of them united in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard our position as a sea power.

One of the main objects of the formation of the League of Nations was to bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and a commission was organized under the League to consider this question, but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation of navies so long as a great naval power like the United States refused to cooperate with the League of Nations or even to recognize its existence. As President Harding had promised the American people some subst.i.tute for the League of Nations, he decided, soon after coming into office, to convene an international conference to consider the limitation of armament on land and sea. By the time the Conference convened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subject of land armament. It was recognized from the first that the mere proposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective steps could be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflict which make navies necessary. Therefore the formal invitation to the Conference extended to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and j.a.pan, August 11, 1921, linked the subject of Limitation of Armament with Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The European powers accepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but j.a.pan's answer was held back for some time. She was reluctant to have the powers review the course she had pursued in China and Siberia while they were at war with Germany. After agreeing to attend the Conference, j.a.pan endeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, and she soon entered into negotiations with China over the Shantung question with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would prevent that question from coming before the Conference. Invitations to the Conference were later sent to the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China. Portugal was interested because of her settlement at Macao, the oldest European settlement in China.

Holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the Pacific.

While Belgium has no territorial interests in the Orient, she has for years been interested in Chinese financial matters.

The Was.h.i.+ngton Conference convened in plenary session November 12, 1921, in Memorial Continental Hall. Seats were reserved on the main floor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved for officials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to secure tickets of admission. The question of open diplomacy which had been much discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes, who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals for the limitation of navies before the Conference. There were in all seven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little more than confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee.

The real work of the Conference was carried on by committees, and from the meetings of these committees the public and press representatives were as a matter of course excluded. There were two princ.i.p.al committees, one on the Limitation of Armament, and the other on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. There were various sub-committees, in the work of which technical delegates partic.i.p.ated. Minutes were kept of the meetings of the two princ.i.p.al committees, and after each meeting a communique was prepared for the press. In fact, the demand for publicity defeated to a large extent its own ends. So much matter was given to the press that when it was published in full very few people had time to read it. As a general rule, the less real information there was to give out, the longer were the communiques. Experienced correspondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions were made with as much secrecy in Was.h.i.+ngton as at Paris.

The plan of the United States for the limitation of armament presented by Secretary Hughes at the first session proposed (1) that all programs for the construction of capital s.h.i.+ps, either actual or projected, be abandoned; (2) that a large number of battles.h.i.+ps of older types still in commission be sc.r.a.pped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliary combatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane carriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital s.h.i.+ps. These proposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under consideration in the same relative positions. Under this plan the United States would be allowed 500,000 tons of capital s.h.i.+ps, Great Britain 500,000 tons, and j.a.pan 300,000 tons.

j.a.pan objected to the 5-5-3 ratio proposed by Secretary Hughes, and urged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength. The American proposal included the sc.r.a.pping of the _Mutsu_, the pride of the j.a.panese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed.

The sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navy were much greater than those which England or j.a.pan were called upon to make, and in this lay the strength of the American position. The j.a.panese refused, however, to give up the _Mutsu_, and they were finally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the 5-5-3 ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the United States and Great Britain. In the treaty as finally agreed upon, j.a.pan was allowed 315,000 tons of capital s.h.i.+ps and the United States and Great Britain each 525,000 tons.

In his address at the opening session, Secretary Hughes said: "In view of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this subject be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference."

This somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gave unexpected offense to the French delegation. During the next four or five weeks, while Great Britain, the United States, and j.a.pan were discussing the case of the _Mutsu_ and the question of fortifications in the Pacific, the French delegates were cheris.h.i.+ng their resentment at being treated as the representatives of a second-cla.s.s power.

Hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation like France undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of that part of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines.

When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the allowance of capital s.h.i.+p tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demand of 350,000 tons of capital s.h.i.+ps. According to Hughes's figures based on existing strength, she was ent.i.tled to 175,000 tons. It is not probable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a large tonnage. It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that France could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order to pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfortunately the French demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and caused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers. In the committee the relations between the British and French delegates became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine tonnage. On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the heads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris.

As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for capital s.h.i.+ps, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the same ratio as France.

Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, the treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial warfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that the capital s.h.i.+p is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface s.h.i.+ps. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital s.h.i.+p as obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their submarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon the building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.

By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, and j.a.pan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and naval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions, notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. This agreement relieves j.a.pan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on the Great Lakes.

The 5-5-3 ratio puts the navies of Great Britain, the United States, and j.a.pan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis.

Each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one of them will be able to attack the home territory of the others. Of course it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines, together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alter the situation. Hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: national defense and the enforcement of foreign policies. The new treaty means that as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be used for defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies in distant quarters of the globe. In other words, when disputes arise, British policies will prevail in the British area, American policies in the American area, and j.a.panese policies in the j.a.panese area. Having agreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attack j.a.pan, the only pressure we can bring to bear upon her in China or elsewhere is moral pressure. Through what was considered by some a grave strategical error, the naval treaty was completed before any settlement of the Chinese and Siberian questions had been reached.

The French insistence on the practically unlimited right to build submarines caused much hard feeling in England. The British delegates had proposed the total abolition of submarines, and this proposal had been ably supported by the arguments of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee.

Unfortunately the United States delegation stood for the submarine, proposing merely certain limits upon its use. The five naval powers finally signed a treaty reaffirming the old rules of international law in regard to the search and seizure of merchant vessels, and declaring that "any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." By the same treaty the signatory powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibit the use in war of poisonous gases.

The attempt to limit by treaty the use of the submarine and to prohibit altogether the use of gases appears to many to be utterly futile.

After the experience of the late war, no nation would readily trust the good faith of another in these matters. Each party to a war would probably feel justified in being prepared to use the submarine and poison gases, contrary to law, in case the other party should do so.

We would thus have the same old dispute as in the late war in regard to floating mines as to which party first resorted to the outlawed practice. What is the use in solemnly declaring that a submarine shall not attack a merchant vessel, and that the commander of a submarine who violates this law shall be treated as a pirate, when the contracting parties found it utterly impossible to agree among themselves upon a definition of a merchant vessel?

But the reader may ask, what is the use in signing any treaty if nations are so devoid of good faith? The answer is that the vast majority of treaties are faithfully kept in time of peace, but that very few treaties are fully observed in time of war. Had these five powers signed a treaty pledging themselves not to build or maintain submarines of any kind or description, we would have every reason to expect them to live up to it. But when a nation is engaged in war and has a large flotilla of submarines which it has agreed to use only for certain purposes, there is apt to come a time when the temptation to use them for wholly different purposes will be overwhelming.

The Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions held its first meeting November 16. This committee was primarily concerned with the very delicate situation created by the aggressive action and expansion of j.a.pan during the past twenty years. In 1905, by the Treaty of Portsmouth, j.a.pan succeeded to the Russian rights in southern Manchuria; in 1910 she annexed Korea; in 1911, during the Chinese Revolution, she stationed troops at Hankow and later constructed permanent barracks; in 1914, after the defeat of the Germans at Kiao-chau, she took over all the German interests in the Shantung peninsula; in 1915 she presented the Twenty-one Demands to China and coerced that power into granting most of them; and in 1918, in conjunction with the United States, Great Britain, and France, she landed a military force in the Maritime Province of Siberia for the definite purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops who had made their way to that province and of guarding the military stores at Vladivostok. The other powers had all withdrawn their contingents, but j.a.pan had increased her force from one division to more than 70,000 troops. The eastern coast of Asia was thus in the firm grip of j.a.pan, and she had secured concessions from China which seriously impaired the independence of that country.

It was commonly supposed that the United States delegation had prepared a program on the Far Eastern question, and that this would be presented in the same way that Hughes had presented the naval program. If this was the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for between one and two o'clock at night the Chinese delegates were aroused from their slumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for them to present China's case before the committee at eleven o'clock that morning. They at once went to work with their advisers, and a few minutes before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of the Ten Points, which Minister Sze read before the committee. These Points const.i.tuted a Chinese declaration of independence, and set forth a series of general principles to be applied in the determination of questions relating to China. Several days later the committee adopted four resolutions, presented by Mr. Root, covering in part some of the Chinese principles. By these resolutions the powers agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, to give China the fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable government, to recognize the principle of equality for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China, and to refrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges. This somewhat vague and general declaration of principles appeared to be all that China was likely to get. Had Mr. Hughes presented a Far Eastern program and gotten nothing more than this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige of the United States. That is probably why he decided at the last moment to let China present her own case.

At the fourth plenary session of the Conference the treaty relating to the Pacific islands, generally known as the Four-Power Treaty, was presented by Senator Lodge. By the terms of this treaty, the United States, Great Britain, France, and j.a.pan agreed "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean," and in case of any dispute arising out of any Pacific question to refer the matter to a joint conference for consideration and adjustment. This article appeared harmless enough, but Article 2 seemed to lay the foundations of an alliance between these powers. It was as follows: "If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." This treaty is to remain in force for ten years, after which it may be terminated by any of the High Contracting Parties on twelve months' notice. It supersedes the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance which, it expressly provided, should terminate on the exchange of ratifications.

In presenting the treaty, Senator Lodge a.s.sured his hearers that "no military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under cover of these plain and direct clauses," and Secretary Hughes in closing the discussion declared that it would probably not be possible to find in all history "an international doc.u.ment couched in more simple or even briefer terms," but he added, "we are again reminded that the great things are the simple ones." In view of these statements the members of the Conference and the public generally were completely flabbergasted some days later when Secretary Hughes and the President gave out contradictory statements as to whether the treaty included the j.a.panese homeland. Hughes stated to the correspondents that it did, the President said it did not. Whereupon some wag remarked that at Paris President Wilson did not let the American delegation know what he did, while at Was.h.i.+ngton the delegates did not let President Harding know what they were doing. In deference to the President's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the j.a.panese press a supplementary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" did not include the j.a.panese homeland.

Meanwhile the Shantung question was being discussed by China and j.a.pan outside of the Conference, but with representatives of the British and American governments sitting as observers ready to use their good offices if called on. The reason for not bringing the question before the Conference was that Great Britain, France, and Italy were parties to the Treaty of Versailles, which gave j.a.pan a legal t.i.tle to the German leases in Shantung. The restoration of the province to China was vital to a satisfactory adjustment of Chinese affairs generally.

j.a.pan, however, was in no hurry to reach an agreement with China, wis.h.i.+ng for strategical purposes to keep the matter in suspense to the last, if not to avoid a settlement until after the adjournment of the Conference and continue negotiations under more favorable conditions at Peking or Tokio.

By Christmas it seemed that the Conference had accomplished about all that was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreements already reached could be put into treaty form and signed. At the end of the first week in January it looked as if the Chinese and j.a.panese had reached a deadlock, and that the Conference would adjourn without a satisfactory adjustment of any of the Chinese problems. Mr. Balfour and other important delegates had engaged return pa.s.sage, and all indications pointed to an early dissolution of the Conference. But the unexpected happened. At an informal gathering of Administration leaders at the White House on Sat.u.r.day night, January 7, stock was taken of the work of the Conference, and some of the senators present expressed the opinion that if it adjourned without doing more for China, there would be little hope of getting the treaties ratified. As a result Secretary Hughes persuaded the British and j.a.panese delegates to cancel their sailings, and with characteristic energy and determination took personal charge of the Far Eastern situation, which up to this time had been left mainly to Mr. Root. After a little pressure had been brought to bear on the Chinese by President Harding, and probably on the j.a.panese by Mr. Balfour, Secretary Hughes was finally able to announce at the plenary session of February 1 that China and j.a.pan had reached an agreement as to the terms on which Shantung was to be restored. At the same session the agreements in regard to China reached by the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs were announced. These agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, one dealing with the tariff and the other with the open door, and a series of ten resolutions.

Since the middle of the last century Chinese tariffs have been regulated by treaties with foreign powers, the customs service organized and administered by foreigners, and the receipts mortgaged to meet the interest on foreign loans. China has never been permitted to levy duties in excess of 5 per cent., and, in fact, as a result of the methods of valuation the duties have not averaged above 3 1/2 per cent.

This has been an unjust state of affairs, and has deprived the Chinese Government of what would naturally be one of its main sources of revenue. By the new agreement there is to be an immediate revision of tariff valuations so as to make the 5 per cent. effective. China is also to be allowed to levy a surtax on certain articles, mainly luxuries, which will yield an additional revenue. It is estimated that the total annual increase in revenue derived from maritime customs will be about $150,000,000 silver. It is claimed by some, with a certain degree of truth, that any increase in Chinese customs duties will be immediately covered by liens to secure new loans, and that putting money into the Chinese treasury just now is like pouring it into a rat hole. As soon as China is able to establish a stable and honest government, she should, without question, be relieved of all treaty restrictions on her tariffs.

The Conference also took certain steps to restore to China other sovereign rights long impaired by the encroachments of foreign powers.