The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Volume Iii Part 11

I do not think the attack on Transubstantiation the most successful point of the orthodox Protestant controversialists. The question is, what is meant in Scripture, as in 'John' vi. by Christ's body or flesh and blood. Surely not the visible, tangible, accidental body, that is, a cycle of images and sensations in the imagination of the beholders; but his supersensual body, the 'noumenon' of his human nature which was united to his divine nature.

In this sense I understand the Lutheran ubiquity. But may not the "oblations" referred to by Field in the old canon of the Ma.s.s, have meant the alms, offerings always given at the Eucharist? If by "substance" in the enunciation of the article be meant 'id quod vere est', and if the divine nature be the sole 'ens vere ens', then it is possible to give a philosophically intelligible sense to Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation; at least to a doctrine that might bear the same name;--at all events the mystery is not greater than, if it be not rather the same as, the a.s.sumption of the human by the divine nature.

Now for the possible conception of this we must accurately discriminate the 'incompossibile negativum' from the 'incompatibile privativum'. Of the latter are all positive imperfections, as error, vice, and evil pa.s.sions; of the former simple limitation.

Thus if '(per impossible)' human nature could make itself sinless and perfect, it would become or pa.s.s into G.o.d; and if G.o.d should abstract from human nature all imperfection, it might without impropriety be affirmed, even as Scripture doth affirm, that G.o.d a.s.sumed or took up into himself the human nature.

Thus, to use a dim similitude and merely as a faint ill.u.s.tration, all materiality abstracted from a circle, it would become s.p.a.ce, and though not infinite, yet one with infinite s.p.a.ce. The mystery of omnipresence greatly aids this conception; 'totus in omni parte': and in truth this is the divine character of all the Christian mysteries, that they aid each other, and many incomprehensibles render each of them, in a certain qualified sense, less incomprehensible.

Ib. p. 208.

But first, it is impious to think of destroying Christ in any sort.

For though it be true, that in sacrificing of Christ on the altar of the cross, the destroying and killing of him was implied, and this his death was the life of the world, yet all that concurred to the killing of him, as the Jews, the Roman soldiers, Pilate, and Judas sinned d.a.m.nably, and so had done, though they had shed his blood with an intention and desire, that by it the world might be redeemed.

Is not this going too far? Would it not imply almost that Christ himself could not righteously sacrifice himself, especially when we consider that the Romanists would have a right to say, that Christ himself had commanded it? But Bellarmine's conceit [9] is so absurd that it scarce deserves the compliment of a serious confutation. For if sacramental being be opposed to natural or material, as 'noumenon' to 'phaenomenon', place is no attribute or possible accident of it 'in se'; consequently, no alteration of place relatively to us can affect, much less destroy, it; and even were it otherwise, yet translocation is not destruction; for the body of Christ, according to themselves, doth indeed nourish our souls, even as a fish eaten sustains another fish, but yet with this essential difference, that it ceases not to be and remain itself, and instead of being converted converts; so that truly the only things sacrificed in the strict sense are all the evil qualities or deficiencies which divide our souls from Christ.

Ib. p. 218.

That which we do is done in remembrance of that which was then done; for he saith, 'Do this in remembrance of me.'

This is a 'metastasis' of Scripture. 'Do this in remembrance of me', that is, that which Christ was then doing. But Christ was not then suffering, or dying on the cross.

Ib. p.223.

That the Saints do pray for us 'in genere', desiring G.o.d to be merciful to us, and to do unto us whatsoever in any kind he knoweth needful for our good, there is no question made by us.

To have placed this question in its true light, so as to have allowed the full force to the Scriptures a.s.serting the communion of Saints and the efficacy of their intercession without undue concessions to the 'hierolatria' of the Romish church, would have implied an acquaintance with the science of transcendental a.n.a.lysis, and an insight into the philosophy of ideas not to be expected in Field, and which was then only dawning in the mind of Lord Bacon. The proper reply to Brerely would be this: the communion and intercession of Saints is an idea, and must be kept such. But the Romish church has changed it away into the detail of particular and individual conceptions, and imaginations, into names and fancies.

N.B. Instead of the 'Roman Catholic' read throughout in this and all other works, and everywhere and on all occasions, unless where the duties of formal courtesy forbid, say, the 'Romish anti-Catholic Church;' Romish--to mark that the corruptions in discipline, doctrine and practice do for the worst and far larger part owe both their origin and their perpetuation to the court and local tribunals of the city of Rome, and are not and never have been the catholic, that is, universal faith of the Roman empire, or even of the whole Latin or Western church; and anti-Catholic,--because no other Church acts on so narrow and excommunicative a principle, or is characterized by such a jealous spirit of monopoly and particularism, counterfeiting catholicity by a negative totality and heretical self-circ.u.mscription, cutting off, or cutting herself off from, all the other members of Christ's Body.

12th March, 1824.

It is of the utmost importance, wherever clear and distinct conceptions are required, to make out in the first instance whether the term in question, or the main terms of the question in dispute, represents or represent a fact or cla.s.s of facts simply, or some self-established and previously known idea or principle, of which the facts are instances and realizations, or which is introduced in order to explain and account for the facts. Now the term 'merits,' as applied to Abraham and the saints, belongs to the former. It is a mere 'nomen appellativum' of the facts.

Ib. c. 5. p. 252.

The Papists and we agree that original sin is the privation of original righteousness; but they suppose there was in nature without that addition of grace, a power to do good, &c.

Nothing seems wanting to this argument but a previous definition and explanation of the term, 'nature.' Field appears to have seen the truth, namely, that nature itself is a peccant (I had almost said an unnatural) state, or rather no State at all, [Greek: ou stasis all' apostasis].

Ib. c. 6. p. 269.

And surely the words of Augustine do not import that she had no sin, but that she overcame it, which argueth a conflict; neither doth he say he will acknowledge she was without sin, but that he will not move any question touching her, in this dispute of sins and sinners.

Why not say at once, that this anti-Scriptural superst.i.tion had already begun? I scarcely know whether to be pleased or grieved with that edging on toward the Roman creed, that exceeding, almost Scriptural, tenderness for the divines of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, which distinguishes the Church of England dignitaries, from Elizabeth inclusively to our Revolution in 1688, from other Protestants.

Ib. c. 10. p. 279.

Derwent! should this page chance to fall under your eye, for my sake read, f.a.g, subdue, and take up into your proper mind this chapter 10 of Free Will.

Ib. p. 281.

Of these five kinds of liberty, the two first agree only to G.o.d, so that in the highest degree [Greek: to autexousion], that is, freedom of will is proper to G.o.d only; and in this sense Calvin and Luther rightly deny that the will of any creature is or ever was free.

I add, except as in G.o.d, and G.o.d in us. Now the latter alone is will; for it alone is 'ens super ens'. And here lies the mystery, which I dare not openly and promiscuously reveal.

Ib.

Yet doth not G.o.d's working upon the will take from it the power of dissenting, and doing the contrary; but so inclineth it, that having liberty to do otherwise, yet she will actually determine so.

This will not do. Were it true, then my understanding would be free in a mathematical proportion; or the whole position amounts only to this, that the will, though compelled, is still the will. Be it so; yet not a free will. In short, Luther and Calvin are right so far. A creaturely will cannot be free; but the will in a rational creature may cease to be creaturely, and the creature, [Greek: apostasis], finally cease in consequence; and this neither Luther nor Calvin seem to have seen. In short, where omnipotence is on one side, what but utter impotence can remain for the other? To make freedom possible, the 'ant.i.thesis' must be removed. The removal of this 'ant.i.thesis' of the creature to G.o.d is the object of the Redemption, and forms the glorious liberty of the Gospel.

More than this I am not permitted to expose.

Ib. p. 283.

It is not given, nor is it wanting, to all men to have an insight into the mystery of the human will and its mode of inherence on the will which is G.o.d, as the ineffable 'causa sui'; but this chapter will suffice to convince you that the doctrines of Calvin were those of Luther in this point;--that they are intensely metaphysical, and that they are diverse 'toto genere' from the merely moral and psychological-- tenets of the modern Calvinists. Calvin would have exclaimed, 'fire and f.a.gots!' before he had gotten through a hundred pages of Dr. Williams's Modern Calvinism.

Ib. c. 11. p. 296.

Neither can Vega avoid the evidence of the testimonies of the Fathers, and the decree of the Council of Trent, so that he must be forced to confess that no man can so collectively fulfil the law as not to sin, and consequently, that no man can perform that the law requireth.

The paralogism of Vega as to this perplexing question seems to lurk in the position that G.o.d gives a law which it is impossible we should obey collectively. But the truth is, that the law which G.o.d gave, and which from the essential holiness of his nature it is impossible he should not have given, man deprived himself of the ability to obey. And was the law of G.o.d therefore to be annulled? Must the sun cease to s.h.i.+ne because the earth has become a mora.s.s, so that even that very glory of the sun hath become a new cause of its steaming up clouds and vapors that strangle the rays? G.o.d forbid! 'But for the law I had not sinned'. But had I not been sinful the law would not have occasioned me to sin, but would have clothed me with righteousness, by the transmission of its splendour.

'Let G.o.d be just, and every man a liar'.

B. iv. c. 4. p. 346.

The Church of G.o.d is named the 'Pillar of Truth;' not as if truth did depend on the Church, &c.

Field might have strengthened his argument, by mention of the custom of not only affixing records and testimonials to the pillars, but books, &c.

Ib. c. 7. p. 353.

Others therefore, to avoid this absurdity, run into that other before mentioned, that we believe the things that are divine by the mere and absolute command of our will, not finding any sufficient motives and reasons of persuasion.