The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Volume Iv Part 24

But yet I cannot give to faith the meaning he does, though I give it all, and more than all, the power. But if that Name, as power, saved the Jewish Church before they knew the Name, as name, how much more now, if only the will be not guiltily averse? Any miracle does in kind as truly bring G.o.d from heaven as the Incarnation, which the Socinians wholly forget, as in other points. They receive without scruple what they have learned without examination, and then transfer to the first article which they do look into, all the difficulties that belong equally to the former: as the Simonidean doubts concerning G.o.d to the Trinity, and the like.

Ib. p. 27.

The Eclectic Neo-Platonists (Sall.u.s.tius and others,) justified their Polytheism on much the same pretext as is in fact involved in the language of this page; [Greek: pollo men en de mia theotaeti]. This indeed seems to me decisive in favour of Waterland's scheme against this of Sherlock's;--namely, that in the latter we find no sufficient reason why in the nature of things this intermutual consciousness might not be possessed by thirty instead of three. It seems a strange confounding [Greek: heteron geneon] to answer, "True; but the latter only happens to be the fact!"--just as if we were speaking of the number of persons in the Privy Council.

Ib. p. 28.

'Notes'. By keeping this faith 'whole and undefiled', must be meant that a man should believe and profess it without adding to it or taking from it. * * * First, for adding. What if an honest plain man, because he is a Christian and a Protestant, should think it necessary to add this article to the Athanasian Creed;--'I believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be a divine, infallible and complete rule both for faith and manners'. I hope no Protestant would think a man d.a.m.ned for such addition; and if so, then this Creed of Athanasius is at least an unnecessary rule of faith.

'Answer'. That is to say, it is an addition to the Catholic Faith to own the Scriptures to be the rule of faith; as if it were an addition to the laws of England to own the original records of them in the Tower.

This Notary manages his cause most weakly, and Sherlock 'fibs' him like a scientific pugilist. But he himself exposes weak parts, as in p. 27.

The objection to the Athanasian Creed urged by better men than the Notary, yea, by divines not less orthodox than Sherlock himself, is this: not that this Creed adds to the Scriptures, but that it adds to the original 'Symbolum Fidei', the 'Regula', the 'Canon', by which, according to the greater number of the 'ante'-Nicene Fathers, the books of the New Testament were themselves tried and determined to be Scripture. Now this 'Symbolum' was to bring together all that must be believed, even by the babes in faith, or to what purpose was it made?

Now, say they, the Nicene Creed is really nothing more than a verbal explication of the common Creed, but the clause in the Athanasian ('which faith', &c.), however fairly deduced from Scripture, is not contained in the Creed, or selection of certain articles of Faith from the Scriptures, or not at least from those preachings and narrations, of which the New Testament Scriptures are the repository. Might not a Papist plead equally in support of the Creed of Pope Pius: "The new articles are deduced from Scripture; that is, in our opinion, and that most expressly in our Lord's several and solemn addresses to St. Peter."

So again Sherlock's answer to this paragraph from the Notes is evasive,--for it is very possible, nay, it is, and has been the case, that a man may believe in the facts and doctrines contained in the New Testament, and yet not believe the Holy Scripture to be either divine, infallible, or complete.

Sect. IV. p. 50.

We know not what the substance of an infinite mind is, nor how such substances as have no parts or extension can touch each other, or be thus externally united; but we know the unity of a mind or spirit reaches as far as its self-consciousness does, for that is one spirit, which knows and feels itself, and its own thoughts and motions, and if we mean this by 'circ.u.m-incession', three persons thus intimate to each other are numerically one.

The question still returns; have these three infinite minds, at once self-conscious and conscious of each other's consciousness, always the very same thoughts? If so, this mutual consciousness is unmeaning, or derivative; and the three do not cease to be three because they are three sames. If not, then there is Tritheism evidently.

Ib. p. 64.

St. Paul tells us, 1 Cor. ii. 10. 'That the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of G.o.d'. So that the Holy Spirit knows all that is in G.o.d, even his most deep and secret counsels, which is an argument that he is very intimate with him; but this is not all: it is the manner of knowing, which must prove this consciousness of which I speak: and that the Apostle adds in the next verse, that the Spirit of G.o.d knows all that is in G.o.d, just as the spirit of a man knows all that is in man: that is, not by external revelation or communication of this knowledge, but by self-consciousness, by an internal sensation, which is owing to an essential unity. 'For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him; even so the things of G.o.d knoweth no man but the Spirit of G.o.d.'

It would be interesting, if it were feasible, to point out the epoch at which the text mode of arguing in polemic controversy became predominant; I mean by single texts without any modification by the context. I suspect that it commenced, or rather that it first became the fas.h.i.+on, under the Dort or systematic theologians, and during the so called Quinquarticular Controversy. This quotation from St. Paul is a striking instance:--for St. Paul is speaking of the holy spirit of which true spiritual Christians are partakers, and by which or in which those Christians are enabled to search all things, even the deep things of G.o.d. No person is here spoken of, but reference is made to the philosophic principle, that can only act immediately, that is, interpenetratively, as two globules of quicksilver, and co-adunatively.

Now, perceiving and knowing were considered as immediate acts relatively to the objects perceived and known:--'ergo', the 'principium sciendi'

must be one (that is, h.o.m.ogeneous or consubstantial) with the 'principium essendi quoad objectum cognitum'. In order therefore for a man to understand, or even to know of, G.o.d, he must have a G.o.d-like spirit communicated to him, wherewith, as with an inward eye, which is both eye and light, he sees the spiritual truths. Now I have no objection to his calling this spirit a 'person,' if only the term 'person' be so understood as to permit of its being partaken of by all spiritual creatures, as light and the power of vision are partaken of by all seeing ones. But it is too evident that Sherlock supposes the Father, as Father, to possess a spirit, that is, an intellective faculty, by which he knows the Spirit, that is, the third co-equal Person; and that this Spirit, the Person, has a spirit, that is, an intellective faculty, by which he knows the Father; and the 'Logos' in like manner relatively to both. So too, the Father has a 'logos' with which he distinguishes the 'Logos';--and the 'Logos' has a 'logos', and so on: that is to say, there are three several though not severed triune G.o.ds, each being the same position three times 'realiter positum', as three guineas from the same mint, supposing them to differ no more than they appear to us to differ;--but whether a difference wholly and exclusively numerical is a conceivable notion, except under the predicament of s.p.a.ce and time; whether it be not absurd to affirm it, where inters.p.a.ce and interval cannot be affirmed without absurdity--this is the question; or rather it is no question.

Ib. p. 68.

Nor do we divide the substance, but unite these three Persons in one numerical essence: for we know nothing of the unity of the mind, but self-consciousness, as I showed before; and therefore as the self-consciousness of every Person to itself makes them distinct Persons, so the mutual consciousness of all three divine Persons to each other makes them all but one infinite G.o.d: as far as consciousness reaches, so far the unity of a spirit extends, for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit, but consciousness.

But this contradicts the preceding paragraph, in which the Father is self-conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, and the Son that he is not the Father, and that the Father is not he. Now how can the Son's being conscious that the Father is conscious that he is not the Son, const.i.tute a numerical unity? And wherein can such a consciousness as that attributed to the Son differ from absolute certainty? Is not G.o.d conscious of every thought of man;--and would Sherlock allow me to deduce the unity of the divine consciousness with the human? Sherlock's is doubtless a very plain and intelligible account of three G.o.ds in the most absolute intimacy with each other, so that they are all as one; but by no means of three persons that are one G.o.d. I do not wonder that Waterland and the other followers of Bull were alarmed.

Ib. p. 72.

Even among men it is only knowledge that is power. Human power, and human knowledge, as that signifies a knowledge how to do anything, are commensurate; whatever human skill extends to, human power can effect: nay, every man can do what he knows how to do, if he has proper instruments and materials to do it with.

This proves that perfect knowledge supposes perfect power: and that they are one and the same. "If he have proper instruments:"--does not this show that the means are supposed co-present with the knowledge, not the same with it?

Ib.

For it is nothing but thought which moves our bodies, and all the members of them, which are the immediate instruments of all human force and power: excepting mechanical motions which do not depend upon our wills, such as the motion of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the concoction of our meat and the like. All voluntary motions are not only directed but caused by thought: and so indeed it must be, or there could be no motion in the world; for matter cannot move itself, and therefore some mind must be the first mover, which makes it very plain, that infinite truth and wisdom is infinite and almighty power.

Even this, though not ill-conceived, is inaccurately expressed.

Ib. p. 81.

There is no contradiction that three infinite minds should be absolutely perfect in wisdom, goodness, justice and power; for these are perfections which may be in more than one, as three men may all know the same things, and be equally just and good: but three such minds cannot be absolutely perfect without being mutually conscious to each other, as they are to themselves.

Will any man in his senses affirm, that my knowledge is increased by saying "all" three times following? Is it not mere repet.i.tion in time?

If the Son has thoughts which the Father, as the Father, could not have but for his interpenetration of the Son's consciousness, then I can understand it; but then these are not three Absolutes, but three modes of perfection const.i.tuting one Absolute; and by what right Sherlock could call the one Father, more than the other, I cannot see.

Ib. p. 88.

And yet if we consider these three divine Persons as containing each other in themselves, and essentially one by a mutual consciousness, this pretended contradiction vanishes: for then the Father is the one true G.o.d, because the Father has the Son and the Holy Spirit in himself: and the Son may he called the one true G.o.d, because the Son has the Father and the Holy Ghost in himself, &c.

Nay, this is to my understanding three G.o.ds, and Sherlock seems to have brought in the material phantom of a thing or substance.

Ib. p. 97.

But if these three distinct Persons are not separated, but essentially united unto one, each of them may be G.o.d, and all three but one G.o.d: for if these three Persons,--each of whom [Greek: monadikos], as it is in the Creed, singly by himself, not separately from the other divine Persons, is G.o.d and Lord, are essentially united into one, there can be but one G.o.d and one Lord; and how each of these persons is G.o.d, and all of them but one G.o.d, by their mutual consciousness, I have already explained.

--"That is,--if the three Persons are not three;"--so might the Arian answer, unless Sherlock had shown the difference of separate and distinct relatively to mind. "For what other separation can be conceived in mind but distinction? Distinction may be joined with imperfection, as ignorance, or forgetfulness; and so it is in men:--and if this be called separation by a metaphor from bodies, then the conclusion would be that in the Supreme Mind there is distinction without imperfection; and then the question is, whence comes plurality of Persons? Can it be conceived other than as the result of imperfection, that is, finiteness?

Ib. p. 98.

Thus each Divine Person is G.o.d, and all of them but the same one G.o.d; as I explained it before.

O no! a.s.serted it.

Ib. p. 98-9.

This one supreme G.o.d is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Trinity in Unity, three Persons and one G.o.d. Now Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, with all their divine attributes and perfections (excepting their personal properties, which the Schools call the 'modi subsistendi', that one is the Father, the other the Son, and the other the Holy Ghost, which cannot be communicated to each other) are whole and entire in each Person by a mutual consciousness; each feels the other Persons in himself, all their essential wisdom, power, goodness, justice, as he feels himself, and this makes them essentially one, as I have proved at large.

Will not the Arian object, "You admit the 'modus subsistendi' to be a divine perfection, and you affirm that it is incommunicable. Does it not follow therefore, that there are perfections which the All-perfect does not possess?" This would not apply to Bishop Bull or Waterland.

Sect. V. p. 102.

St. Austin in his sixth book of the Trinity takes notice of a common argument used by the orthodox fathers against the Arians, to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Father, that if the Son be the Wisdom and Power of G.o.d, as St. Paul teaches (1 'Cor'. i.) and G.o.d was never without his Wisdom and Power, the Son must he co-eternal with the Father. * * * But this acute Father discovers a great inconvenience in this argument, for it forces us to say that the Father is not wise, but by that Wisdom which he begot, not being himself Wisdom as the Father: and then we must consider whether the Son himself, as he is G.o.d of G.o.d, and Light of Light, may be said to be Wisdom of Wisdom, if G.o.d the Father be not Wisdom, but only begets Wisdom.

The proper answer to Augustine is, that the Son and Holy Ghost are necessary and essential, not contingent: and that 'his' argument has a still greater inconvenience, as shewn in note p. 98.