Cavalry in Future Wars Part 2

With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast role his Arm is called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be a.s.sisting in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the great Service to which he belongs.

I

EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERs.h.i.+P

CHAPTER I

THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY

The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the character of almost all European Armies.

All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities, and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization, together with the reduction in the period of service which has been very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the troops, whilst at the same time the 'ma.s.ses' have risen to unimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_,' against which certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.

Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which, from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.

The enormous development of railway communication has changed all conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway to move ma.s.ses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions appear modified. Ma.s.ses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously great vulnerability.

On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished enormously. The a.s.sailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'

This increased importance of the communications, which in already exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.

All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which, in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of all operations due to the increased ma.s.ses and the more concentrated susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they have attained and their endurance.'[1]

[Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here endeavouring to combat.]

To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and forced the infantry to change their whole const.i.tution (whether to their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the Cavalry.

Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service, because, owing to the peculiar circ.u.mstances of its existence, it can scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:

1870.

463 Battalions.

460 Squadrons.

251 Batteries.

15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.

1902.

625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').

486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).

562 Batteries.

38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.

28 Pioneer Battalions.

This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.

Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms numerically an almost insignificant factor.

There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more particularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibility of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry have been fully recognised.

The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such 'ma.s.ses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.

With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in 'ma.s.s' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand, the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides during the American Civil War were obtained in general under conditions which can no longer be antic.i.p.ated, for at the moment of collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.

The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generally sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of results such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of any serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadays have to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; and it needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in the difficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, all the conditions of our future action must be modified.

Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees itself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the wider field of strategical operations--with new problems, towards the solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general indications.

If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new conditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, and work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced essentially from the probable requirements of the future.

Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve their difficulties in peace.

If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?

From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry in particular, and these demands give us a means for determining the limits of its employment, its consequent organization, and the training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.

If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly, the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may therefore antic.i.p.ate that many horses will not be stopped in the charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply; and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern weapons.

Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.

Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled to seek the a.s.sistance of the cover the ground affords in order to carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with its enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will it still be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open.

Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target for our purpose.

The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions; on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the ground even more indispensable than formerly.

The possible partic.i.p.ation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such experiences will be very much intensified.

Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger s.p.a.ces, notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced number of patrols, etc.

Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent, since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a smaller proportion of his whole Army.

If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.

If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.

Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.

Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ enormous ma.s.ses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in order thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating, and when we further consider how these exertions must increase the strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparent that the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelming importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'ma.s.ses'

behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in the consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar tactical conditions.

The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more difficult with growing ma.s.ses to divert an operation once commenced, to give it a new direction or a.s.sign it a new objective, the less possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued on false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value of thorough and active reconnoitring_.

If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War will be conducted with comparatively great ma.s.ses; on the other, as we have seen, _the importance of the strategical element has unquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_ has been proportionably intensified.