Putnam's Handy Law Book for the Layman Part 16

The damages may be either nominal, one dollar is often given in such cases, or compensatory, larger damages, as a punishment. The amount rendered is within the province of the jury, but courts do not hesitate to modify or set aside verdicts which are deemed excessive or too meager.

The defenses in such actions may be briefly described. The truth of the charge is a complete defense to a civil action for slander or libel, because "the law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect to an injury to a character which he either does not or ought not to possess." A privileged communication is another defense. The heads of the executive departments of government are absolutely privileged for defamatory statements made by them while acting within the limits of their authority. Their motives do not become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. Judicial officers are s.h.i.+elded by this rule while discharging their duties. The publication of judicial proceedings is conditionally privileged. The condition is that the proceedings are public, are decent and fit for publication, that the reports are full and fair, and that their publication is not inspired by malice. Says Burd.i.c.k: "The reports of such proceedings are usually made without reference to the individuals concerned, and for the information and benefit of the public. The law, therefore, presumes that they are made in good faith." The full and fair reports of parliamentary and legislative proceedings are also conditionally privileged as well as the reports of judicial proceedings, and for the same reasons. The publication of the proceedings of quasi public bodies, like state, medical, and ecclesiastical societies has been deemed conditionally privileged. But "professional publishers of news are not exempt, or a privileged cla.s.s, from the consequences of damage done by false news. Their communications are not privileged merely because made in public journals." Statements rendered by mercantile or collection agencies to inquirers for business purposes are clearly privileged. But whether the circulation among all their subscribers of a sheet containing such statements is privileged is a disputed question among the courts. Again, every statement made with the object of protecting some interest of the writer or speaker and which is reasonably necessary for such purpose is conditionally privileged.

Fair comment is another defense. The most frequent subjects of fair comment from which spring actions for defamations are the character and conduct of public men or candidates for office; and literary, artistic, or commercial productions offered to the public. Whether a particular statement is an unfair aspersion of one's personal character, or a fair comment on his public conduct, is a question usually for the jury.

At common law a defamer could not insist on an opportunity to retract or apologize, but he could give in evidence any apology or retraction to lessen the damages. This rule has formed the basis of a statute in some of the states. Though attacked on const.i.tutional grounds, it has been sustained in Minnesota, North Carolina and perhaps in other commonwealths. Where it can be made, the apology and retraction must be full, fair, prompt.

Pa.s.sing to private nuisances, a wrong or tort consists in wrongfully disturbing one in the reasonably comfortable use and enjoyment of his property. Ordinarily the motive of the wrongdoer is not material in determining his maintenance of a nuisance. Some things and trades are considered as nuisances of themselves, for example, a slaughter house in a large town, a pigsty near a dwelling house, a house of ill fame, the fouling of a spring, well or stream; keeping a large quant.i.ty of explosives near a public dwelling, or animals or other property dangerous to human life. Likewise, a hospital that operates to destroy the peace, quiet and comfort of those in adjoining residences, affects their health and value of their property is a private nuisance, against which action may be taken for its removal or abatement. Public cemeteries come under the same ban. They will not be adjudged a nuisance simply because they offend the fancy, delicacy, or fastidiousness of neighbors, or even depreciate the value of adjoining property.

When a business is carried on, structures are erected, or excavations are made which are nuisances, the actor is liable in damages for them whether he exercised due care in constructing and maintaining them or not. The same rule applies to the owner or keeper of a savage and dangerous animal.

Acts of discomfort that amount to a nuisance are such as produce this effect to persons of ordinary sensibility who live in the locality where the nuisance exists. Noises, odors, smoke, or dust may const.i.tute an actionable nuisance in one locality and not in another.

If the nuisances are from ordinary musical instruments in the dwelling of a neighbor, or from his children, yet are only of a kind that may be expected in such a neighborhood, they must be borne, unless prohibited by law. On the other hand, the same amount of noise caused by horses in the bas.e.m.e.nt of an adjoining house is an actionable nuisance.

A temporary annoyance is quite another thing. The erection of an iron building near a dwelling might, during the period of construction, cause great noise and discomfort, yet the occupier of the dwelling would have no remedy. But there is a limit to the conduct of the annoyer. He must act reasonably. He cannot blast rock, or hammer metal, or operate noisy steam drills at all hours of the day and night. He must conform to the habits of the community, and not unreasonably disturb his neighbors, during ordinary working hours.

There is a distinction also between acts that annoy and those that injure adjoining property. Generally acts of the latter kind are actionable. If one fixes his residence near a nuisance, formerly he had no remedy. This is no longer the law. When, however, a court is asked to enjoin or stop a useful and lawful business in a place, the court will inquire whether the business has long existed and the place has grown up by reason of its existence. If this prove to be the case a court will reluctantly interfere. Yet, if the business is actually harmful to health or injurious to property, it will be enjoined however great the loss may be to the owner.

While a land owner is not liable for a nuisance created on his land by a stranger, whose acts cannot in any way be attributed to him, he is liable for a nuisance resulting from a licensee's use of his property.

Thus, if a licensee by attaching a wire to a chimney converts it into a nuisance to pa.s.sers-by, the land owner who knowingly permits the nuisance to continue will be liable for the damages that result. Nor can one who has fouled a stream or the air, or who indulges in disturbing noises, defend himself for doing these things by showing that others did them before he began.

As a person acts at his peril in maintaining a nuisance, so is the owner of trespa.s.sing cattle liable for all the harm done by them, whether he knows of their disposition to do harm or not. But he is not liable for harm done by them while they are driven along the highway without negligence on the driver's part; nor is he liable for mischief done by them to the person or personal property of one at other times without knowledge of their viciousness or other proof of negligence.

Nor is he liable by the common law as an insurer against all damage done by them when they escape from his land.

When vicious animals are kept for any purpose and are a menace to human beings they are a nuisance. Hence, they may be killed without incurring liability, and should they do damage their owner or responsible keeper must answer for it. If the animal be a vicious dog, the owner must exercise a degree of care commensurate with the danger to others following his escape from custody, and must secure it from injuring anyone who does not unlawfully provoke or intermeddle with the animal.

By the early common law a person who started a fire, even for a needful and lawful purpose, was responsible for the consequences. This rule has been modified with time. "A person," says Burd.i.c.k, "does not start a fire on his land at his peril. If it spreads beyond his premises and harms others his liability for the harm must be grounded on his negligence. The same is true of his liability for electricity escaping from his control. In both cases the care he must exercise in guarding the dangerous element varies with the hazard to which it exposes others."

The liability of a person who keeps explosives is not absolute, unless he is maintaining a nuisance. Otherwise he is liable only when negligent. If he is ignorant of the character of the explosive, and without fault in not knowing, his duty of care is fixed by the apparent character of the article. Suppose a carrier was carrying a trunk containing an explosive of which he had no knowledge or reason for supposing was there, surely he would not be held liable if it exploded and caused injury.

The liability of a manufacturer, seller, lender, or user of things is not that of an insurer in making, selling, lending or using them. But he does incur liability whenever he fails to exercise such care as is fairly needful to protect others against the hazard in buying and using them. A druggist, therefore, who affixes a wrong label to a bottle of medicine and thereby injures a person who uses it is responsible. And the rule would apply whether the taker was the purchaser or some other person.

When persons are invited on one's premises for mutual advantage, the inviter owes the duty of ordinary care. He is not an insurer of their safety, nor need he exercise extraordinary care in guarding them from harm, unless there was unusual danger. Suppose a man had a way which persons used in going to and from his business, and he began to dig a well near the way and left the place unprotected during its construction, undoubtedly the owner would be liable. Suppose the well was a considerable distance from the way where persons did not usually go and had no occasion for going. Then he would not be liable. How far away from the road could he dig without thought of the public? The answer would depend on the facts in the case.

A somewhat different rule has been applied to children. Although a child of tender years who meets with an injury on the premises of a private owner may be a technical trespa.s.ser, yet the owner may be liable, if the things causing the injury have been left exposed and unguarded, and are of such a nature as to be attractive to children, appealing to their childish curiosity and instincts. Unguarded premises, which are thus supplied with dangerous attractions, are regarded as holding out implied invitations to children. There has been a great deal of controversy over this important rule. Those opposed say, if everywhere applied, it would render the owner of a fruit tree, for example, liable for damages to a trespa.s.sing boy who, in attempting to get the fruit, should fall from the tree and be injured. Professor Burd.i.c.k, after a full review of the cases, says that the tide of judicial opinion is setting the other way. Children, therefore, who invade the premises of a person without any right are trespa.s.sers like older people. The duty of caring for children remains with their parents and guardians; and if they are injured while unlawfully going on the land of others their parents cannot visit the consequences of their neglect on the owners of the land where the injuries happened.

=Warranty.=--The law, a.s.suming that the purchaser knows or can find out the quality and worth of things, does not make an implied warranty of them generally. The legal maxim is, "Let the purchaser beware." He must take care of himself. In many cases, though, he does obtain a warranty. He must, however, distinguish between this and a mere representation. It may be difficult to draw the line always, but it exists. A statement that is not intended as a warranty, made simply to awaken the buyer's interest in the thing for sale, is not a warranty.

Nor does the law imply a warranty from the payment of a full price.

Formerly, when a commodity was adulterated, it could be returned, and the courts became sorely troubled to defend an adulteration. More recently, statutes have cleared away the difficulty, and are a great protection to buyers. In many cases, doubtless, they know more about the quality and condition of the things they buy than the inexperienced salesmen who are behind the counters, so they need no protection from the law; when they do need it a warranty may serve a good purpose. In articles concerning which the seller does possess a superior knowledge, precious stones, drugs, medicines, and the like, the modern law has raised an implied warranty for the buyer's protection. In this cla.s.s of cases the buyer and seller do not deal on equal terms. The vendor is professedly an expert.

In a sale of food there is no longer an implied warranty of fitness, unless the buyer expressly or by inspection acquaints the seller with the purpose of the purchase and unless it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment. Even then, if the buyer has examined the goods and has discovered a defect, there is no warranty.

The burden of showing that he has made known his purpose and that he has relied on the seller is on the purchaser who claims the existence of an implied warranty.

There is another implied warranty, that of the seller's t.i.tle, when he is in possession of the goods. This is limited to persons who are acting for themselves, and not agents, trustees, officers of the law, who are acting for others. An innocent purchaser of goods, therefore, for a good consideration obtains a good t.i.tle, even from a vendee who has obtained them by fraud, as against the original vendor. This rule, though very broad, does not prevent a lawful owner from recovering his property. Thus, if a farmer's oxen were stolen and the thief should sell them as his own, and the purchaser should pay for them, nevertheless the farmer could recover them. The only exception to this rule is negotiable paper. This is made in order to surround it with greater protection.

Where goods are sold by sample there is a warranty that the goods will be like the sample, but there is no warranty of the sample itself. In one of the well-known cases hops were sold by sample, and after the hops had been delivered the discovery was made that they had been injured by heating. The buyer sued though failed to recover anything, for it was proved that they were like the sample, which had been shown several months before, and at that time the heating had not begun. As they were sold at the earlier period, their condition at the time of the delivery did not affect the sale. See _Deceit_; _Sale_.

=Will.=--A will is a disposition of one's property to take effect after his death. He is called a testator, and must possess a sound mind to make an effective will. He must be able to comprehend what he is doing. Wills are often contested on the ground that the testator's mind was feeble and that undue influence was exercised over him in disposing of his property. Married women can make wills like their husbands and so can a minor in many states.

All of the states have enacted statutes on the subject which require various things; one of the most important is the witnessing of wills.

Generally, three witnesses are required. An eminent judge, not long since, made a will to please his wife leaving a large sum to found an inst.i.tution. He was opposed to the thing. The astute judge had no witnesses, so he both fooled his wife and pleased himself, for his will was worthless. The statutes require the witnesses to sign in the testator's presence, who often give important testimony of his competency whenever his will is contested. As they may be called for this purpose, intelligence should be used in selecting persons to become witnesses. A witness who is competent at the time of signing does not become incompetent by reason of anything that may happen to him afterward. A witness should not be given anything in the will, for, if this is done, his act of witnessing in perhaps all the states violates the gift. Though this may be the consequence the rest of the will is not thereby impaired. The property given is either real or personal. Real property consists of land extending indefinitely upward and downward, every building thereon, every growing thing, likewise all minerals and in some cases even ice. Personal property includes everything of a movable nature. A transformation is often effected. A tree while standing on the land is a part thereof; cut down it becomes personal property.

A will should be in writing; and this in most states is a statutory requirement, to guard against the wrongs and frauds that might otherwise arise. A testator may write his own will, indeed to do so would be a good test of will-making capacity. If he is unable to write his name, he may make his mark. When this is done, there should be ample proof that he did so, for a mark can be so easily made by any one.

A person to whom real estate is given is called a devisee; the receiver of personal property a legatee. When the testator gives real estate he must have regard to the laws of the state where it is situated; in giving personal property he is governed by the law of the state where he resides, his domicil. Many a devise has been declared invalid, because the testator in devising it did not comply with the law of the state where the land was located.

The princ.i.p.al ground on which wills are attacked is feebleness of mind, lack of mental capacity. The question a.s.sumes this form: did the testator at the time he executed his will have sufficient mental capacity to do it. An eminent jurist, Chief Justice Redfield, has said that he must have undoubtedly sufficient active memory to perceive the more obvious relations of things to each other. Even if unable to manage his business, he can nevertheless make a will if he knows what he is doing.

Again an insane person may make a will provided this is done during a lucid interval. Many a person is insane only at times or on particular subjects and therefore may be competent to make a rational disposition of his property. Some persons have curious religious beliefs, prejudices against persons, governments and inst.i.tutions, and yet these vagaries may not impair their capacity to dispose of their property in a legal and rational manner.

Another requirement of a testator is that he must declare in the presence of the witnesses that it is his last will and testament. This is called a publication of the will. Of course, his will must be completed when this is done. Suppose a person makes several wills, which one of them is effective? The last one. A will should be dated, suppose this has been forgotten, what then? The last will must be established, if possible, by other evidence. Suppose it is believed that the last will has been destroyed, and a prior will is found, can this be set up as establis.h.i.+ng the testator's disposition of his property? It is not his last will, for he has made another.

Any person may be a devisee or legatee including married women, minors and corporations. If a bequest is made to a corporation not in existence, is it valid? By some courts this can be done, by others this power is denied to a testator. Many a well-meant bequest to a n.o.ble charity has been smitten down because there was no legal donee then existing to receive the gift. A testator may bequeath property to a trustee who shall select the objects of the testator's bounty.

The thing bequeathed must be described with sufficient clearness to identify it, nothing more is required. In some cases proper evidence may be used to identify things where the description in the will is ambiguous.

A devise of lands may consist of the entire estate or interest of the testator, or he may give the devisee a lesser interest in them. It is a common thing for a testator to devise the use of land to a person during his lifetime, and after his death the entire interest or fee to another. He usually adds a final or residuary clause to his will to the effect, that all he may have which has not been bequeathed to any one specifically shall be given to one or more persons or objects named in his will. Or, if a legacy shall lapse, that is, the person to whom it has been given shall die, or for any other reason cannot, or will not take it, it falls into the residuary portion and goes to the residuary legatee.

If a will does not contain such a clause, and there is no statute in the way, then a lapsed legacy or other property, not covered by the will, goes to such persons as the law has prescribed whenever persons die leaving no will, or, in legal language, die intestate.

A will takes effect from the testator's death and so does the validity of all the bequests. Thus, should a person mentioned as legatee die before the testator, the legacy would be invalid. But many or all of the states have provided by statute for the continuation of these in many cases. Thus, should a son, to whom his father has devised some land, die leaving children, they take it in place of their father.

These statutes vary much, some limiting the subst.i.tution to the lineal heirs of the deceased, son, grandson, etc., others extending the subst.i.tutes to the collateral heirs of any devisee or legatee.

Again, by statute and common law a wife is ent.i.tled on the death of her husband to a specific portion of his property. Should he not give her as much by his will, unless he had made an agreement with her before marriage with respect to what she was to receive, she may renounce her rights under her husband's will and claim what the law would give her as if he had made no will.

A will can be revoked any time. The common way is to destroy it.

Another way is to dispose during his lifetime of his property. In one of the cases a testator had indorsed on his will in his own handwriting "canceled." Though this was not signed, it was held to be a revocation. In another case a blind testator called for his will which was handed to him. He gave it back with the direction to put it in the fire. Instead of doing so another piece of paper was subst.i.tuted and burned. This was a downright fraud, and the court justly held that the will had been revoked.

=Workmen's Compensation Acts.=--Who is ent.i.tled to compensation by these acts? The proper test to apply is, whether the employer possessed the power to control the other while at work at the machine or other thing from which the injury arose. Says Honnold: "In the ordinary acceptance of the term, one who is engaged to render services in a particular transaction is not an employee; the term employee embracing continuity of service and excluding those employed for a single and special transaction. It does not usually include physicians, pastors or professional nurses. It may, however, include those not engaged in manual labor, such as a school-teacher. The fact that a workman furnishes tools and materials, or undertakes to do a specified job will not prevent his being an employee. A deaconess, living and working in a hospital and receiving an annuity to cover clothing and expenses, is not an employee of the hospital," nor is an employee of a religious home for the aged who works around the house for which he is not paid any fixed amount. A director of a bank is not an employee within the meaning of the acts under consideration.

To be an employee there must be a contract of service. This is not the same thing as a contract for services. By the latter relations.h.i.+p one is an independent contractor and excluded from the acts. The contract of service need not be actually made, it may be implied, for example, the case of a subst.i.tute who is engaged by an employee in accordance with custom. A contract of service is not created by the relation of landlord and tenant, carrier and pa.s.senger, bailor and bailee, nor by professional service, nor by forming a partners.h.i.+p, nor by performing manual labor beyond the employer's control. Whether a contract of service arises from charitable work depends on the circ.u.mstances of the particular case. State employees are within these acts in some states, and excluded in others, likewise munic.i.p.al employees. By the federal act the term "laborer" is used to designate men who do work that requires but little skill as distinguished from an artisan who practices an industrial art. The act includes a storekeeper, an inspector who performs no manual labor, a messenger in the government printing office, the master of a dredge, the matron of an Indian school, a transit man, a surveyor, a clerk engaged in office work, an a.s.sistant veterinarian, a laboratory a.s.sistant, a dock master.

Compensation legislation is not limited to healthy employees. One's previous physical condition is of no consequence in determining the amount of relief to be afforded. Nevertheless, it is a circ.u.mstance to be considered in ascertaining, when one has been injured, whether the injury resulted from the work or from his health.

In some of the compensation acts minors are excluded, in other acts he is protected by them. An apprentice who is qualifying himself to operate an elevator is an employee within the Minnesota Act. Many of the acts provide that the term employee shall include every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, except one whose employment is casual, or is not in the usual course of the trade, business profession or occupation of his employer.

Farm laborers are outside these acts in some states. Thus, in Ma.s.sachusetts "the workmen's compensation act was not intended to confer its advantages upon farm laborers, or to impose its burdens upon farmers." But a farmer may adopt it if he desires. And any contract of insurance made by him under its terms is valid and enforceable. Such an exemption, however, does not except employees working for one who is engaged in a commercial or other non-agricultural enterprise though he be a farmer. Likewise, a farmer carrying on a market garden may procure insurance covering his drivers and helpers employed in distributing the produce of his farm without insuring other employees who are merely farm laborers. The right to compensation is determined by the character of the labor one is actually doing when the accident occurs, rather than by the fact that the employee occasionally does farm labor. Thus, plowing is usually farm labor, but if it is done to make land ready for building a house it is not. If a farmer does not avail himself of the act for all of his employees, he may procure insurance for a limited portion of them.

"If there are those," says Chief Justice Rugg, "separable from others by cla.s.sification and definition, whose labor is more exposed and dangerous, or whom he may desire to protect for any other reason, there is nothing in the act to prevent him from doing so."

Likewise, domestic servants are excluded by some of these acts, who are they? "A household servant is one who dwells under the same roof with the family under circ.u.mstances making him a member thereof." And his status is determined rather by his relation to the family than by his relation to the service. Thus, a workman who is hired to tend the furnace, mow the lawn, and do odd jobs about the house, who has a room therein and eats at the family table, is a household servant. On the other hand, a chauffeur who is hired by the month to run the employer's private automobile, but is not living as a member of the family, is not a household servant. In many cases, however, he is one.

While it is doubtful whether the test of living in the employer's house is the sole test of household service, it is essential that he is engaged in rendering service in the house, such as cleaning, cooking or was.h.i.+ng. On one occasion, a porter in a saloon was sent upstairs by the proprietor to wash the windows in the apartment where the proprietor lived with his family. While thus engaged he fell to the sidewalk and was injured. The court regarded him as a household servant.

Many of the acts exclude from their protection casual employees. This term is a difficult one to define, and has been omitted in many of the acts. Where this is done all employees engaged in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of their employer, with some exceptions, receive compensation. Ordinarily, an employment is casual when it is for a single day, or by the hour, but does not apply to one who is employed to render a service that recurs with some regularity. Thus, one who is employed as a workman in a sawmill on such days as it was in operation for four months was not a casual employee. Casual employment in the Connecticut act means occasional or incidental employment. In California, if the length of employment is less than a week it is casual, even though contrary to agreement the employee took more than a week to do the work for which he was hired, and which a skillful employee could have finished within a week.

"The question whether an employment is casual must be determined with reference to the scope and purpose of the hiring rather than with sole regard to the duration and regularity of the service. One who enters into a contract of employment for an entire season is not a casual employee merely because he may be required to work for only short and irregular periods." Thus, a longsh.o.r.eman who is employed at a certain sum per hour to help load a s.h.i.+p, having frequently rendered a similar service on other occasions, is not a casual employee; nor is one who keeps machinery and boats in order at an amus.e.m.e.nt park; nor is a boy who is called at irregular intervals for service in a butcher's shop when extra help is needed, or in the absence of a regular employee; nor is one who is employed during a packing season to drive for a packer whenever he is needed.

The compensation law does not apply to independent contractors. It is difficult, however, to draw the line in many cases. Generally, an independent contractor is one who exercises an independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own method, without being subject to the control of the employer. A test that is sometimes applied is, who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how, and who has the right of general control. When, therefore, one exercises an independent employment, selects his own help and has the control of them, and the method of conducting the work, he is an independent contractor. Again, he may change his relation for a time, and become an employee, or he may be a contractor for a part of his service and an employee for a part. Thus, one who was injured while operating a launch to bring supplies to a dredge for his employer was an employee and not an independent contractor, though he was one in conducting the work of dredging. Likewise, a physician who is employed on a salary by another physician, who in turn is serving a manufactory, is an employee of the latter and not an independent contractor, though he is still engaged to some extent in his own private practice.