Copyright: Its History and Its Law Part 5

In respect to the right to limit the use of his work under his sale, gift, loan, grant, lease, etc., for a special purpose or at a special price, or for a special time, or in a special locality or to a special person, these powers of limitation, though implied in the grant of copyright, are dependent for their enforcement rather upon the law of contracts than upon copyright law.

There can be no such thing as a copyright for a special purpose or for a special locality, or under other special conditions, for there can be only one copyright, and that a general copyright, in any one work. But specific contracts can be made, enforceable under the law of contracts, as for the sale of a copyrighted book within a certain territory, provided such contracts or limitations are not contrary to other laws.

Although record of a.s.signment in the Copyright Office is provided for by the law only for the copyright in general, the separate estates as a right to publish in a periodical and the right to publish as a book may be sold and a.s.signed separately, and the special a.s.signment recorded in the Copyright Office, though this does not convey a right to subst.i.tute in the copyright notice a name other than that of the recorded proprietor of the general copyright, which can only be changed as specifically provided in the law under recorded a.s.signment of the entire copyright.

{Sidenote: Copyright as monopoly}

Copyright is a monopoly to which the government a.s.sures protection in granting the copyright. It is a monopoly not in the offensive sense, but in the sense of private and personal owners.h.i.+p; the public is not the loser but is the gainer by the protection and encouragement given to the author. The whole aim of copyright protection is to permit the author to sell as he pleases and to transfer his rights collectively or severally to such a.s.signs as he may choose. Copyright is a monopoly only in the sense that any owners.h.i.+p is a monopoly. Says Herbert Spencer: "If I am a monopolist, so also are you; so also is every man. If I have no right to those products of my brain, neither have you to those of your hands. No one can become the sole owner of any article whatever; and all property is 'robbery.'" In the copyright debates of 1891, Senator O. H. Platt rightly said: "The very essence of copyright is the privilege of controlling the market. That is the only way in which a man's property in the work of his brain can be a.s.sured." And as Senator Evarts pointed out in the same debate: "The sole question is what we shall do concerning something which is the essential nature of copyright and patent protection, namely, monopoly." In discussing patent monopoly and the law of contracts in Victor Talking Machine Co. _v._ The Fair, the U.

S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Baker, said, in 1903, that "within his domain the patentee is czar. The people must take the invention on the terms he dictates or let it alone for seventeen years."

Thus as the government grants and guarantees the monopoly, it is not to be taken as in restraint of trade or otherwise contrary to law. Said Judge Cullen in the case of Murphy _v._ Christian Press a.s.sociation, in the Appellate Division of the N. Y. Supreme Court, in 1899, decisions as to agreements in restraint of trade "have no application to agreements concerning copyrights and patents, the very object of which is to give monopolies."

{Sidenote: Limit only in term}

Copyright being in essence a monopoly giving to the copyright proprietor "exclusive rights," as the Const.i.tution provides, the only limitation upon it should be that indicated in the Const.i.tution which confines protection to "limited times." The opponents of copyright have frequently taken the course of falling back upon the plea that in the interests of the public the author should not have exclusive right to his writings and to manage his own affairs, but that Congress should prescribe how he should market his property. This commonly takes shape in the licensing scheme known in England as the Farrer plan and in America as the Pearsall-Smith plan, with respect to books; and in the pa.s.sage of the "international copyright amendment" of 1891 this plan was made the basis of attack upon the measure. An a.n.a.lysis of the scheme as presented by R. Pearsall-Smith of Philadelphia is given by G. H. Putnam, from the book publisher's point of view, in the "Question of copyright."

In the work on "The law and history of copyright," by Augustine Birrell, a member of the present British cabinet, this plan is characterized as a "preposterous scheme." In the case of a book, for instance, a publisher often suggests to the author the general idea of the book, so that it would be doubly unjust to permit any other publisher to issue that book on the compulsory license scheme; and this might hold true, although to less extent, in other fields of copyright. In any event, the original publisher makes large investment not only in type-setting, printing, and binding a book, or in the publis.h.i.+ng of any other work, but in advertising and making a market, and that a rival publisher should have the benefit of this market without paying the cost is a violation of the very essence of property. This scheme, however, is applied, in a limited way and as a compromise, respecting mechanical music, in the American code of 1909, and const.i.tutes its most serious defect. There is question, indeed, whether the compulsory license and fixed price may not be an unconst.i.tutional provision. This matter is more fully discussed in later chapters.

{Sidenote: Altered theory of copyright}

It should be noted that whereas the previous American law required certain statutory formalities before publication, the new American code somewhat alters the theory of copyright, and more nearly conforms statutory with common law, by making publication with notice the initial copyright act and registration and deposit secondary acts necessary for the completion of the copyright and its protection under the statute.

{Sidenote: Publis.h.i.+ng}

The definition of the date of publication (sec. 62) as "the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority" remedies the vagueness of the previous law and adopts into the statute court decisions to the effect that acts not by the authority of the author or proprietor do not const.i.tute publication in the sense of dedication to the public. In other words, it is made clear that the right to publish inheres in the author and that he cannot be divested of it without his consent. This is the fundamental principle of the new law in the vital matter of protecting the author at the critical point at which an unpublished work, absolutely his own, becomes a published work, subject to statute. In this respect the American code of 1909 comes very close to the acceptance of the right in intellectual property as a natural and inherent right.

{Sidenote: What const.i.tutes publis.h.i.+ng}

As to what const.i.tutes publis.h.i.+ng, interpretation by the courts based on previous law will in many respects be applicable to the new code. A book which has been sold or leased to subscribers on a contract of restricted use is none the less published, as was set forth in the opinion by Chief Judge Parker of the N. Y. Court of Appeals in Jewellers' Mercantile Agency _v._ Jewellers' Weekly Pub. Co. in 1898, and in the opinion by Judge Putnam of the U. S. Circuit Court in Ma.s.sachusetts in Ladd _v._ Oxnard in 1896, both having reference to credit-rating books leased to subscribers for their individual use.

{Sidenote: "Privately printed" works}

Publication depends upon sale or offer to the public, and it is a question whether the sale or offer of a copyrightable work, as the proceedings or publications of a society, to the members of that society only, const.i.tutes publication, to be pa.s.sed upon by the courts in view of the specific facts. A work "privately printed" or with the imprint "printed but not published," given or even sold by the author to his friends, and not sold generally by his authority, would probably not be held to be published; but the courts would probably hold that the sale of a work, though "privately printed," to merely nominal members of a nominal society, made up of the purchasers of the work, would const.i.tute publication and, if without copyright notice, dedication.

{Sidenote: Copying}

As to the right to copy, this word in the broad sense as interpreted by the courts, covers the duplicating or multiplying of copies within the stated scope of the statute. It was argued in the mechanical music cases that the word copy extends to any form or method of duplication by which the thought of the author can be recorded or conveyed, but, as more fully stated in the chapter on mechanical music, the U. S. Supreme Court in White-Smith _v._ Apollo Co. in 1908 upheld the decision below that a perforated roll is not a _copy_ in fact of staff notation, and thus limited the statutory use of the word to duplication by similar or corresponding process. It was for this reason that such specific phrases as "to make any other version," "to convert," "to arrange or adapt," "to make transcription or record" were included in the new code, although these would be included in the broader sense of the right "to copy."

{Sidenote: Vending}

The right to vend covers by a comprehensive word those general rights of sale through which only can the author obtain remuneration for his work.

The most important question which has arisen in respect to the application of this word, which is used both in the previous laws and in the present code, has been as to the use of this exclusive right to limit the conditions of sale after the original sale from the author or proprietor as vendor to the immediate vendee. The courts have in general held that the copyright and patent laws, while creating a legal monopoly for the author or original proprietor, do not authorize any continuing control, and have indeed gone so far as to indicate that a sale is absolute and complete unless limited by special contract within the principles of common or statutory law of contracts. In the leading case of Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., the U. S. Supreme Court in 1895, through Justice s.h.i.+ras, said:

{Sidenote: Control of sale}

"Upon the doctrine of these cases we think it follows that one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place. Whether a patentee may protect himself and his a.s.signees by special contracts brought home to the purchaser is not a question before us and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws."

{Sidenote: Specific relation to copyrights: the Macy cases}

This question in specific relation to copyrights again came before the U. S. Supreme Court in a series of cases, known as the Macy cases, between Isidor and Nathan Straus doing business as R. H. Macy & Co., on the one side, and the Bobbs-Merrill Co. and Charles Scribner's Sons as the respective defendants.

In both cases, the publishers had sought to maintain the retail price of a book, as a right under the copyright law. The Bobbs-Merrill Co.

copyrighted the "Castaway" May 18, 1904, and immediately below the copyright notice printed the following in each copy: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."

The Scribners sought to accomplish the same purpose as to their copyright books by printing in their catalogues, invoices and bills of goods the following notice: "Copyrighted net books published after May 1, 1901, and copyrighted fiction published after February 1, 1902, are sold on condition that prices be maintained as provided by the regulations of the American Publishers' a.s.sociation."

New dealers were required by the American Publishers' a.s.sociation, in consideration of a discount allowed by the publisher in question, to enter into an agreement as indicated, but this agreement Macy & Co.

refused to accept and they bought books as best they could and sold them at "cut rates," thus inducing dealers from whom the purchases were made to violate the agreement with the publishers.

{Sidenote: The Bobbs-Merrill case}

In the leading case of Bobbs-Merrill Co., appellant, _v._ Straus, the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court was delivered June 1, 1908, by Justice Day, who said: "The precise question in this case is, does the sole right to vend (named in section 4952) secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum? We do not think the statute can be given such a construction, and it is to be remembered that this is purely a question of statutory construction. There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book. In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract."

{Sidenote: The Scribner case}

In the Scribner case the decision delivered on the same day by the same justice, upheld the lower courts in their view, "that there was nothing in any of the notices of a claim of right or reservation under the copyright law," and "that independent of statutory law" the question of relief in equity was not open to the federal courts because there was no diversity of citizens.h.i.+p nor claim above $2000 "requisite to confer jurisdiction of questions of rights independent of the copyright statutes." On the allegations of the bill as to alleged contributory infringement by inducing dealers to sell in violation of agreement, on which the lower courts held that complainants had not proved an agreement based upon their printed notice, the Supreme Court declined to review the question of fact.

{Sidenote: English underselling case}

In the English case of Larby _v._ Love, in 1910, however, Justice Bucknill in the King's Bench held the defendant liable for damages for the sale of certain maps to undersellers in disregard of prohibitions specified in the bill of sale.

{Sidenote: Suits under state law}

The Macy cases included suits in the New York State courts by Straus _v._ American Publishers' a.s.sociation _et al._, claiming that the action of the publishers in endeavoring to maintain rates const.i.tuted a conspiracy in restraint of trade contrary to the statutes. The N. Y.

Court of Appeals held, through Chief Judge Parker, that the agreements would have been free from legal objections if confined solely to copyright publications, but were contrary to the statute in affecting the right of a dealer to sell books not copyrighted at the price he chooses. The copyright side of the question was again pressed in the lower courts and reached the Court of Appeals a second time in 1908, when it was pa.s.sed upon by a divided court, four to three, Judge Gray for the court declining to review its previous action. The dissenting judges, through Judge Bartlett, held that the decision of the U. S.

Supreme Court in the Bobbs-Merrill case did apply in the current case and that the State Court of Appeals should therefore conform its decision to the finding of the federal Supreme Court. The question has been brought into the federal courts in a new series of suits, and it has yet to be finally settled by the U. S. Supreme Court, whether the legal monopoly conferred by the copyright statute safeguards the copyright proprietor against certain provisions of the anti-trust laws, state or national.

{Sidenote: Translating}

{Sidenote: "Other version"}

The right "to translate into other languages or dialects" is strengthened in the new American code by the addition of the phrase "or to make any other version thereof," and the author is thus given exclusive right and entire control as to translation of his original work by himself or others, without specific reservation of rights except as implied and included in the general copyright notice. The broad phrase "make any other version thereof" may cover not only translation into another language, but into another literary form as from prose into poetry or _vice versa_. No case involving construction of this phrase seems yet to have arisen to be decided by the courts; but the author of a narrative poem, like Owen Meredith's "Lucile" or Tennyson's "Enoch Arden," could probably prevent the transformation of his poetical work into equivalent prose; and a novelist would have probably a like protection in case of an attempt to duplicate or transform his story as a narrative poem. This view is confirmed by the a.n.a.logous specific protection of the right to dramatize a work or convert a drama into non-dramatic form.

{Sidenote: Translating term}

The exclusive right "to translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a non-dramatic work" are granted by the act for the same period as the term of original copyright and the renewal term, instead of for a shorter period, as ten years, as is the case in certain foreign legislation. The right to translate or to dramatize is separate from the right to copyright a translation or dramatization, as is shown by the fact that a translation or dramatization can be separately copyrighted for a term extending from its own date of publication and therefore possibly beyond the copyright term of the original work, though on the expiration of the primary copyright any one else may make a translation or dramatization despite the continuing existence of the copyright in the authorized translation or dramatization. These subjects are more specifically discussed for translations under the subject-matter of copyright and for dramatizations under dramatic and musical copyright.

{Sidenote: Oral delivery}

The exclusive right to deliver orally addresses and similar productions is now specifically included in the American law, as in the laws of some other countries, and probably involves the right to register, before publication, any literary production intended for oral delivery before it is printed in a book or periodical. Thus if Mr. Cable desires to include in his readings, especially if in public for profit, chapters from an unpublished novel, or a poet desires to protect his copyright in a poem which he publicly recites, it may be desirable that he should register such unpublished work under the provisions of the act for that purpose; although it is a generally accepted doctrine that oral delivery does not const.i.tute publication, and that the matter orally delivered may thus be protected at common law.

{Sidenote: "Publicly and for profit"}

It should be noted that in the case of a lecture or other work for oral delivery and of a musical composition, the exclusive right is given for its delivery or performance "publicly and for profit," and in the case of a drama, "publicly," the words for profit being, probably by inadvertence, omitted. There is some question, therefore, whether a copyrighted lecture, drama, or musical composition can be given without consent of the author privately, or, except in the case of a drama, gratuitously before the public. In view of the special exception (sec.

28) exempting oratorios, etc., performed for charitable or educational purposes and not for profit, from authorization or payment, as well as on general principles of construction, it would seem probable that the courts would protect the author of a lecture, drama, or musical composition, except in such instances as a private rendering in a private house, to which there was not public admission and at which no fee was charged or collection taken. The cases bearing on this point are given in the later chapter on dramatic and musical copyright.

{Sidenote: Material and immaterial property}

The American code adopts into the law an important distinction as between the property in the material and the immaterial rights, hitherto somewhat uncertain, in the following provision (sec. 41): "That the copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the sale, or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself const.i.tute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the a.s.signment of the copyright const.i.tute a transfer of the t.i.tle to the material object; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained."

The negative provision in this section was inserted in the new copyright law apparently to differentiate it from patent law with the intent of preventing the proprietor of a copyrighted work from controlling the conditions of sale after copies had left his possession. It is doubtful what, if any, effect this provision may have, as the phrase "lawfully obtained" would scarcely have the result of limiting and annulling contractual conditions of sale. The innocent purchase of a stolen book would not relieve the purchaser from the necessity of returning the stolen property to its proper owner, although as far as intent, knowledge, and payment are concerned, he would have "lawfully obtained"