Dio's Rome Volume VI Part 12
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12. --When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)
13. --When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fas.h.i.+on, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171.
Zonaras, 8, 3.)
14. --Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to the desire to antic.i.p.ate injuries that they might suffer at his hands.
For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
15. --Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however, they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)
16. --The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,--a kind of beast that they had never before seen,--had fallen into dismay, still, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)
17. --The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)
18. --The Epirots dishonored the ties of friends.h.i.+p, through vexation that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him, on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them than his promises. (Mai, ib.)
19. --Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
20. --The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army of Laevinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fas.h.i.+on. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn, but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)
21. --Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city, entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
22. --When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management, whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence, if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the amba.s.sadors: "Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any rate obtain friends.h.i.+p for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring peace, and will cordially a.s.sist you in that purpose if it is to our advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things, because it is not seemly for an amba.s.sador to receive gifts at all. I would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you bid me accept them? Let me a.s.sure you, then, of the fact that I have many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he could not live without it.
"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure could rehea.r.s.e. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crus.h.i.+ng hand of Fate [Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)
26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)
27. --Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. --Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not succeed in accomplis.h.i.+ng this even if he wished it [i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of the question. (Mai, p.177.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general toward them with great circ.u.mspection, and awarded greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him, than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. --As the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth, despoiled them and sent the spoils on s.h.i.+ps to Tarentum. And the men almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)
32. --All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us,"
he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)
[Frag. XLI]
[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] --Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to respect them, despatched amba.s.sadors to him in turn.
From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)
[Frag. XLII]
[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]--Though the Romans were faring in this manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their amba.s.sadors.
The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)
[Frag. XLIII]
1. --The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were--on the side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had a.s.sisted the Tarentini, on the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of friends.h.i.+p with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 8.)
2. --The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying, as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8, 8.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] 3. --Gaius Claudius came to the meeting, and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear) opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians, especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin and on account of the request for a.s.sistance they had made. (Mai, p.179.
Zonaras, 8,8.)
4. --Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. --Hanno, who was in no wise disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the s.h.i.+ps and the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
6. --When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
7. --Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an a.s.sembly of their number and made the statement: "I have no need of arms but will leave it with you to decide everything." By this means he persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180.
Zonaras, 8, 9.)
8. --The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpa.s.sed the skill of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained in a brief s.p.a.ce by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man's nature, could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)
9. -- The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition.
[Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this section.] (Mai, p. 539.)
11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it irretrievably.
Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing, as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)
12. -- The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were equally matched in the number of s.h.i.+ps and readiness to serve.
[Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain the latter. One side surpa.s.sed in the experience possessed by the crews of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due consideration. (Mai, p.181.)
13. --The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who failed in an enterprise.
He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the battle." (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (_a.u._ 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: "When the storm continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal's defeat through the agency of some deserters." (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26.
Zonaras, 8, 12.)
15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they [Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force.
For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. If they failed, they would lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was, indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and children should be furnished their support from the public treasury.
(Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)
Dio's Rome Volume VI Part 12
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