Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 13

It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview with Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had been based on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had no knowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams, toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority to negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So far as he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of an agreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in fact completed, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on the sixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a completed agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instruction already given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams'

conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought.

The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status of belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This required consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again open up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and permanent renunciation of privateering?

For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May 18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had already transmitted authority [to Lyons] to a.s.sent to any modification of the only point in issue which the Government of the United States might prefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty whatever[284]." This clearly referred to privateering. Russell's instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in reverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by all nations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized as law, both in Great Britain and in the United States." The second article, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the history of their independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to adhere to the principle she then adopted." Thus briefly stating his confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles, Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the American crisis.

"There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the United States withheld their a.s.sent. Under these circ.u.mstances it is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no question, however, but that the commander and crew of a s.h.i.+p bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of marque.

"In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new principle.

"You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]."

What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to him were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be piracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln's proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russell could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as close to it as he dared, by a.s.serting that Great Britain would use vigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might be interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the _facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern activities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in the proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was also dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction "to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled Confederate States," and he further explained his purpose and the British position:

"... You will not err in encouraging the Government to which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in regard to privateering....

"You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of the law of nations[287]."

Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared by Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a renunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced of the wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenel might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:

"I have further to state to you, with reference to my despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first instance inclined to propose to both of the contending parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch.

"I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M.

Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the abolition of privateering, yet that some lat.i.tude of action is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to exercise it[288]."

Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward's mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only as the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatever method seemed most "conciliatory." His first private comment on receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering[289]," and in an official confidential despatch of the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward expected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did the matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in London Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June 6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... it may open the way to the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But ... we ought not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining this desirable object[292]." Evidently, in his opinion, the South would not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days later, however, having learned from the French Amba.s.sador that Dayton in Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].

Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American Secretary of State.

Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not pus.h.i.+ng them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date, indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate Government[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated, feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous," but believing they had prevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Was.h.i.+ngton, that such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to issue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions to make this clear--let alone any "lat.i.tude" to deal with privateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward his personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was not an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the "misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were being sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His only subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no circ.u.mstances should a convention be signed without a distinct declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern privateers[301].

The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' report of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that Adams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, and that he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offer to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.

On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no resulting irritations or complications with the United States. He recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons should act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall was now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the end[303]."

Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the convention at once. The warnings received from many sources did not dismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.

Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing a Convention with the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer immediately by telegraph[304]." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley in a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it would be better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again his fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The same objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a reply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the same time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your despatches to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308], and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter the Proclamation of Neutrality[309].

The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310].

Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar French convention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for the affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"

from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this negotiation.

But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting to secure a friendly att.i.tude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this was by giving a.s.surances on maritime law in time of war. True he probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument, but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have const.i.tuted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the existence of a state of war.

In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simple and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far as the a.s.sumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry was gone[316]."

And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not, it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly att.i.tude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France, and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated, suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality could long be maintained[318].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.]

[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.]

[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.]

[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275.]

[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562.]

[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, p. 563.]

[Footnote 242: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 18.]

[Footnote 244: _Ibid._, No. 25.]

[Footnote 245: _Ibid._, No. 26.]

[Footnote 246: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams to Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.]

[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 28.]

[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, No. 31.]

[Footnote 249: _Ibid._, No. 32.]

[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581.]

[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early in the London press. Thus the _Sat.u.r.day Review_. June 8, 1861, commenting on the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, stated that this could have no effect on the present war but would be welcomed for its application after this war was over.]

[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the Geneva Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British diplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of a.s.sault upon Great Britain." Cited in Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280.]

[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279.]

[Footnote 254: _Ibid._, p. 271.]

[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 273.]

[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, p. 277.]

[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without stating details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of Henry Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.]

[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31.]

[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189.]

[Footnote 260: _Ibid._]