Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 39

This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictum that the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate British governmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief that strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating an argument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet the new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to his friends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in favour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle a.s.serted is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon its merits as a political measure[936]." Two weeks later, reporting a public speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_, while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it was not to be understood as fully defending a system of government which chose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]."

Similarly in America the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation, though loudly applauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincoln was disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent, though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow up the victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November went heavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground of the President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole was not favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as but a useless bit of "waste paper[939]." In England, John Bright, the most ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and even then in but half-hearted fas.h.i.+on, though he thought public interest was much aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date set by Lincoln for actual enforcement of emanc.i.p.ation[940]. In a speech at Birmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emanc.i.p.ation; rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South for admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was the very "corner-stone" of Southern inst.i.tutions and society[941]. A few public meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown were tried in October and November with some success but with no great show of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of public opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by the proclamation began to veer in favour of the emanc.i.p.ation edict[942]. By the end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrified hands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]."

Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause of emanc.i.p.ation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by Jefferson Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared that Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection,"

and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said State." This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for his freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave a good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944].

Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December that the promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hoped that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliation would be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1 proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]."

But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an "abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week of December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, there took place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were pa.s.sed enthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation and pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ from week to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, noting fifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The American Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved resolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations.

The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield, January 10:

"_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the American States, and that the object of the leaders of the rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its emanc.i.p.ation policy till not a slave be left on the American soil[947]."

Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of "n.o.bodies." Adams commented:

"They do not indeed belong to the high and n.o.ble cla.s.s, but they are just those n.o.bodies who formerly forced their most exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol, and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to the complete emanc.i.p.ation of the negro slaves in the British dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]."

Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expression of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working cla.s.ses,"

and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949].

The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation, accepted and printed communications with increasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in the public meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press.

Samuel A. G.o.ddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letter writer to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northern cause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just and holy[950]." In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the proclamation to touch slavery in the border states, G.o.ddard made clear the fact that Lincoln had no const.i.tutional "right" to apply his edict to states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalled the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetings attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spoken twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence.

Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slavery feeling, now strongly for the North[952].

Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in an address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe now replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. A largely signed "round robin" letter a.s.sured her that English women were still the foes of slavery and were indignantly united against suggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working cla.s.s Britain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those of Manchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of thanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hards.h.i.+ps resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot"

he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [of human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpa.s.sed in any age or in any country[954]." Nonconformist England now came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London, made his great congregation pray with him: "G.o.d bless and strengthen the North; give victory to their arms[955]." Further and more general expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letter received February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen, urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln.

The London and Manchester Emanc.i.p.ation Societies combined in drawing up a doc.u.ment for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption at a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" but the address was carried by a large majority and two representatives, Ma.s.sie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to the brethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblical sanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading this sanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957].

Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in a pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" His position and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to the North.

Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, became aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamation made good his pledge of the previous September: other elements of opinion, and in all cla.s.ses, were strengthened in like measure, and everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrection largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to such lengths in its support of emanc.i.p.ation as to astound and alarm the _Sat.u.r.day Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival of cant[959]." More neutral minds were perplexed over the practical difficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January, 1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men slaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popular approval of emanc.i.p.ation was in full swing. On the evening of the twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great ma.s.s meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had been advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hall was jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptly organized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admission crowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand.

Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Hall and cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. Newman Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted to heckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961].

The "carnival of cant," as the _Sat.u.r.day Review_ termed it, was truly a popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported by the working and non-enfranchised cla.s.ses. Its first effect was to restore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upper cla.s.ses. Bright had welcomed emanc.i.p.ation, yet with some misgivings. He now joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on "Slavery and Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.

In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_, which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influenced largely upper-cla.s.s att.i.tude in favour of the South, Cairnes had published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was a reasoned a.n.a.lysis of the basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis of Spence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power, Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be read with more conviction by that cla.s.s which until now had been coldly neutral and which wished a more rea.s.sured faith in the Northern cause than that stirred by the emotional reception given the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation. Yet at bottom it was emanc.i.p.ation that brought this reasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logical basis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterances previously made in private correspondence, or in governmental conversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North.

On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the Duke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a speech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," Argyll said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of the Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that the contest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it that great blessing to the white race which shall consist in the final freedom of the black[963]."

The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America that governmental England would show some evidence of a more friendly att.i.tude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas he thought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read:

"Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore,

_Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such recognition or admission[964]."

This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Was.h.i.+ngton, in November, 1862, he had regarded the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation as a political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administration he thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This was the burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but does not appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to give offence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the correctness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm leading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictators.h.i.+p measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound by the social and educational traditions of his cla.s.s, and had at first not the slightest conception of the force or effect of emanc.i.p.ation upon the public in middle-cla.s.s England. He feared an American reaction against England when it was understood that popular meetings would have no influence on the British Government.

"Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely round to the North that the Government will be obliged to favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it, unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]."

Lincoln's plan of emanc.i.p.ation and his first proclamation had little relation to American foreign policy. Seward's att.i.tude toward emanc.i.p.ation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile war might be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain, from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emanc.i.p.ation into effect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, in part by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier British newspaper speculations, was strongly a.s.sociated with emanc.i.p.ation, in the English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862, proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public with apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emanc.i.p.ation and the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave of relief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not so quickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that England which was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exulted and now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affect governmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyons correctly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press the British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a head a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during the war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctly unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building in British ports of Confederate naval vessels of war.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturing Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III.]

[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]

[Footnote 848: F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to be already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint of it in the interview with Lyons.]

[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offer of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructions and those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelled to face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offer without England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O.S.)).]

[Footnote 850: F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.]

[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]

[Footnote 852: F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.]

[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152.]

[Footnote 854: _Ibid._, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861.]

[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs.

Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.]

[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 859: _Sat.u.r.day Review_, Nov. 17, 1860.]

[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]

[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contest in America."]

[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69.]

[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln_, p. 243.]

[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, pp. 229-32.]

[Footnote 867: _Ibid._, p. 233, May 19, 1862.]