My Mission to London 1912-1914 Part 4

Sir Arthur, who had been Amba.s.sador at Petrograd, had concluded the treaty of 1907, which had enabled Russia again to turn her attention to the West and to the Near East.

TYRRELL

Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed far greater influence than the Permanent Under-Secretary. This highly intelligent man had been at school in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but had only been abroad for a short time. At first he favoured the anti-German policy, which was then in fas.h.i.+on amongst the younger British diplomatists, but later he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. He influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he was very intimate, in this direction. Since the outbreak of war he has left the Office and found a place in the Home Office, probably because of the criticisms pa.s.sed on him for his Germanophil tendency.

ATt.i.tUDE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London successes and the position which I had managed to make for myself in a short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render my office more difficult. I was left in complete ignorance of the most important matters, and was restricted to the communication of dull and unimportant reports. Secret agents' reports, on matters about which I could not learn without espionage and the necessary funds, were never available to me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that I learnt, quite by chance, from the Naval Attache of the secret Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets in case of war.

The knowledge of other important events which had been known to the Office for a long time, like the correspondence between Grey and Cambon, was kept from me.

IN CASE OF WAR

Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under _no_ circ.u.mstances had we to fear a British attack or British support for any foreign attack, but that _under any circ.u.mstances England would protect the French_. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to a.s.sent to the neutrality formula and England's att.i.tude during the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications.

In addition there were the secret agreements which I have referred to, and which were known to the Office.

I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers, England as a commercial state would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France; because of the necessity of maintaining the European balance of power and of preventing a German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had expressed themselves in the same sense.

THE SERBIAN CRISIS

At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of the Emperor. A few weeks prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour which had not been conferred on any German Amba.s.sador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the _Meteor_ we learned of the death of the Archduke.

H.M. regretted that his efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt.

As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later on I could only remark that amongst Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board the _Meteor_ there was also an Austrian guest of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He had remained in his cabin all the time suffering from sea-sickness, in spite of the splendid weather; but on receiving the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured him.

On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told him that I considered the state of our foreign relations very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time, whilst in France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist Ministry.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. I sought to rea.s.sure him, emphasising the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would never receive Anglo-French support, as both countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow, and he told me that Russia was about to raise 900,000 additional troops. His language betrayed unmistakable annoyance with Russia, which was "everywhere in our way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war; but I learned that Herr von Tschirschky had been reprimanded because he reported that he had counselled moderation towards Serbia in Vienna.

On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia in order to put an end to an impossible situation.

I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance of the news.

I thought that nothing would come of it this time either, and that matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I would not co-operate in a policy of this kind.

Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference at Potsdam on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry received the unqualified a.s.sent of all the leading people, and with the rider that no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about all these matters.

At that time I received instructions to induce the British Press to adopt a friendly att.i.tude should Austria administer the _coup de grace_ to the "Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence to prevent public opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If one remembered England's att.i.tude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would support the intended punitive expedition against the murderers of the prince happened so remote, that I found myself obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also warned them against the whole plan, which I characterised as adventurous and dangerous, and advised them to counsel the Austrians to _moderation_, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localised.

Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready; there would probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we must just risk it.

In view of this att.i.tude, which, as I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under any circ.u.mstances, and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E.

Grey's great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.

At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria, because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard insisting emphatically that, however much the crime merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation.

When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception of the _Standard_--the ever-necessitous, which had apparently been bought by Austria--were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war--indeed, "the world-war."

The British Fleet, which happened to have a.s.sembled for a naval review, was not demobilised.

My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the att.i.tude of the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situation.

Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as M. Pasitch had really agreed to everything, excepting two points, about which, however, he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered.

Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed out the conciliatory att.i.tude of the Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal was that a committee, consisting of M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should a.s.semble under his presidency, and it would have been an easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the points at issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise there was danger of the world-war, through which we stood to gain nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the dignity of Austria--we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters--we left these to our ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."

Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success, and to accept the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary they urged in the direction of war. It would have been such a splendid success.

After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of territory.

Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of territory it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of va.s.salage, and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer it.

The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any circ.u.mstances. It was impossible to interpret our att.i.tude, on a question which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent requests and definite a.s.surances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be ma.s.sacred.

The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey.

Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.

THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR

Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe.

Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st August to tell me that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if France did? I understood that we should then agree to spare France, but he had meant that we should remain altogether neutral--towards Russia also. That was the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In the afternoon, however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and the possibility that we and France might face one another in arms without attacking.

Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any guarantee, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made this report the foundation for far-reaching measures.

Then there came M. Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's telegram. The waverers in the Cabinet--excepting three members who resigned--were converted.

Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting att.i.tude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard from a private source. Even on the 1st August the King had given the President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin announcing the imminent danger of war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.

Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house. I had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he would always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany."