An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations Part 27

The depreciation of money, wherever it takes place, would cause an increase of taxes, even if there were no other reason for it; but, in so far it counteracts itself, by making them to be more easily born. =sic= Whatever its particular effects may be, and however complicated they are, the general tendency of the depreciation of money is to depress industry in that country, and to encourage it in others, where the value is greater than in it.

{142} In America the value of money is less than in England, compared with wages; but the usual proportion, between the wages of labour and the price of corn, is different in that country from every other with which we have any connection.

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CHAP. IX.

_Conclusion of the interior Causes.--Their Co-operation.--Their general Effect on the Government and on the People.--The Danger arising from them does not appear till the Progress in Decline is far advanced_.

Though these causes enumerated have all one general tendency, yet their distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristics deserve attention.

Some begin their operation from the moment the wealth of a country commences, others are only felt late in the progress of its decline. The effects of some may be diminished greatly, others may be prevented entirely; but, in all cases, the attention of government is necessary, and that before the operation of decline is actually commenced; for, prevention, and not remedy, is what ought to be aimed at, besides which, when decline has once begun, governments are too feeble to be capable of any effectual regulations.

To a.s.sist nature, in every case where her operations are favourable to the enjoyment and happiness of men, and to counteract those that are unfavourable, is the business of individuals and of states. What the individual is unable to do, should be done by those to whom the care of public affairs is given; by those who act for the benefit of all, and in the name of all.

From the first approaches of a state to wealth and greatness, we find that there are a combination of causes that begin to operate in promoting its decline. The first moving principle, necessity, is gradually done away, and with it flies industry; so that, from one generation to another, both the moral and physical man becomes changed, till he is unable to sustain the weight that he has raised; and, at last, he is crushed by the decent =sic= of the ponderous ma.s.s.

While a gradual progress destroys that industry, from which all wealth springs, other causes act to remove or misapply the labour [end of page #166] that is left, while others again are putting capital to flight, or leading to a misapplication of it.

Last of all come discord and war, the most universal cause of all those that tend to depopulate a country, and to diminish as well as degrade the inhabitants, thus giving durability to misfortune, and rendering hopeless the fate of a fallen nation.

Amongst all the causes of decline, one alone is found that has a double effect, and counteracts in one direction what it promotes in another.

This is taxation, a very certain cause of ruin if carried too far, and always dangerous; but, for a length of time, having a very powerful effect in repressing the progress of luxury, in continuing the action of necessity, the mother of industry, and in preventing that species of consumption that lays the foundation for the depopulation of a country.

From this it would seem to be almost as dangerous to take off the burthens that have been laid upon a people, as to lay them on with too heavy a hand. There is not any example worth noticing of such a case, therefore, it must stand on its own ground: history informs us nothing on the subject.

The supposed case would be thus. That a nation should rise to a high pitch of wealth by industry, and support a heavy load of taxes, still increasing in wealth, and superior to most other nations. We are to suppose the load of taxes greatly diminished, and then to investigate the consequences.

Perhaps this is an useless hyyothesis =sic=, the case never has been, and perhaps never will be; but, still it is, at least, a possible case; it is a matter of curiosity, at least, if it is not one of utility, and I have a great example to plead as my apology. Dr. Adam Smith amused himself in his inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations =sic= in a similar manner, by a hypothesis concerning the taxation of the British colonies.

Supposing the pressure of necessity were to be suddenly taken away, those whose income is regulated by their efforts would relax in exertion; that is to say, the productive labourers of the country would relax, while those whose incomes are fixed, that is princ.i.p.ally [end of page #167] the unproductive labourers, would become comparatively more opulent, and their luxury would increase.

This is an effect very different from what the public expects. The most useful cla.s.s would gain little or nothing, while the drones of society would find their wealth greatly augmented, which would be one of the most unfortunate effects that could well be conceived, and might very soon bring about a very serious and disagreeable event.

In the course of investigating the national debt of England, in the Fourth Book =sic--there is none.=, it will be necessary to examine this at length, but, there it will be attended with another circ.u.mstance, not one of general consideration; (as national debt is not any general or necessary appendage to a government) namely, the letting loose a great monied capital, which must either be employed here, or it will seek employment in another country, which may rise on the ruin of this.

In considering the reduction of taxes that have been long standing, and have risen to a great amount, there is certainly reason to fear evil consequences, though this is no argument in favour of taxation; on the contrary, it is a reason for avoiding it, for, it is in all cases dangerous to do what it will be attended with danger to undo.

Though the precise case of taxes being done away may never come before us, there is, at this time, an operation going on that is nearly similar, and the result of which will soon be known.

The French people were loaded with nearly twenty-five millions sterling annually to the church, and they do not now pay three. This, indeed, was partly in taxes, and part in church-lands; they have also got rid of a great deal of rent, by the sale of emigrant estates, the lands have got into the hands of men, who mostly cultivate them themselves, and have no rent to pay.

On the supposition that the new government is not more expensive than the old, (and it ought not to be so, the debts having been nearly all wiped off,) the burthens on industry will be much less than formerly, it will then be curious to observe if agriculture flourishes more, if prices are reduced, and if the taxes that still remain are better paid. There are, indeed, many concomitant circ.u.mstances that will tend to derange the experiment, or render the conclusion uncertain; but, still it is an in-[end of page #168] teresting and a great event, and will be worth attentive observation. {143}

We must, so far as this investigation goes, conclude, that, unless the natural tendency of things to decline is powerfully counteracted, every country that rises to wealth must have a fall; and that, therefore, it merits investigation, whether it is or is not possible to counteract the tendency to decline, without interrupting the progress towards greater prosperity, and, to manage matters so, that whether it is not possible, after having attained the summit of wealth, we may remain there instead of immediately descending, as most nations have hitherto done.

From individuals, the exertion necessary is not to be expected; but, it may be looked for from the government of a country, which, though composed of individuals, the succession of persons is differently carried on; it is not from age to age, and from an old father to a young son, but from men in the vigour of life, to men in the vigour of life, who, while they are occupied in public affairs, may be considered, with respect to whatever is to be done for the good of the nation, (for its prosperity, defence, or protection,) as animated with the same spirit, without any interruption.

With respect to the interior causes of decline, they may be counteracted always with more or less effect, by a proper system of govern-

{143} The burthens on the industry of old France, were,

Livres.

Rent of land 700,000,000 Revenues of clergy 600,000,000 Taxes, including the expense of levying 800,000,000 ____________ 2,100,000,000

In sterling money L. 87,500,000 Half land now occupied by the cultivators, } and the remainder let at lower rents } 350,000,000 Revenues of clergy, and the expenses 50,000,000 Taxes as before 800,000,000 _____________ 1,200,000,000 Or in sterling money L. 50,400,000

This makes a diminution of L. 37,100,000; or something more than a third of the whole expense, and more than all the taxes to the state estimated at the highest rate.

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ment. In the latter portion of this work we shall endeavour to shew how that may be attempted with safety, if not accomplished with full success.

Before, however, we conclude this subject, and rely on government, it is necessary to mention that, in treating with other nations, a kind of overbearing haughty pride is natural to those who govern a powerful and wealthy people. In that case, they act as individuals, and are not to be trusted; and the less so, that a nation of proud pampered citizens is but too apt to applaud insolence in those who govern them.

This pride has been a very constant forerunner of the fall of wealthy and great nations, and, in Rome excepted, it has never failed. The emperors of Rome were much less haughty than the amba.s.sadors of the republic; a love of false splendour had supplanted a ferocious affectation of dignity, yet, the former was the less humiliating of the two to other nations. {144}

While the rulers of wealthy nations are apt to act haughtily to others, they are liable to fall into another error, in mistaking the strength of their own people, and loading them too heavily, trusting too much both to their internal energy, and external force.

As the near observers of the inability of the people are generally afraid to carry unwelcome tidings to their superior; and, if they did, as he is seldom inclined to give credit to unwelcome news, the ruin of a nation has probably made a very considerable progress before he, whose business it is to put a stop to it, is aware of the danger.

The continual clamour that is made about every new burthen that is laid on, and the cry of ruin, which perpetually is sounded in the ears of a minister, and of those who execute his orders, are some ex-

{144} The appearance of virtue and self-command, which the republican Romans preserved, added to the bravery with which they maintained whatever claims they put in, overawed a great part of their enemies; and those, who were not absolutely overawed thought that defeat and submission were, at least, robbed of their shame, when such was the character of the conqueror; and the claim once allowed was no longer questioned. Very different was the case, when the emperor was a fidler, or a buffoon, the senators puppets, and the pro- consuls themselves robbers.

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cuses for their not attending to them; but the consequence is not the less fatal to the nation on that account.

A nation that is feeble has, at least, the advantage of knowing it, and is not insensible if she receives a wound; but the government of a powerful nation is like the pilot of a s.h.i.+p, who navigates in a sea, the depth of which he cannot sound, and who spreads all his sails: if he strikes upon a rock, his s.h.i.+p is dashed to pieces in a moment. The other, sailing amongst shallows and sands, proceeds with caution, avoids them if possible, and, if she touches, it is so gently, that even her feeble frame is scarcely injured.

The rulers of nations appear, in general, not to be aware of the evil that arises from the government they have to manage becoming too unwieldly =sic=, or too complicated; in either case, a check, though but of short duration, is irretrievable. This is a great oversight, and, at least, greatly augments the chances against the durability of a government. In proportion as the machine is unmanageable and complex, the embarra.s.sment of those who have the conduct of it will be great, and the enemies will be proportionately bold and audacious.

In all such conflicts, much depends on the spirit of the combatants, and more still on that of those who, at first, are lookers on, who act in consequence of the opinion they have of the force or feebleness of either party. {145}

The tendency that a nation has to decline is not, then, in general, counteracted, by the government; but, on the contrary, is pushed on by it, and precipitated into the gulf. No wonder, then, that the career is rapid, and the fall irretrievable.

It is, nevertheless, to the government, and to it alone, that we must look for that counteracting force that is to stay the general current.

Individuals can only look to their own conduct, and they neither can