An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations Part 30

The exterior dangers of a country are not only more simple in their nature than the interior ones, but, being less silent and gradual in their progress have been more noticed by historians.

Even the ambitious rapacity of the Romans was first directed [end of page #186] against Carthage, on account of its pride and injustice in attacking other states; and, in the history of the nations of the world, there is scarcely a single example of national prosperity being unattended with some degree of pride, arrogance, and injustice; nor can it easily be otherwise, for, notwithstanding all the boasted law of nations, power seems amongst them to be one of the princ.i.p.al claims on which right is founded, though, in the moral nature of things, power and right have not the most distant connection.

It is then an object for those who govern nations, in the first place, to counteract as much as possible the internal tendency to decline, arising from the causes that have been enumerated; and, after having done that, to regulate their conduct with regard to other nations, so as to protect themselves from those external causes of decline, on the existence of which they have no direct influence, but which are not capable of producing any great effect, unless favoured by the internal state of the country, and by the unwise conduct of those by whom it is governed.

_Digression concerning the Importance of Public Revenue_.

No state, what ever its wealth may be, can possess power, unless a certain portion of that wealth is applicable to public purposes. As the want of revenue has not been a very common cause of weakness, we shall give, as an example, the almost solitary, but very strong, case of Poland. Its feebleness, in repelling the attacks of its enemies, was occasioned, in a great measure, by want of revenue. It was with far superior population, with more fertile soil, and a people no way inferior in bravery, greatly inferior in actual exertion to Prussia.

When, at last, the Poles, seeing their danger, united together, and were willing to make every personal exertion and sacrifice, to preserve their country, they had no means of executing their good intentions. They had not kept up an army when it was not wanted, and they could not, on the emergency, create one when it was become necessary. [end of page #187]

The definition given of power makes it a relative thing, and, therefore, the revenue necessary to maintain that power or force must be relative also; it, therefore, depends on circ.u.mstances, what is to be considered as a sufficient or insufficient revenue.

If the United States of America were accessible with ease to European nations, or if they had powerful neighbours on their own soil, they would find their present revenues quite unequal to preserving their independence; but, as it is, perhaps they are the most wealthy civilized nation in the world, if an excess of revenue const.i.tutes wealth.

In Europe, whatever nations are unable to keep up forces sufficient to make those exertions which, according to their alliances and dangers, may be necessary, they are weak from want of revenue, and ought to augment it.

In the course of making greater exertions than the revenues would bear, some nations have contracted debts. It is not the purpose here to enter into the complication such debts occasion, and the alterations they make on the revenue, and the disposal of the revenue of a country; but, so far as that subject is yet understood, it appears that the clear revenue, after paying the interest of the debt, ought to be as great as it would be altogether, if there were no debt; that is to say, after paying interest, there ought to remain a sufficient surplus to pay all the expenses necessary for government and defence.

The money that goes for the payment of interest has some tendency to increase the influence of government at home, but is of no manner of use with regard to enemies.

From the statistical chart here annexed, which shews the relative proportion of the revenues of all the nations in Europe, as well as their actual amount, it is perfectly clear, that, great and extensive as the Russian empire is, it will not be very powerful until its revenues are considerably increased.

The great value of money, and the prices of provisions, and many sorts of warlike stores, enable great armies to be maintained in that country, even with small revenues; but the Russians can make no great effort, at a distance from home, till their revenues are augmented.

The revenues of Spain are considerable; but the free revenue is not, [end of page #188] and it has no credit to supply the place. The same thing may be said of Portugal; and if England had no credit, it would be in the same situation; but as it has better credit than any nation ever had, so, likewise, it is the only one whose efforts have never been in any way, or at any time, either restricted or suspended, for want of money to carry them into effect.

The Dutch were, at one time, situated nearly as England is now; they had not sufficient free revenue, but they had good credit; of which, however, they were not willing to make the necessary use, and the French marched into Amsterdam with greater ease than the Russians did into Warsaw.

The greatest victories of the French, during the revolution, were gained at a time when her regular revenues were inconsiderable, and when she was in a state of absolute bankruptcy. This is considered by some as a proof that force is independent of revenue, and that Frederick the Great was mistaken in saying, that money was the sinews of war; but this case has been misunderstood as well as misrepresented.

Though, in general, regular resources for money are necessary to support war, and regular resources imply revenue, it never was a.s.serted, that, if irregular resources could be obtained, they would not answer the same purpose, so long as they lasted. During the first five years of the French revolution, a sum equal to at least four hundred millions sterling was consumed, besides what was pillaged from the enemy. So that at the time that France was without regular revenue, she was actually expending seventy-five millions sterling per annum: a sum greater than any other nation ever had at its disposal.

The impossibility of such a resource continuing is of no importance in the present argument, although it is luckily of very great importance to the peace of mankind. France supported war, for a certain time, by consuming capital, and without revenue, but not without money; so that what his Prussian Majesty said, stands uncontroverted, and the necessity of revenue, regular and durable, for the maintenance of regular and durable force, is established beyond the power of contradiction. [end of page #189]

EXPLANATION OF STATISTICAL CHART, NO. 2.

In this chart, the different nations of Europe are represented by circles, bearing the proportion of their relative extent. This is done in order to give a better idea of the proportions than a geographical map, where the dissimilar and irregular forms prevent the eye from making a comparison.

The graduated scale of lines represents millions of pounds sterling; and the red lines, that rise on the left of each circle, express the number of inhabitants in millions, which may be known by observing at what cross-line the red one stops.

The yellow lines, on the right of the circles, shew the amount of revenue in pounds sterling.

The nations stained green, are maritime powers; those stained pale red, are only powerful by land.

The dotted lines, to connect the extremities of the lines of population and revenue, serve, by their descent from right to left, or from left to right, to shew how revenue and population are proportioned to each other.

The impression made by this chart is such, that it is impossible not to see by what means Sweden and Denmark are of little importance, as to wealth or power; for, though population and territory are the original foundation of power, finances are the means of exerting it.

What must the consequences be if the Russian empire should one day become like other nations? If ever that should happen, it either will be divided, or it will crush all Europe.

The prodigious territory of Russia, and the immense revenues of England, are the most astonis.h.i.+ng things represented in that chart; they are out of all proportion to the rest. [end of page #190]

========= BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

_Result of the foregoing Inquiry applied to Britain.--Its present State, in what its Wealth consists, ill.u.s.trated by a Chart, shewing the Increase of Revenue and Commerce_.

Having now taken a view, and inquired into the causes that have ruined nations that have been great and wealthy, from the earliest to the present time; having also inquired into the causes that naturally will operate where those did not, and that would, at a later period, have produced the same effect; it is now the business to examine how far and in what way the result of the inquiry applies to the British empire.

The power and wealth of Britain, according to the definition given at the beginning of this work, are founded not on conquests, extent of territory, superior population, or a more favourable soil or climate, or even in bravery; for in those it is but on a par with other nations.

The only natural advantages of Britain are, its insular situation and the disposition of the people, and the excellent form of its government.

From the two first have arisen that good government, commerce, and industry; and on those have arisen again a great naval power, and an uncommon degree of wealth.

In arms, it does not appear that England is so powerful by land, in proportion as in former times: her power must then be considered as a naval power, and that founded princ.i.p.ally on commerce. {153}

{153} Our last brilliant achievements by land were under the Duke of Marlborough; but even then, with allies to a.s.sist, we were but a balance to France. Before the conquest, England seems to have been far below the level of most other nations, as a power by land. Soon after [end of page #191] she appears to have risen above France, and other nations, or they probably rather sunk; but, ever since England became formidable at sea, she has lost her superiority in the army; although she has never sunk under the level, and never, in any instance, were her armies beat when the numbers were equal to those of the enemy.

{Here appears at page 192 the second chart, ent.i.tled

"Chart Representing the Extent, Population & Revenue -of the- PRINc.i.p.aL NATIONS in EUROPE --in 1804--by W. Playfair"}

As such then we have only to examine the foundation on which she stands, and find in what she is vulnerable.

We must first begin with the interior situation, to follow the same order that has been attended to in the rest of the work.

Changes of manners, habits of education, and the natural effects of luxury, are as likely to operate on the British empire, as on some others which they have destroyed.

From the unequal division of property, there is perhaps less danger, but from the employment of capital there is more than almost in any other nation.

From the abuses of law and public inst.i.tutions and _l'esprit du corps_, we run a very great risk; more indeed than under an arbitrary government or even a republic. These last are the dangers that most seriously threaten a nation living under a mixed government.

As to the produce of the soil becoming unequal to the maintenance of a people addicted to luxurious habits, we have much also to fear from that: the operation is begun, and its effects will soon be most serious: they are already felt, and very visible.