World's War Events Volume I Part 36

"SEPTEMBER 25, 11.45.

"I urgently beg for reinforcements; the men are dying from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no news of the battalion."

The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front was a quarter-past nine in the morning. There was no hesitation. At the time mentioned the troops came out of the trenches with the aid of steps or scaling ladders and drew up in line before making a rush at the German trenches.

The operation was rapidly effected. The objective was at an average distance of two hundred metres; this was covered without serious losses.

The Germans were nearly everywhere surprised, and their defensive fire was not opened until after the invading tide of the attackers had pa.s.sed by.

[Sidenote: First German trench penetrated.]

Over the whole attacking front our troops penetrated into the first German trench. But subsequently the progress was no longer uniform.

While certain units continued their forward movement with extreme rapidity, others came up against machine guns still in action and either stopped or advanced only with difficulty. Some centres of the German resistance maintained their position for several hours and even for several days.

[Sidenote: Outline of advance in Champagne.]

[Sidenote: The battle a series of a.s.saults.]

A line showing the different stages of our advance in Champagne would a.s.sume a curiously winding outline, and would reveal on the one hand the defensive power of an adversary resolved to stick to the ground at all costs and on the other the victorious continuity of the efforts of our troops in this hand-to-hand struggle. The battle of Champagne must be considered in the light of a series of a.s.saults, executed at the same moment, in parallel or convergent directions and having for their object either the capture or the hemming in of the first German position, the units being instructed to reform in a continuous line before the second position.

[Sidenote: Unity of the action.]

In order to understand the development, the terrain must be divided into several sectors, in each of which the operations, although closely co-ordinated, a.s.sumed, as a consequence either of the nature of the ground or of the peculiarities of the enemy defences, a different character. The unity of the action was nevertheless ensured by the simultaneity of the rush, which carried all the troops beyond the first position, past the batteries, to the defences established by the enemy on the heights to the south of Py.

[Sidenote: At extremities offensive does not progress.]

At the two extremities of our attacking front, subjected to converging fires and to counter-attacks on the flanks, our offensive made no progress. The fighting which took place in Auberive and round about Servon were distinguished by more than one trait of heroism, but they were destined to have no other result than that of containing the forces of the enemy and of immobilising him at the wings while the attack was progressing in the centre.

[Sidenote: Position from Auberive to Souain a triangle.]

[Sidenote: Wire checks the attackers.]

[Sidenote: Gains maintained.]

(1) _Sector of l'Epine de Vedegrange._ The first German line was established at the base of a wide glacis covered with clumps of trees, and formed a series of salients running into each other. At certain points it ran along the edge of the woods where the supplementary defences were completed by abattis. The position as a whole between Auberive and Souain described a vast triangle. To the west of the road, from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops traversed the first enemy line and rushed forward for a distance of about a kilometre as far as a supporting trench, in front of which they were stopped by the wirework. A counterattack debouching from the west and supported by the artillery of Moronvillers caused a slight retirement of our left. The troops of the right, on the contrary, maintained their gains and succeeded on the following days in enlarging and extending them, remaining in touch with the units which were attacking on the east of the road. The latter had succeeded in a particularly brilliant manner in overcoming the difficulties with which they were confronted.

[Sidenote: Nature of the position captured.]

[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns seized.]

The German position which they captured, with its triple and quadruple lines of trenches, its small forts armed with machine guns, its woods adapted for the purpose in view, const.i.tuted one of the most complete schemes of defence on the Champagne front and afforded cover to a numerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On this front, which was about three and a half kilometres wide, the attack on September 25, 1915 achieved a varying success. The troops on the left, after having penetrated into the first trench, had their progress arrested by machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of the obstacle presented by four successive trenches, each of which was covered by a network of wire entanglements and was concealed in the woods, where our artillery had difficulty in reaching them, the attacking troops gained nearly two kilometres, capturing seven hundred prisoners, of whom seventeen were officers, and seizing two guns of 77 and five guns of 105.

The advance recommenced on September 27, 1915. The left took possession of the woods lining the road from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet as far as the Epine de Vedegrange. Along the whole extent of the wooded heights as far as the western side of the hollow at Souain the success was identical. Notwithstanding the losses they sustained, notwithstanding the fatigue involved in the incessant fighting, the troops pushed forward, leaving behind them only a sufficient force to clear the woods of isolated groups of the enemy who still remained there. Between 4 and 6 p.m. we arrived immediately in front of the second German position.

[Sidenote: Second German position penetrated.]

[Sidenote: Results of attack in this sector.]

On the 27th we penetrated into this position at two points. We took possession of a trench about a kilometre wide, called the "parallel of the Epine de Vedegrange," which is duplicated almost throughout by another trench (the parallel of the wood of Chevron), and the wirework entanglements of which were intact, and precluded an a.s.sault. Further east our soldiers also continued, thanks to the conformation of the terrain, to penetrate into the enemy trench to a depth of about four hundred metres. But it was impossible to take advantage of this breach owing to a concentration of the German heavy artillery, a rapidly continued defence of the surrounding woods, and the fire of machine guns which it was not possible to capture and which were directed from the trenches on the right and left of the entry and exit to the breach. The results attained in this attacking sector alone may be stated thus: fifteen square miles of territory organized for defence throughout nearly the whole of its extent; on September 28, forty-four cannon, seven of 105 and six of 150, and more than three thousand prisoners.

(2) _Sector of Souain._ The enemy lines round about Souain described a wide curve. In the immediate vicinity of our trenches, to the west at the Mill and to the east of the wood of Sabot, they swerved to the extent of over a kilometre to the north of the village and of the source of the Ain.

[Sidenote: Sapping operations.]

[Sidenote: a.s.sault made in three directions.]

When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in order to extend our lines forward to striking distance, to undertake sapping operations in parallel lines, and at times to make dashes by night over the intervening ground. The men working underground got into communication with the trenches by digging alleys of communication. This difficult undertaking was effected with very slight losses, under the eyes and under the fire of the enemy. Our parallel lines approached to within a distance of two hundred metres of the German trenches. The a.s.sault was made in three different directions: on the west in the direction of Hills 167 and 174; in the centre along a line running parallel with the road from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the direction of the farm of Navarin; on the east in the direction of the woods intersected by the road from Souain to Tahure, and in the direction of the b.u.t.te de Souain.

[Sidenote: Machine gun positions surrounded.]

The advance was extremely rapid--on the left two kilometres in less than one hour, in the centre three kilometres in forty-five minutes. At 10 a.m. we had reached the farm of Navarin. Towards the east the forward march was more difficult. Some German machine guns stood their ground in the wood of Sabot and contributed to the resistance of the enemy. This defence was destined to be overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at the wooded region in that part where it is intersected by the road from Souain to Tahure, the a.s.sailants joined up on September 27, 1915 with those of our troops who were attacking to the north of Perthes. They left behind them only what was barely necessary in the way of troops to clear the woods of stragglers.

[Sidenote: The French take guns and supplies.]

Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them with a volley of rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the night. The majority were killed and the survivors surrendered. Several batteries and a large quant.i.ty of _materiel_ (supplies of sh.e.l.ls and provisions, grenades, telephones, wire, light railways) remained in our hands. On the 28th, along the entire length of the sector, we were immediately in front of the second German position. The troops had shown an unparalleled ardour and energy. They had been trained by officers whose courage and spirit of self-sacrifice are indicated by this casualty list; a general of division and four colonels wounded; two colonels killed.

[Sidenote: Wooded region between Souain and Perthes.]

[Sidenote: Region broken up by mines and trenches.]

(3) _Sector of Perthes._ Between Souain and Perthes stretches a wooded region in which already, in February and March, heavy fighting had taken place. At that period we had contrived to take possession on the eastern extremity of this region of the German defences of the wood of Sabot. We had also made progress to the north-west of Perthes, on the summit of Hill 200. But between these two positions the Germans had retained a strong system of trenches forming a salient almost triangular in shape, to which we gave the name of the Pocket (_la Poche_). During the whole year a war of mining had been going on, and the region, which was broken up by concave constructions and intersected in all directions by trenches and alleys of communication, const.i.tuted an attacking ground all the more difficult because to the north of la Poche the somewhat thickly wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of which were in a state of defence, obstructed a rapid advance. This wooded region extends over a width of a kilometre and a half and a depth of four kilometres. The arrangements made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of la Poche, the surrounding of the wood of the Trou Bricot. The junction was to be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the troops a.s.signed for the attack on the eastern border of the hollow at Souain.

[Sidenote: The York trench.]

The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult. Open and comparatively flat, it was defended on the north of Perthes by a triple line of trenches distant 100 metres from each other. At a distance of 1000 metres to 1200 metres a supporting trench, called the "York trench," was almost unique in its entire construction. The open country beyond stretched for a distance of three kilometres up to the second German position (Hill 195, b.u.t.te de Tahure). The princ.i.p.al effort was directed against this pa.s.sage, the left flank of the attack being secured by a subsidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche.

[Sidenote: Attack preceded by artillery fire.]

At 9 a.m. our artillery directed its fire successively against the first-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The attack took place in the most perfect order. The a.s.sailants were already swarming in the German lines when the enemy artillery opened its defensive fire. Our counter-batteries hampered the German pieces and our reserves in the rear suffered little from their fire.

[Sidenote: La Poche position surrendered.]

[Sidenote: The York trench occupied.]

At 9.45 a.m. the two columns which were attacking the extremities of the salient of la Poche joined hands. The position was surrounded. These Germans who remained alive inside it surrendered. At the same time a battalion was setting foot in the defences of the southern edges of the wood of Trou Bricot. The battalions that followed, marching to the outside of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a "left turn" and came and formed up alongside the alleys of communication as far as the supporting trench. At the same moment, in the open country to the north of Perthes, the troops surmounted the three first-line trenches and, preceded by our artillery, made a quick march towards the York trench and occupied it almost without striking a blow.

[Sidenote: Cleaning up the sector.]

Further to the East, along the road from Perthes to Tahure, their advance encountered greater difficulties. Some centres of the German resistance could not be overcome. A sheltered machine gun continued its fire. An infantry officer, with a quartermaster of artillery, succeeded in getting into action a gun at a distance of three hundred metres from the machine gun and in firing at it at close quarters. Of the troops which were advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the eastern border of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the camps, ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in bed. Late in the afternoon one of our regiments had reached the road from Souain to Tahure. Other units were marching straight towards the north, clearing out the little woods on the way. They there captured batteries of which the artillerymen were riveted to their guns by means of bayonets (notably ten pieces of 105 and five of 150).

[Sidenote: Progress hindered by weather.]

The same work was being performed in the woods extending east of the road from Perthes to Souain and Tahure, where batteries were charged and captured while in action. At this spot a regiment covered four kilometres in two hours and captured ten guns, three of 105 and seven of 77. But, from twelve o'clock midday onwards the rate of progress decreased, the bad weather making it impossible for our artillery to see what was going on, and rendering the joining up of the different corps extremely difficult. From the b.u.t.tes de Souain and Tahure the enemy directed converging fires on our men, who were advancing along very open ground. Nevertheless they continued their advance as far as the slopes of Hill 193 and the b.u.t.te de Tahure, and there dug themselves in.

[Sidenote: Contact with second German position.]

The night pa.s.sed without any counter-attack by the enemy. Our artillery, including several field batteries, which had arrived immediately after the attack beyond the York trench, also brought forward its heavy pieces. At dawn the reconst.i.tuted regiments made another forward rush which enabled them to establish themselves in immediate contact with the second German position from the b.u.t.te de Souain to the b.u.t.te de Tahure, and even to seize several advanced posts in that neighbourhood.

But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements remained intact; a successful a.s.sault on them would have been possible only after a fresh preparation. Up to October 6, 1915, the troops remained where they were, digging trenches and organizing a defensive system which had to be constructed all over again on ground devastated by the enemy fire.