World's War Events Volume II Part 13

In this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose that the effort required would not be within our powers.

[Sidenote: Necessity to gain spur and heights.]

The last completed system of defense, before Le Transloy, was flanked to the south by the enemy's positions at Sailly-Saillisel, and screened to the west by the spur lying between Le Transloy and Les Boeufs. A necessary preliminary, therefore, to an a.s.sault upon it was to secure the spur and the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground at this latter village would at once give a far better command over the ground to the north and northwest, secure the flank of our operations toward Le Transloy, and deprive the enemy of observation over the allied communications in the Combles Valley. In view of the enemy's efforts to construct new systems of defense behind the Le Transloy spur, was extended and secured time in dealing with the situation.

[Sidenote: Rain and fog a hindrance.]

Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavorable weather set in and continued with scarcely a break during the remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor visibility seriously interfered with the work of our artillery, and constant rain turned the ma.s.s of hastily dug trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep mud. The country roads, broken by countless sh.e.l.l craters, that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly became almost impa.s.sable, making the supply of food, stores, and ammunition a serious problem.

These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of the advantages we had gained.

[Sidenote: Enemy has time to reorganize.]

None the less, my right flank continued to a.s.sist the operations of our allies against Saillisel, and attacks were made to this end, whenever a slight improvement in the weather made the co-operation of artillery and infantry at all possible. The delay in our advance, however, though unavoidable, had given the enemy time to reorganize and rally his troops. His resistance again became stubborn and he seized every favorable opportunity for counterattacks. Trenches changed hands with great frequency, the conditions of ground making it difficult to renew exhausted supplies of bombs and ammunition, or to consolidate the ground won, and so rendering it an easier matter to take a battered trench than to hold it.

[Sidenote: French take Sailly-Saillisel.]

On September 12 and 18, 1916, further gains were made to the east of the Les Boeufs-Gueudecourt line and east of Le Sars, and some hundreds of prisoners were taken. On these dates, despite all the difficulties of ground, the French first reached and then captured the villages of Sailly-Saillisel, but the moment for decisive action was rapidly pa.s.sing away, while the weather showed no signs of improvement. By this time, too, the ground had already become so bad that nothing less than a prolonged period of drying weather, which at that season of the year was most unlikely to occur, would suit our purpose.

[Sidenote: New line established.]

In these circ.u.mstances, while continuing to do all that was possible to improve my position on my right flank, I determined to press on with preparations for the exploitation of the favorable local situation on my left flank. At midday on October 21, 1916, during a short spell of fine, cold weather, the line of Regina Trench and Stuff Trench, from the west Courcelette-Pys road westward to Schwaben Redoubt, was attacked with complete success. a.s.sisted by an excellent artillery preparation and barrage, our infantry carried the whole of their objectives very quickly and with remarkably little loss, and our new line was firmly established in spite of the enemy's sh.e.l.l fire. Over one thousand prisoners were taken in the course of the day's fighting, a figure only slightly exceeded by our casualties.

[Sidenote: Part of Regina trench carried.]

On October 23, 1916, and again on November 5, 1916, while awaiting better weather for further operations on the Ancre, our attacks on the enemy's positions to the east of Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt were renewed, in conjunction with French operations against the Sailly-Saillisel heights and St. Pierre Vaast Wood. Considerable further progress was achieved. Our footing at the crest of Le Transloy Spur was extended and secured, and the much-contested tangle of trenches at our junction with the French left at last pa.s.sed definitely into our possession. Many smaller gains were made in this neighborhood by local a.s.saults during these days, in spite of the difficult conditions of the ground. In particular, on November 10, 1916, after a day of improved weather, the portion of Regina Trench lying to the east of the Courcelette-Pys road was carried on a front of about one thousand yards.

[Sidenote: Enemy losses.]

Throughout these operations the enemy's counterattacks were very numerous and determined, succeeding indeed in the evening of October 23, 1916, in regaining a portion of the ground east of Le Sars taken from him by our attack on that day. On all other occasions his attacks were broken by our artillery or infantry and the losses incurred by him in these attempts, made frequently with considerable effectives, were undoubtedly very severe.

[Sidenote: Preparations for attack on the Ancre.]

On November 9, 1916, the long-continued bad weather took a turn for the better, and thereafter remained dry and cold, with frosty nights and misty mornings, for some days. Final preparations were therefore pushed on for the attack on the Ancre, though, as the ground was still very bad in places, it was necessary to limit the operations to what it would be reasonably possible to consolidate and hold under the existing conditions.

[Sidenote: Permanent line of enemy fortifications.]

The enemy's defenses in this area were already extremely formidable when they resisted our a.s.sault on July 1, 1916, and the succeeding period of four months had been spent in improving and adding to them in the light of the experience he had gained in the course of our attacks further south. The hamlet of St. Pierre Divion and the villages of Beaucourt-sur-Ancre and Beaumont Hamel, like the rest of the villages forming part of the enemy's original front in this district, were evidently intended by him to form a permanent line of fortifications, while he developed his offensive elsewhere. Realizing that his position in them had become a dangerous one, the enemy had multiplied the number of his guns covering this part of his line, and at the end of October introduced an additional division on his front between Grandcourt and Hebuterne.

[Sidenote: Barrage to cover infantry.]

At 5 o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1916, the special bombardment preliminary to the attack was commenced. It continued with bursts of great intensity until 5.45 o'clock on the morning of November 13, 1916, when it developed into a very effective barrage covering the a.s.saulting infantry.

[Sidenote: St. Pierre Divion taken.]

At that hour our troops advanced on the enemy's position through dense fog, and rapidly entered his first-line trenches on almost the whole front attacked, from east of Schwaben Redoubt to the north of Serre.

South of the Ancre, where our a.s.sault was directed northward against the enemy's trenches on the northern slopes of the Thiepval Ridge, it met with a success altogether remarkable for rapidity of execution and lightness of cost. By 7.20 a.m. our objectives east of St. Pierre Divion had been captured, and the Germans in and about that hamlet were hemmed in between our troops and the river. Many of the enemy were driven into their dugouts and surrendered, and at 9 a.m. the number of prisoners was actually greater than the attacking force. St. Pierre Divion soon fell, and in this area nearly 1,400 prisoners were taken by a single division at the expense of less than 600 casualties. The rest of our forces operating south of the Ancre attained their objectives with equal completeness and success.

[Sidenote: Objectives reached on right bank of Ancre.]

North of the river the struggle was more severe, but very satisfactory results were achieved. Though parties of the enemy held out for some hours during the day in strong points at various places along his first line and in Beaumont Hamel, the main attack pushed on. The troops attacking close to the right bank of the Ancre reached their second objectives to the west and northwest of Beaucourt during the morning, and held on there for the remainder of the day and night, though practically isolated from the rest of our attacking troops. Their tenacity was of the utmost value, and contributed very largely to the success of the operations. At nightfall our troops were established on the western outskirts of Beaucourt, in touch with our forces south of the river, and held a line along the station road from the Ancre toward Beaumont Hamel, where we occupied the village. Further north the enemy's first-line system for a distance of about half a mile beyond Beaumont Hamel was also in our hands. Still further north--opposite Serre--the ground was so heavy that it became necessary to abandon the attack at an early stage, although, despite all difficulties, our troops had in places reached the enemy's trenches in the course of their a.s.sault.

[Sidenote: Beaumont carried.]

Next morning, at an early hour, the attack was renewed between Beaucourt and the top of the spur just north of Beaumont Hamel. The whole of Beaumont was carried, and our line extended to the northwest along the Beaucourt road across the southern end of the Beaumont Hamel spur. The number of our prisoners steadily rose, and during this and the succeeding days our front was carried forward eastward and northward up the slopes of the Beaumont Hamel spur.

[Sidenote: Allies command Ancre Valley.]

The results of this attack were very satisfactory, especially as before its completion bad weather had set in again. We had secured the command of the Ancre Valley on both banks of the river at the point where it entered the enemy's lines, and, without great cost to ourselves, losses had been inflicted on the enemy which he himself admitted to be considerable. Our final total of prisoners taken in these operations, and their development during the subsequent days, exceeded 7,200, including 149 officers.

[Sidenote: Enemy kept on alert.]

Throughout the period dealt with in this dispatch the role of the other armies holding our defensive line from the northern limits of the battle front to beyond Ypres was necessarily a secondary one, but their task was neither light nor unimportant. While required to give precedence in all respects to the needs of the Somme battle, they were responsible for the security of the line held by them and for keeping the enemy on their front constantly on the alert. Their role was a very trying one, entailing heavy work on the troops and constant vigilance on the part of commanders and staffs. It was carried out to my entire satisfaction, and in an unfailing spirit of unselfish and broad-minded devotion to the general good, which is deserving of the highest commendation.

[Sidenote: Great number of raids.]

Some idea of the thoroughness with which their duties were performed can be gathered from the fact that in the period of four and a half months from July 1, 1916, some 360 raids were carried out, in the course of which the enemy suffered many casualties and some hundreds of prisoners were taken by us. The largest of these operations was undertaken on July 19, 1916, in the neighborhood of Armentieres. Our troops penetrated deeply into the enemy's defenses, doing much damage to his works and inflicting severe losses upon him.

[Sidenote: Main objects of offensive achieved.]

The three main objects with which we had commenced our offensive in July had already been achieved at the date when this account closes, in spite of the fact that the heavy Autumn rains had prevented full advantage from being taken of the favorable situation created by our advance, at a time when we had good grounds for hoping to achieve yet more important successes.

Verdun had been relieved, the main German forces had been held on the western front, and the enemy's strength had been very considerably worn down.

[Sidenote: Ample compensation for sacrifices.]

Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme battle. The attainment of all three of them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of our troops and for the sacrifices made by ourselves and our allies. They have brought us a long step forward toward the final victory of the allied cause.

[Sidenote: German failure at Verdun.]

The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had invested that place with a moral and political importance out of all proportion to its military value. Its fall would undoubtedly have been proclaimed as a great victory for our enemies, and would have shaken the faith of many in our ultimate success. The failure of the enemy to capture it, despite great efforts and very heavy losses, was a severe blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he had openly expressed as to the results of the struggle.

[Sidenote: Eastward movement of German troops checked.]

Information obtained both during the progress of the Somme battle and since the suspension of active operations has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the enemy's main forces tied to the western front. A movement of German troops eastward, which had commenced in June as a result of the Russian successes, continued for a short time only after the opening of the allied attack. Thereafter the enemy forces that moved east consisted, with one exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme battle, and these troops were already replaced on the western front by fresh divisions. In November the strength of the enemy in the western theatre of war was greater than in July, notwithstanding the abandonment of his offensive at Verdun.

[Sidenote: Somme offensive relieved Verdun.]

It is possible that if Verdun had fallen large forces might still have been employed in an endeavor further to exploit that success. It is, however, far more probable, in view of developments in the eastern theatre, that a considerable transfer of troops in that direction would have followed. It is therefore justifiable to conclude that the Somme offensive not only relieved Verdun but held large forces which would otherwise have been employed against our allies in the east.

The third great object of the allied operations on the Somme was the wearing down of the enemy's powers of resistance. Any statement of the extent to which this has been attained must depend in some degree on estimates.

There is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to place it beyond doubt that the enemy's losses in men and material have been very considerably higher than those of the Allies, while morally the balance of advantage on our side is still greater.

[Sidenote: Enemy resistance feebler.]

During the period under review a steady deterioration took place in the morale of large numbers of the enemy's troops. Many of them, it is true, fought with the greatest determination, even in the latest encounters, but the resistance of still larger numbers became latterly decidedly feebler than it had been in the earlier stages of the battle. Aided by the great depth of his defenses and by the frequent reliefs which his resources in men enabled him to effect, discipline and training held the machine together sufficiently to enable the enemy to rally and reorganize his troops after each fresh defeat. As our advance progressed, four-fifths of the total number of divisions engaged on the western front were thrown one after another into the Somme battle, some of them twice, and some three times; and toward the end of the operations, when the weather unfortunately broke, there can be no doubt that his power of resistance had been very seriously diminished.

[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns taken.]