The Federalist Papers Part 15

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In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the state legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those a.s.semblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile cla.s.s, will ever be a favourite object of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of state power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect that the state legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But as in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of the federal house of representatives; an improper bias towards the mercantile cla.s.s, is as little to be expected from this quarter or from the other.

In order perhaps to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government, which may produce an endeavour to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed cla.s.s? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a laboured answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere a.s.signed, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the union, than in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the const.i.tution in favour of the landed cla.s.s, because that cla.s.s would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And, thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound, as would be occasioned by the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interests, from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favour, by the urgent calls of public necessity.

I rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavour to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of the "wealthy and the well born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time, it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.

But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are the wealthy and the well born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several states? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns and the cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot, or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to beae) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of elections to particular districts, would be as subversive of its own aim, as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, times, the the places, places, and the and the manner manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and fixed in the const.i.tution, and are unalterable by the legislature. of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and fixed in the const.i.tution, and are unalterable by the legislature.

Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted, that all the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of the national rulers; still, I imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution, without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object, has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment, that such a force might exist; and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it, would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favourite cla.s.s of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients, which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remotest extremes of their respective states to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to subst.i.tute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?

PUBLIUS

No. 61

BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON

The same subject continued, and concluded

THE MORE CANDID OPPOSERS of the provision, contained in the plan of the convention, respecting elections, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of it; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be held in the counties where the electors reside. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless: so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers, must be sufficient to satisfy all dispa.s.sionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several state const.i.tutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the lat.i.tude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from that which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But, as that review would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the state in which I write. The const.i.tution of New York makes no other provision for locality locality of elections, than that the members of the a.s.sembly shall be elected in the of elections, than that the members of the a.s.sembly shall be elected in the counties; counties; those of the senate, in the great districts into which the state is, or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived, that it would not be more difficult for the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the senate and a.s.sembly for that county and district? Can we imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, &c. or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the a.s.sembly or senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to partic.i.p.ate in the choice of the members of the federal house of representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an those of the senate, in the great districts into which the state is, or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived, that it would not be more difficult for the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the senate and a.s.sembly for that county and district? Can we imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, &c. or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the a.s.sembly or senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to partic.i.p.ate in the choice of the members of the federal house of representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the const.i.tution of this state; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in respect to the const.i.tutions of most of the other states. from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the const.i.tution of this state; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in respect to the const.i.tutions of most of the other states.

If it should be said, that defects in the state const.i.tutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed; I answer, that, as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is, that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the state const.i.tutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or, at most, they can only be asked to a.s.sign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people, in a single state, should be more impregnable to the l.u.s.t of power, or other sinister motives, than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought, at least, to prove to us, that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are dest.i.tute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction, in a single state, should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular cla.s.s of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen states, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circ.u.mstances, prejudices, and interests.

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage, which will accrue from this disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circ.u.mstance of uniformity, in the time of elections for the federal house of representatives. It is more than possible, that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare; both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each state may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several states, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be, that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The ma.s.s would be likely to remain nearly the same; a.s.similating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example, which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think, that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty, than one-third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.

Uniformity, in the time of elections, seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the senate; and for conveniently a.s.sembling the legislature at a stated period in each year.

It may be asked, why then could not a time have been fixed in the const.i.tution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention in this state, are in general not less zealous admirers of the const.i.tution of the state, the question may be retorted, and it maybe asked, why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the const.i.tution of this state? No better answer can be given, than that it was a matter which might safely be intrusted to legislative discretion; and that, if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added, that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several states of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments, and for the national government, at the same epoch.

PUBLIUS

No. 62

BY JAMES MADISON

Concerning the const.i.tution of the senate, with regard to the qualifications of the members; the manner of appointing them; the equality of representation; the number of the senators, and the duration of their appointments

HAVING EXAMINED THE CONSt.i.tUTION of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate.

The heads under which this member of the government may be considered, are, I. The qualifications of senators: II. The appointment of them by the state legislatures: III. The equality of representation in the senate: IV The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected: V. The powers vested in the senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age, and a longer period of citizens.h.i.+p. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions, is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust; which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires, at the same time, that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, partic.i.p.ating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merit and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the state legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for const.i.tuting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favouring a select appointment, and of giving to the state governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.

III. The equality of representation in the senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional proportional share in the government; and that among independent and sovereign states bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an share in the government; and that among independent and sovereign states bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an egual egual share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason, that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the const.i.tution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller states. The only option then for the former, lies between the proposed government, and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless antic.i.p.ation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason, that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the const.i.tution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller states. The only option then for the former, lies between the proposed government, and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless antic.i.p.ation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a const.i.tutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small states: since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the states into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the const.i.tution of the senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be pa.s.sed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the states. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may, in some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favour of the smaller states, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other states, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger states will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser states; and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the const.i.tution may be more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and, in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an inst.i.tution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their const.i.tuents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative a.s.sembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that, as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circ.u.mstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.

Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous a.s.semblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent pa.s.sions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought moreover to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate, lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an a.s.sembly of men, called, for the most part, from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarra.s.sments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads, rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding, session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well const.i.tuted senate?

A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to a.s.sert, that, in the American governments, too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal const.i.tution avoids this error: and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourth. The mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable inst.i.tution in the government. Every new election in the states, is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbours may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his: and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another, what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage of the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbours. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarra.s.sed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood: if they be repealed or revised before they are promulg[at]ed, or undergo such incessant changes, that no man who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known and less fixed.

Another effect of public instability, is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the monied few, over the industrious and uninformed ma.s.s of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the few, the few, not for the not for the many. many.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils, damps every useful undertaking; the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no a.s.surance, that his preparatory labours and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all, is that diminution of attachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected, without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.

PUBLIUS

No. 63

BY JAMES MADISON

A further view of the const.i.tution of the senate, in regard to the duration of the appointment of its members

A FIFTH DESIDERATUM, ILl.u.s.tRATING the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations, is important to every government, for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honourable policy: the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong pa.s.sion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbia.s.sed part of mankind.

Yet, however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an a.s.sembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island, would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that state, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister states; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone, would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now labouring.

I add, as a sixth defect, the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces this responsibility. The remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the const.i.tuents. The objects of government may be divided into two general cla.s.ses: the one depending on measures, which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps un.o.bserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident, that an a.s.sembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for plans or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share share of influence, which their annual a.s.semblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a of influence, which their annual a.s.semblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its const.i.tuents. body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its const.i.tuents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circ.u.mstances which point out the necessity of a well constructed senate, only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an inst.i.tution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers: so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular pa.s.sion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own pa.s.sions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region, cannot, like the crouded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent pa.s.sions; or to the danger of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying, that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured in a former paper to show, that it is one of the princ.i.p.al recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining, for a longer time, under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect, that history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first, there was a senate for life. The const.i.tution of the senate in the last, is less known. Circ.u.mstantial evidence makes it probable, that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other, which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some inst.i.tution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circ.u.mstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circ.u.mspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial inst.i.tution, are common to a numerous a.s.sembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an inst.i.tution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests: but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation, which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint therefore in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true, in the lat.i.tude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing representing them in their them in their executive executive capacity. capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine archons, annually elected by the people at large. elected by the people at large. The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period we find an a.s.sembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period we find an a.s.sembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the people; elected by the people; and and partially partially representing them in their representing them in their legislative legislative capacity, since they were not only a.s.sociated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity. capacity, since they were not only a.s.sociated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the and considered as the representatives representatives of the people, almost in their of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary plenipotentiary capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the people; elected by the people; and have been considered by some authors as an inst.i.tution a.n.a.lagous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body, the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people. and have been considered by some authors as an inst.i.tution a.n.a.lagous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body, the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear, that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political const.i.tutions. The true distinction between these and the American governments, lies in the total exclusion of the people, in their collective total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share in the capacity, from any share in the latter, latter, and not in the and not in the total exclusion total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the of the representatives of the people from the administration of the former. former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favour of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favour of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, ill.u.s.trated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the const.i.tution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient; that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former, as well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, is apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the state legislatures; must then corrupt the house of representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident, that the senate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the house of representatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself, that the proposed senate can, by any possible means within the compa.s.s of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is p.r.o.nounced by experience. The const.i.tution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The senate of that state is elected, as the federal senate will be, indirectly by the people; and for a term less by one year only, than the federal senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment; and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colourable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the senate of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal const.i.tution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland const.i.tution is daily deriving from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any state in the union.

But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary a.s.sembly of opulent n.o.bles. The house of representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years; and in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display, the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument, the British history informs us, that this hereditary a.s.sembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the house of representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for life; continually gained on its authority, and finally drew all power into their own hands. The tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. This fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second punic war, lost almost the whole of its original portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this a.s.semblage of facts, that the federal senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the const.i.tution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the const.i.tutional authority of the senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves.

PUBLIUS

No. 64

BY JOHN JAY

A further view of the const.i.tution of the senate, in regard to the power of making treaties

IT IS A JUST, and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either, as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed const.i.tution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.

The 2d section gives power to the president, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, PROVIDED TWO-THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR." PROVIDED TWO-THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."

The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The convention appear to have been attentive to both these points: they have directed the president to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the state legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, the hopes, and fears of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.

As the select a.s.semblies for choosing the president, as well as the state legislatures who appoint the senators, will, in general, be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The const.i.tution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the elections to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that, as an a.s.sembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters; so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the president and senators so chosen, will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several states or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.

Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs, has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular a.s.sembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circ.u.mstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures, which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed, is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of rendering their acc.u.mulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way, as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for, by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information, will be preserved.

There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who a.s.sent to the truth of this position, will see and confess that it is well provided for, by making the concurrence of the senate necessary, both to treaties and to laws.

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons, whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the senate, and still less in that of a large popular a.s.sembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the president must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.

They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides, very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs, is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circ.u.mstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the most favourable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pa.s.s, and they who preside in either, should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered, from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the const.i.tution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. The matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy, and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures, which are no otherways important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the main objects. For these the president will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circ.u.mstance occur, which requires the advice and consent of the senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see, that the const.i.tution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigation, on the one hand; and from secrecy and despatch, on the other.

But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged.

Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions const.i.tutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws pa.s.sed by our legislature. All const.i.tutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and, therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them power to do every other act of sovereignty, by which the citizens are to be bound and affected.

Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme law of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties, like acts of a.s.sembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country; but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they

The Federalist Papers Part 15

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