Pius IX. And His Time Part 2

Pius IX. had made up his mind to inst.i.tute thoroughly representative and const.i.tutional government. And this was all that the Roman people, as yet, desired. They were only anxious that the views of the Pontiff should be speedily carried into effect. Accordingly, Prince Corsini, the Senator (Mayor), and the eight princ.i.p.al members of the Munic.i.p.al Council, were commissioned to make known their wishes to the Pope. His reply was dignified and candid. In declaring his intention to grant the const.i.tution which they asked for, he took care to intimate in the most decided manner that he was not making a concession to the urgency of the moment, but accomplis.h.i.+ng his premeditated purpose. "Events," said he, "abundantly justify the request which you address to me in the name of the Council and Magistracy of Rome. All are aware that it is my constant study to give to the Government the form which appears to me to be most in harmony with the times. But, none are ignorant, at the same time, of the difficulties to which he is exposed, who unites in his own person two great dignities, when endeavouring to trace the line of demarcation between these two powers. What, in a secular Government, may be done in one day, in the Pontifical can only be accomplished after mature deliberation. I flatter myself, nevertheless, that the preliminary labours having been completed, I shall be able, in a few days, to impart to you the result of my reflections, and that this result will meet the wishes of all reasonable people."

On the 14th of March, accordingly, was published _the fundamental statute for the temporal government of the Holy See_, and so was inaugurated const.i.tutional rule in the most complete and straightforward manner which it is possible to conceive.

The const.i.tution was framed according to the model of the French Liberal Monarchy of 1830, so modified as to render it capable of being adapted to the Pontifical Government. Under its provisions there were a Ministry which was responsible, and two Houses of Parliament, one of which was elective, and the other composed of members who should hold their appointment during their lifetime. To the Council of State belonged the framing of laws to be afterwards submitted to the votes of the two Chambers.

In all const.i.tutional monarchies, the a.s.sent of the sovereign is necessary, in order to give the force of law to measures voted by Parliament. So, under the const.i.tution promulgated at Rome by Pius IX., the College of Cardinals were const.i.tuted a permanent council, whose office it was to sanction finally the decisions of the Legislative Chambers. Such, in substance, was the statute by which the Pontifical States became undeniably const.i.tutional. A few days later the Ministry was named. Three-fourths of their number were laymen. Cardinal Antonelli was appointed President or First Minister. And thus the const.i.tution was no sooner framed than it came into operation, so anxious was Pius IX. to advance the interests and meet the wants and wishes of his people.

Now, one would say, grat.i.tude only could await the Pontiff. But no! at the moment when, of all others, he was ent.i.tled to rely on the devotedness of his people, a new and great difficulty arose.

By the diplomacy of 1815, at the close of the great European War, certain portions of Italy had been left subject to German rule. By war only, some Italians imagined, could this evil be removed. This was an extravagant idea. War could only raise up new enemies to the cause of Italy and that regeneration which appeared to be so near at hand. Diplomacy would have served them better. What it had done at one time, under pressure of the most trying circ.u.mstances, it would have been ready to achieve when circ.u.mstances were changed, and imperatively demanded a new order of things.

In the new emergencies that had arisen, the learning and ability of statesmen ought, at least, in the first instance, to have been appealed to. As between individuals, it is reasonable that all peaceful means of adjusting a quarrel should be employed, so, in the greater affairs of nations, all the arts of statesmans.h.i.+p ought to be had recourse to before resort is had to bayonets and blood. How successful such a course would have proved, and how beneficial to the cause of Italian liberty, is more than sufficiently shown by the great result which diplomacy obtained, when Austria, insisting on treaty rights, displayed the flag of war at Ferrara.

In that case, no doubt, the Pope was the chief diplomatist. But would he not have been so, likewise, when there was question, not of one city only, but of many of the greatest cities and best provinces of Italy? It is not to be supposed, that in these more momentous circ.u.mstances he would have found "the Barbarians" more hard to deal with. Austria, indeed, was so barbarous as to ignore that exquisite refinement of modern times, which despises religion and its ministers; and so she would have shown, as of old, her reverence for the Pontiff, by withdrawing, at his request, her soldiers from Italian soil.

The Italians, however, did not think so. They would have war, cost what it would. The people even of the Papal States, whose august Chief could have conquered without war, were bent on the same fatal purpose. They were wholly under the influence of the Socialist agitation, and no wiser counsel could be made to prevail.

It was decided among the popular leaders that the question of war should be agitated in the greatest a.s.sembly which it was possible to gather together. The Coliseum was appointed as the place of meeting, and it was destined to present an unwanted spectacle, a grand but ill-omened scene.

All Rome, it may be said, was congregated in the ancient arena, the favorite tribunes at their head. These demagogues were determined that the question of war should be settled by acclamation, hoping thus to influence the Sovereign Pontiff to induce him to abandon his policy of neutrality by this imposing display of opinion and excitement, by so much popular enthusiasm, by such intoxication, so to say, of patriotism. At an early hour the vast arena was already crowded. All orders of the State were there-n.o.bles, Burghers, Soldiers, Princes-everybody. Priests even came in tolerable numbers to swell the crowd, and monks of every order, ecclesiastics of every college, members of every congregation. Such was the immense open air a.s.semblage in which the question of the new crusade was to be solemnly discussed. It would have been a grand and noteworthy spectacle, had it not been arranged beforehand by skilful leaders who were adepts in the art of getting up revolutionary displays. In the great a.s.sembly there may have been sincerity. In the chief actors there was none. Such a spontaneous expression of public sentiment, if really such, would, indeed, have been imposing-grand. Viewed only as a theatrical performance of parts learned to order-and it was nothing more-it was deserving of nothing but contempt. There was in this display, besides, a sinister and melancholy feature-a set of actors practising on the popular mind to-day, in order to discover what they might safely attempt to-morrow.

Near the tribune which overlooks the arena were ranged all those agitators who were destined to become, at a later period, so notorious in the commotions of the time. Among them was observed Padre Gavazzi, a Barnabite monk, whose puerile vanity made him aspire to distinction, and whose career was already marked by pretentious eloquence, a bombastic style, confused ideas, and a mind still undecided as to the limits of orthodoxy, which, a little later, he stepped beyond. He was the preacher of _the crusade_. Next came the shepherd poet, Rosi; Prince Canino's Secretary, Masi; a young French monk of the order of Conventualists, Dumaine; Generals Durando and Ferrari; the journalist, Sterbini, afterwards so fatally popular; and, of course, the demagogue, Cicerruacho, who had been, at first, enthusiastic in the cause of the Pope, but who now burned for war, and, ere long, imparted to the revolution a character of fitful fanaticism and absurd sympathies. The day was spent in magniloquent addresses, which affected the style of ancient types, urgent exhortations to war, poetical orations, rounds of applause, rapturous demonstrations.

The result was, lists for the enrolment of volunteers; the establishment in the different quarters of the city of tables for receiving patriotic offerings, and a threatening demonstration against the Quirinal Palace, where it was intended to force the Pope to bless the colours for the expedition against Austria.

The movement was now beyond all control. The orders of the Pope were treated with a sort of respect, but not obeyed. The spirit of rebellion was abroad, although the people still made a show of reverence. They were no sooner from the presence of the Pontiff than they transgressed his most sacred commands. Pius IX. had distinctly specified, when he authorized the enrolment and the departure of volunteers, that it was his intention and his will that the expedition should be exclusively defensive; that it should protect the territory, but avoid pa.s.sing the frontier. The leaders, notwithstanding, adding perfidy to rebellion, made use of the Pontiff's name in order to deceive the people. General Durando had no sooner arrived at Bologna than he issued a proclamation, in which, falsifying the Pope's wishes, he adduced his authority in order to encourage the war.

"Radetsky," said he, "fights against the cross of Christ. Pius IX. has blessed your swords together with those of Charles Albert. This war of civilization against barbarism is not merely national, it is a Christian war. With the cross and by the cross, we shall be victorious. G.o.d wills it."

Nothing could have tended more completely to compromise the character of the Pontiff. It became necessary, accordingly, to publish the Encyclical Letter of 29th April, 1848. "Men are endeavouring," said the Holy Father, in this admirable doc.u.ment, "to disseminate suspicions that are injurious to the temporal administration of our States. It is our duty to prevent the scandal that might thus be given to the simple and unreflecting." He then proceeds to declare that he is resolved to expose clearly and to proclaim loudly the origin of all the facts of his Government. He refers to the memorandum of 1831, which contained the collective counsels of the European Cabinets to the Apostolic See, recommending the necessary reforms. Some of these reforms were adopted by Gregory XVI. Circ.u.mstances and the danger of the times caused others to be deferred. Pius IX.

considered that it was his duty to complete what his predecessor had begun. He does not disclaim having taken the initiative on certain other points. He had pardoned extensively, and he congratulates himself on this clemency. He repels the calumny which would ascribe to the reforms which he had inaugurated the general movement of Italy towards its enfranchis.e.m.e.nt. This agitation he attributes to events that occurred elsewhere, and which became facts of overwhelming influence for the whole of Europe. Finally, he protests that he gave no other order to his soldiers than that which required that they should defend the Pontifical territory. He cannot be held responsible for the conduct of those amongst his subjects who allow themselves to be swayed by the example of other Italians. He had given his orders distinctly. They had been transgressed.

On the disturbing question of war with Austria, the _Encyclical_ bears the following words:

"They would have us declare war against Austria. We have thought it our duty to protest formally against such a resolution, considering that, notwithstanding our unworthiness, we hold on earth the place of Him who is the Author of peace-the Friend of charity; and that, faithful to the Divine obligations of our Apostolate, we embrace all countries, all peoples, all nations, in a like sentiment of paternal love. Nor can we refrain from repelling, in the face of all nations, the perfidious a.s.sertions of those who desire that the Roman Pontiff should be the chief of the government of a new republic, consisting of all the peoples of Italy.

"Moreover, we earnestly exhort, on this occasion, these same Italian peoples to keep particularly on their guard against these treacherous counsels. We conjure them to remain devotedly attached to their princes, whose affection they have experienced. To act otherwise would be not only to fail in their duty, but also to expose Italy to discord and factions. As regards ourselves, we declare once more that all the thoughts and all the efforts of the Roman Pontiff tend only to increase every day the kingdom of Jesus Christ, which is the Church, and not to extend the limits of the temporal sovereignty, with which Divine Providence has endowed the Holy See, for the dignity and the free exercise of the sublime Apostolate."

No better argument could have been offered in reply to those parties who clamored so unreasonably for war. Nor could the Pontiff have vindicated more eloquently the pacific character of that religion of which he is the Chief and Representative on earth. At the same time, he offered wise and authoritative counsel to the Italian nationalities. It was too late. The voice of friendly warning remained unheard amidst the din of strife and revolution. Need it be added-the cause of liberty perished for a time, victimized by its own excess.

The Socialist party had succeeded in gaining the populace of Rome, and they now const.i.tuted a power which prevailed in the city, whatever it might have been in the field. Skilfully managed by its leaders, it gave law to the Pontifical government. The Pope was not, however, powerless. A merely secular sovereign would have been crushed. He would have had no other resource than to abdicate. The Holy Father was not reduced to this extremity. He was still able to repel the unacceptable measures which the Socialists endeavoured to thrust upon him. They and their myrmidons vociferated for war with Austria. The Pope could still say there should be no war, and his people did not engage in the contest. A few among the Roman youth took the field. But, as effeminate as they were ardent, their courage cooled at the first sight of a _barbarian_ camp. They returned to their hearths, and there talked magniloquently of the tented fields which they had traversed, the savage hordes which they had encountered, and the dangers they had escaped. The party succeeded, however, in forcing a ministry on the reluctant Pontiff. Such a thing, when done through the representative body, however unreasonable, does not so much shock our idea of const.i.tutional government. Neither can we approve the conduct of a faction which, whilst it was anything but const.i.tutional, imposed a minister who held its principles, on the prince who had, of his own accord, become a const.i.tutional monarch. Count Mamiani was one of those whom the clemency of Pius IX. had restored to their country, of all the parties thus favored, he alone refused to become bound in honor to the Holy Father never to abuse the favor, but to remain always a good and faithful subject. He was not without ability; was well informed, cool and resolute, but without any fixed principle in politics. He would as readily have set up a Red Republic as a const.i.tutional monarchy. His political conduct was guided more by events and circ.u.mstances than by any well-conceived idea of what is right and fitting. He was one of those Italian Liberals who might be compared to the Necker of the French Revolution, whilst Mazzini and his followers were the ultra-radicals-the Robespierres of Roman politics. The Mamiani ministry necessarily arose out of the popular commotions, and was a protest of the excited ma.s.ses against the Encyclical of 29th April. Its policy was no secret. In the days of popular turmoil they immediately preceded his nomination. Mamiani had declared distinctly in his harangues to the people that no priest should be appointed to any public office; that although Pius IX. should remain at the head of the government, they ought to obtain from him the revocation of his Encyclical of 29th April, and a declaration of war against Austria; that a new expedition should be speedily organized, and that an official bulletin of the war should be published daily. The warlike and revolutionary p.r.o.nunciamentos, thus pompously made, could not fail to arouse the enthusiasm of the mult.i.tude, whose excitement was already so great. In matters of this nature, however, it is more easy to make fine speeches than to act. The popular Tribune was no sooner elevated to the ministry than he came to experience this difficulty. So it was convenient to forget the grand lessons which he had labored so vehemently to impress upon the people. He still, however, insisted, or appeared to insist, on the Austrian war. It may have been necessary for the new minister, in order to maintain his influence over the ma.s.ses, to announce a war policy.

Such policy, nevertheless, was chimerical. It was decidedly opposed by the legitimately-const.i.tuted powers of the State-the Sovereign on the one hand, who, by his name, his character, his virtues, his office, was still powerful; and on the other, the representative body. Accordingly, when this body came together in the beginning of June, there was an end to the government of the streets. But there arose new difficulties, and these difficulties the government of the Holy Father diligently studied to overcome. Cardinal Altieri delivered, on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff, an energetic and moving exhortation in support of unity and concord.

At the same time, he expressed his earnest hope that the newly-elected deputies would show their good will by concurring with the ministry in rendering the new adaptation of the const.i.tution compatible with the Pontifical government.

This address, however ineffectual, possessed the merit of being thoroughly const.i.tutional. The same praise cannot be awarded to Count Mamiani's inaugural oration. Next day, which was the 9th of June, he ascended the Tribune, and there enunciated ideas which belonged more to the ministry in their individual capacity, than as the representatives of their Sovereign.

This was supremely unconst.i.tutional, and could only be the result of inexperience. What knowledge could those men have had of a free and national const.i.tution? They ought, at least, to have been guided by the laws of honesty and honor. Who will say that they were so, when they gave out that the opinion which they expressed in favor of war was also that of the Pontiff? They endeavored thus to extend the sanction of a venerated name to designs that were subversive of Pontifical rule. Neither inexperience nor ignorance of const.i.tutions presents any valid excuse, or even palliation of such a proceeding. No doubt they called it policy. It was the basest trickery.

In the hands of honest and judicious ministers the new const.i.tution might have proved successful. So thought many persons who were well informed and competent to form an opinion in regard to so difficult a question. It had also many well-wishers. But for the war agitation, it would, to all appearance, have had a different fate. According to the exaggerated idea of Italian patriotism which prevailed, all true Italians were bound to fight for their country. On the Mamiani ministry devolved the very arduous task of reconciling this warlike spirit with the pacific character of the Pontificate. The Pope, like any other sovereign, had a right, no doubt, to defend himself. But both the theology which guided him and the traditions of his sovereignty forbade him to wage war on any people. Such was the difficulty which it fell to the lot of his ministry to solve. The arguments to which they had recourse, however well meant, were certainly very puerile. The Pope, as such, they insisted, might decide for peace, and condemn the shedding of blood, whilst, as temporal sovereign, he would authorize his ministers to act as should seem to them proper, and they would declare for war. This miserable sophistry only showed the weakness of the government which employed it. The Pontiff could not be expected to act as if he were two distinct persons. Nor whilst his ministers waged war, could he, whose representatives they were, be considered as neutral.

For a few months that this ministry remained in office, the Pope continued to save his States by resisting the war-cry in opposition to their wishes.

They were constantly at variance with him on this one great topic. His repugnance to war they could neither comprehend nor overcome. Popular demonstrations of the most threatening kind were often made, but to no purpose.

Justum et tenacem propositi virum, Non civium ardor prava jubentum mente quat.i.t solida.

The Pontiff could not be moved from his firm resolve. The ministry, however, was shaken. With no better stay than sophistry and inconsistency, its weakness became apparent, and, as had been for some time clearly inevitable, it fell.

Before considering further the statesman-like efforts of Pius IX. in the cause of reform, it may not be out of place to review briefly the political opinion of the time. Although all men cannot be expected to accept, especially in many important matters, all the ideas of those distinguished writers, Gioberti, Balbo, D'Azeglio, it would be unjust, nevertheless, to deny them the credit of having imparted new vigor, if not its first impulse, to the cause of reform in Italy. They were not, like so many others, rash and inconsiderate. They desired not to hurry on recklessly to the wished-for goal. They thought it was unwise to aspire, all at once, to the greatest degree of liberty that might be attained. The end in view could be best reached, they conceived, by judicious and well-timed measures of reform, and by such inst.i.tutions as might be developed at a later period, when the Italian people, unaccustomed as yet to a const.i.tutional _regime_, should be capable of a greater degree of freedom. Nothing more wise can be supposed than this view of educating the people for liberty before bestowing on them the precious boon. Their idea of commencing the work of reform by waging war on Austria does not appear to be so commendable. It was not, surely, the part of prudence, when on the eve of a great and arduous undertaking, to stir up enemies on every side. And this was really what they sought to do by provoking Austrian hostility. The government at Vienna was not inclined to be hostile. It had joined with other powers in recommending reform to the late Pope. And now it would rather have been an ally than an enemy. But the "barbarian"

Germans were entirely odious to the Italian people. The power of education ought to have been brought to bear on this same people, if only in order to disabuse their minds of this one noxious prejudice. It had become necessary at length to extend to them the benefits of a political education. And surely the eradication of illiberal ideas would have formed a profitable branch of study.

Pius IX., as has been already shown, was a practical reformer, and he had zealously undertaken the work of reform. Austria was not inclined to throw any impediments in the way of his patriotic labors. Only on one occasion did that powerful empire show a disposition to interfere. It was when Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff were threatened by popular commotions. Then, even on the representation of the Holy Father, Austria laid down her arms.

With these const.i.tutional reformers, if we except their insane idea of waging a needless war, very little fault can be found as politicians. So lately as the early part of the year 1848, their opinions were generally accepted throughout Italy. They were, at that time, also the most powerful party. Their numbers, authority and talent, gave them a decided superiority, whilst the Republicans were still a weak minority. In a few months, to all appearance, everything was completely changed. Talent, respectability, authority, and influence, were still on the side of the const.i.tutional reformers. But, in the meantime, the Red Republic had gained the command of numbers. How this came to pa.s.s it may be well now to enquire.

In every great community there are many people who have no fixed principles in politics, and others, perhaps, not less numerous, who have no political principles at all. Both these cla.s.ses of people depend entirety on other men for the sentiments and opinions by which, at any given moment, they shall be guided. Such people were sufficiently numerous at Rome and the other cities and provinces of Italy. Demagogues, therefore, who were not without ability and possessed fluency of speech, found it no very difficult task to fas.h.i.+on as they had a mind, for these cla.s.ses of citizens, any amount of political principles and _programmes_.

Those even who were fairly imbued with const.i.tutional ideas, but whose minds were not wholly decided, the leaders of the Red Republic endeavored, and not without success, to gain to their side, by persuading them to compromise, as regarded certain points, to modify their opinions on others, change their designations, enter into coalitions, and adopt such ingenious arrangements as were proposed to them. Thus, by degrees, and as was only to be expected in such circ.u.mstances, the ultra-radicals succeeded but too well in causing the most extravagant political notions to prevail among the ma.s.ses. As fate would have it, the revolution in France of February, 1848, which brought to an end the const.i.tutional monarchy, afforded no slight aid and encouragement to the Red Republic of Italy. The men of this party might have understood, on reflection, to what extreme peril France became exposed, when she preferred brute force to const.i.tutional proceeding, and tore down by violence a system which was, in many respects, good; and which, inasmuch as it was a const.i.tution, could in due time have been extended and improved, receiving, as new wants arose, and wisdom and experience warranted, new developments, new adaptations, and daily increasing excellence. The const.i.tutional element once removed, there was no medium between and safeguard against absolutism; on the one hand, and on the other anarchy, or the reign of violence and terror.

The extremists of Italy, however, beheld only in the too successful action of the Parisian populace a new step towards liberty. It became the duty of the Italian people, they declared, to march onward in the wake of enlightened France, and seize the prize that was at length presented for their acceptance. By such counsellors were the people abused and led astray. The moderate reform party were themselves excited by the enthusiasm which events had inspired, and heeded not the snares which the radical chiefs were laying for them. They were thus caught in the toils of those designing men, whilst they imagined that they were only working out their own idea. They supposed even that they were gaining Mazzini, whilst, in reality, Mazzini was making proselytes of them. Gioberti and his more immediate friends, who certainly were not without their faults, were abandoned by the crowd.

Reverting to what has been said already concerning Mazzini and his political doctrines, there need be no hesitation in p.r.o.nouncing him the evil genius of modern Italy. In his book, "Italy in its Relations with Liberty and Moral Civilization," which was published in France, where he was an exile, in 1847, he formally declared that "Young Italy" (the extreme Republicans) was the only party that could exercise any decisive influence on the destiny of Italy. At the same time, he treated with supreme contempt the ideas and hopes of the Reform party. In his mystic republic only was to be found, he affirmed, _the principle of unity, the ideal formula of actual progress_. This theory was the idol at whose shrine he offered sacrifice. His followers were also his fellow-wors.h.i.+ppers, and he was their high priest. They were fascinated by his brilliant utopias. He was no longer a legislator, a politician, a philosopher only. He was a man of inspiration, a prophet, the Mahomet of a new hegira. His sayings were oracles. His doctrines were enunciated in sententious and poetical language; and from his place of exile they were disseminated over the Italian peninsula. It has been shown already how generously Pius IX. had recalled from banishment many subjects who had violated the laws of their country. These men were, at one time, no doubt, sincerely grateful, and showed how highly they appreciated the clemency of the Pontiff. It is not, however, surprising, if, as is usual in such circ.u.mstances, they began to consider more the severity which punished than the goodness which forgave them. Mazzini, among others, dissembled for a time. It may be-it has even been suggested that he was at first sincere, and had n.o.bly resolved to sacrifice his favorite ideas to the cause of Italy. This opinion, however, was destined to be soon dispelled.

It was not long till the newspaper _Italia del Popolo_, revealed the fact that he still held to extreme and revolutionary views. The minds of the people were poisoned by the ravings of this journal, and filled with mistrust. It became the instrument by which sects and parties were stirred up to work the ruin of the country. "_Unita e non unione. a.s.semblea del Popolo Italiano e non dieta._" "_Unity; not union. The a.s.sembly of the Italian people; not a federal diet._" Such was the watchword of Mazzini's paper. And now the ma.s.ses in the streets, under the guidance of the revolutionary leader, vociferated, "Live the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly!" with as much wild enthusiasm as they had formerly shouted for Pius IX. and reform. They had no distinct idea as to the meaning of the cry, but held it to be something extreme-a boundless measure of liberty. The populace wanted nothing better; and so they continued to shout, as they believed, for unity and Republican Government. Such a system was, from the very nature and position of the States of Italy, impracticable, and without pressure from without, foreign war-which the Mazzinians so much deprecated-could never have been established. How bring under the yoke of a general popular convention so many diverse peoples? They were all Italian, no doubt, but of different races, different nationalities, and each of them had for ages enjoyed its own national laws, customs, manners, prejudices, predilections, and antipathies. Nor had they common interests.

What would be good and suitable in one State might, by no means, be adapted to the requirements of another; might even in some cases prove disastrous. The Grand Dukes had, by their mild and liberal rule, endeared themselves to the Tuscan people. Piedmont and Naples were alike devoted to their respective monarchies. The people of the Papal States, with the exception of the populace of Rome, were loyal to their government. That populace was greatly increased in 1848 by the influx of strangers-men holding Republican opinions, who were diligently culled from foreign nationalities. All but these abnormal ma.s.ses were attached to the wise and clement rule of their Pontiff Sovereigns. Of late years many things had occurred to confirm their devoted loyalty. Above all, proof had been given that the sacred monarchy itself could, without any diminution of its real power and dignity, adopt such political reforms as were adapted to the wants of the time. All these monarchies, already so moderate and popular, were becoming every day more const.i.tutional. Were they now to be overthrown? The Mazzinian idea aimed at nothing less. And yet, what would it not have cost? So many time-honored rights would never have been given up without a struggle-without bloodshed, if they were at all to be sacrificed. The torch of civil strife would have blazed from end to end of the Italian peninsula. And the ruin of the ancient monarchies-if, indeed, they had been destined at that time to fall-would probably have been succeeded by more despotic forms of kingly rule.

If, at the time in question, the people of the different States of Italy had acted in concert, uniting their influence, they would have a.s.sumed an imposing att.i.tude, and might have obtained not only the forbearance but the aid even of their powerful neighbors in developing such of their inst.i.tutions as already contained germs of liberty, in extending const.i.tutional rights which had long existed in monarchies that were by no means absolute. In the place of political wisdom, however, a universal mania appeared to prevail. In the confusion of popular demonstrations, and the clamor of party cries, the "still small voice of reason" was unheard.

The revolutionary chiefs harangued anew for war, and Italy, listening to their ill-omened counsels, took up arms against its sovereigns; and so gave the death-blow to its political existence.

The moderate Reform party conceived a plan which, if it had been carried into effect, would have been attended, no doubt, with great and happy results. They proposed to unite all the States of Italy by means of a Federal Parliament. They directed their efforts in the first place to promote union between the rulers and the people, recommending to the former moderation, to the latter a wise forbearance. They hoped thus to postpone the idea of absolute unity, and of the popular convention by which it was designed to establish and maintain it. The federal diet, an excellent idea of which was reduced to writing by the reverend and learned Abbate Rosmini, would have held the place of this a.s.sembly. According to this plan of confederation, the Pope, the King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the other Princes would have been united in an offensive and defensive league. Based on these principles, and provided that nothing were admitted in its details which could interfere with the sacred character and office of the Sovereign Pontiff, the proposed political arrangement would have found favor generally with all who held const.i.tutional views. Eminent authors, at least, have written concerning it approvingly. M. Laboulaye, in his learned work on Count Balbo, says:

"It was necessary that the Princes should be induced to take an interest in the independence which concerned them so much, by forming a confederation like the _Zolverein_, which has so powerfully contributed to the union and the greatness of Germany.

A confederation is undoubtedly that organization which is most suited to the character and the history of Italy, and it is also the best means of reviving Italian nationality and of checking Austria."

Need it be added, that when there should have been question of restraining Austria, there would have been at hand an influence which Austria respected, and to which that mighty empire and its disciplined armies would have yielded more readily than to all Italy in arms. Without a confederation, or an arrangement equally good, there could be no better lot for Italy than civil war and national ruin.

Events, meanwhile, were hastening on with alarming rapidity. The Red Republic persisted in maintaining its idea. The danger with which the country was threatened from without did not, in the least, moderate its efforts, and they were attended by the only results which they were calculated to produce. Italy remained divided. The sword of Charles Albert could not cope alone with the formidable arms of Austria. A united people might have stayed the tide of battle. The imposing spectacle of their union might even have influenced the German Cabinet, and the legions of Radetsky might never have presumed to cross the Mincio. But it was fated to be otherwise. Excess followed on excess, and the inevitable consequence was speedy chastis.e.m.e.nt. "_Perish Italy rather than our idea_," was the watch-cry of the Socialist leaders. And as if fate had combined with their phrenzy to destroy a people, Italy was crushed by the invader. What cared they? What imported it to them that their country was brought low, and its Princes humbled in the field of Novara? The downfall of the Sardinian monarch, which at the same time was the defeat of Italy, was to them a victory. One more impediment to their designs was removed. "_The war of Kings_," said Mazzini, "_is at an end; that of the people commences_." And he declared himself a soldier. But Garibaldi did not long command him. His warlike enthusiasm was soon exhausted. _The war of the people_ also ended disastrously; and the revolutionary chief, tired of the sword, resumed his pen and renewed his attacks on the moderate Reformers, who alone had fought, like brave men, in the Austrian war. The strife of words was more congenial to the revolutionist; and he set about editing a new publication. In this journal he raged against the Reformers. They were a set of traitors, ante-chamber Machiavels, who had muzzled the popular lion for the benefit of kings and aristocracies.

These _Machiavels_ were such men as Count Balbo, who had given his five sons to the war of independence; Signor D'Azeglio, who had been in the campaign with Durando, and who had a leg broken by a ball at Vicenza, whilst defending Monte Benico with two thousand men against twelve thousand Austrians. D'Azeglio, still smarting from his wounds, as well as from the insults of these reckless politicians, replied in a pamphlet, which appeared under the t.i.tle of "Fears and Hopes." He took no pains to spare those club soldiers, those tavern heroes and intriguers, who could wage war so cleverly against the men who had stood under the enemy's guns.

"For my part," he wrote, "I do not fear your republic, but despotism. Your agitation will end with the Croats." And so it fell out. The prediction was but too speedily and too completely realized. A French author, M.

Mignet, comments on this subject at some length, and with remarkable eloquence:

"A party as extreme in its desires as in its doctrines, and which believes that it is possessed of nothing so long as it does not possess everything, and which, when it has everything, knows not how to make anything of it, imagined the establis.h.i.+ng of a republic in a country which is scarcely capable of attaining to representative monarchy, and where the only thing to be thought of, as yet, was territorial independence. This party divided the thoughts, weakened the efforts of the country, and caused mutual mistrust to arise between those governments and peoples which were reconciled under const.i.tutional liberty, and had an understanding against the common enemy. They thus compromised the deliverance of the land. The King of Naples, threatened by an insurrection in his capital, retained his troops that were on the point of marching to the theatre of war; the Pope ceased to give encouragement; the King of Piedmont, already in full march, hesitated; and Italy, agitated, without being free, became once more powerless, because she was disunited, and beheld the Austrians reappear as conquerors, and re-establish themselves anew as masters, in the recovered plains of Lombardy."

These eloquent words confirm the view so generally entertained, that the Red Republicans were all along the cause of Italy's disasters. In consequence of the national weakness which their baneful operations produced, Radetski was enabled to reconquer Upper Italy, whilst they themselves directed their steps towards Rome, spreading terror as they approached, even as if they had been an army of Goths and Vandals.

Swelling by their presence the numbers of men who held the same opinions, who, like them, were dissatisfied, and whom nothing could satisfy, they occasioned an extraordinary agitation of the people, caused fearful disquietude, and excited inordinate hopes. They imbued the ma.s.ses with their subversive principles, and there was an end to all transaction with the Papal government. They had already done all that lay in their power in order to destroy monarchy in Piedmont. They now brought into play every scheme that could be devised, in order to advance the sinister work of dispossessing the Holy Father. They succeeded in gaining many Reformers, who, too easily, allowed themselves to become their dupes.

At first, as has been shown, the popular demonstrations in honor of Pius IX. were honestly expressive of grat.i.tude to the beneficent Pontiff. The Socialists now succeeded in gaining possession of this great influence, and they employed it, certainly, with consummate ability. The ma.s.ses, when once under the spell of agitation, are at the disposal of the boldest demagogues. The Reformers who had allowed themselves to be ensnared, continued to sing their patriotic hymns, the Roman _Ma.r.s.eillaises_, without heeding that Socialist radicalism was imperceptibly taking the crown of the causeway, and that the popular demonstrations had undergone a complete change. At an earlier date "Young Italy" had only used them as a threat. They were now an arm in its hands. And so it governed in the streets, making a tribune of every milestone.

There was only wanting to them at this moment a common centre or general headquarters of insurrection, from which should go forth the word of command, the signal for every rising of the people. This was found in the celebrated _Roman Circle_. This circle was a kind of convention without commission-a travelling cohort of two or three hundred agitators, who carried from town to town the dread and dismal flag of the Red Republic.

This mob-power had, in opposition to the wishes of the Holy Father, brought into office the Mamiani ministry. This weak and irresolute minister broke the ranks of his own party, and pa.s.sed over to "_Young Italy_". This party now dictated to him on all occasions. They urged on him with special earnestness war with Austria, knowing full well that the Pope would never agree to it, and so by his refusal would decline in popularity.