South Africa and the Boer-British War Part 29

[Sidenote: Why Were the Guns Lost]

Another question forces itself upon the student of the situation as it existed at this time: Why could not the guns on the British side of the river, more than a furlong from the bank, be put under the fire of British marksmen and saved? Why were the Boers, who came over and swarmed around them safe, while the British had been crushed on that very spot by an "inferno" fire? The Boers could hardly have been in superior force and position on both sides of the river. Early in the action the British had captured Colenso and the houses near the bridge.

That position should have offered advantages for those who could consider the propriety of remaining upon the defensive. General Buller certainly was wise in not sacrificing lives in attempts that he saw would for some cause be vain to bring off the guns; indeed, he should have desisted when beaten on the left. The life of Captain Roberts had been sacrificed in the attempt to recover the guns, but the long-range rifle in the hands of marksmen could have detained them on the ground where they were abandoned. If the position of the enemy was impregnable from the beginning, as is the conclusion in England, the commanding general should have known it and had the courage of his conviction to accept the defeat on the left as the end of the day's experiment. It was according to his reputation, however, to repeat the effort to force the river with increase of energy. But all depended upon the distance from the river that was to be pa.s.sed--a battery could be in range of the Boer's position and not stricken with their rifle fire and put out of action. There was no eye that made and applied this measurement. It is another form of the question: At what distance is a self-c.o.c.king revolver a better weapon than a magazine rifle?

[Sidenote: Buller's Explanation]

The key to the intelligence of the further proceedings is that the Boers were strongly posted on the south side of the river and pressing at close quarters the right wing of the British army. General Buller explains his refusal to continue the effort to gain possession of the abandoned artillery and the men sheltered in the ravine of retreat, saying, "Of the eighteen horses thirteen were killed, and, as several of the drivers were wounded, I would not allow another attempt, as it seemed they would be a sh.e.l.l mark." This is definite, but not conclusive. The wounding of several drivers does not seem to have been important enough to change the fortunes of the fight; but the fact that, the general adds, he could not sacrifice life in a gallant attempt to force a pa.s.sage, "unsupported by artillery," gives the reason, and a good one, for not attempting to "force a pa.s.sage." The language implies that Buller was at the moment the battery was put out of action attempting to cross at the second ford--the one on the right.

Of course, it was not possible to do that without the support of artillery, and it might be very difficult with the support of artillery. [Sidenote: Conduct of the Men] The general in one sentence refers to the intense heat, and adds that the conduct of the troops was "excellent," and says, in conclusion, "We abandoned ten guns." Right after saying he would not try to force a pa.s.sage without artillery he remarked, "I directed the troops to withdraw, which they did in good order. Throughout the day a considerable force of the enemy was pressing on my right flank, but was kept back by the mounted men under Lord Dundonald." Though they were kept back, they were making themselves very disagreeable on General Buller's side of the river; and this happened, as exactly stated, under "the still blazing sun." One company of riflemen, half a mile away, with plenty of ammunition, if marksmen, could have made the abandoned guns too hot for the Boers to take away. The last line of the official report is, "We have retired to our camp at Chieveley." There was nothing else to do. The day was lost, and full particulars show the Boer position was impregnable.

Buller had to make the attacks, and it was good generals.h.i.+p that gave up the a.s.saults with a loss less than eight per cent. of troops engaged.

[Sidenote: Fuller Accounts Needed]

There is a great deal in General Buller's report that some day will have to be made more intelligible--if not to himself, in justice to the world at large. If the Boer position was impregnable, he ought not to have a.s.saulted it, and he should have known the fact when he ceased fighting on the left. There are many indications that the first attack was more disastrous than has been reported, certainly more so than the official reports represent it, and the second effort, that on the right, according to the facts that have emerged from the turbid dispatches, was a palpable mistake; for the loss of the guns and the retreat five miles to the camp from which the army had moved in the morning, was in consequence of the second failure of the day, and the pressure, which General Buller noticed with grave concern, of the Boers on the right flank of the British. The mystery of that "pressure" is partially cleared through Laffan's Agency in these words: "The cavalry brigade had a very hot engagement. Lord Dundonal, who was in command, tried to take Lhangwana Hill on our extreme right. He found the hill occupied, by a strong force of Boers." This, of course, was on the British side of the river. [Sidenote: Pressed All Along the Line] A flanking attack was made on the Boers, but their lines "ran along some high ground to the right of the flanking party," and that prevented the capture of the hill. Lord Dundonald had a battery which sh.e.l.led the Boers "until at mid-day" an order to retire was received. The battle was, therefore, going on on the right flank at the same time that it was taking place at the left hand, and, therefore, when the central movement was made by bringing up the artillery to the point where it was put out of action and the guns were captured, the British had been hard pressed all along the line, for Dundonald--we quote the correspondent--"was unable to carry out the order (given out immediately to retire) for another two hours, because as soon as the men began to move they became a target for the enemy's fire, and it was only under a continuous sh.e.l.l fire that the retirement was eventually effected." Here we have Dundonald, with his battery and his mounted men, attempting to carry the extreme Boer left and getting into the same shape that Colonel Long got the battery, which was to put themselves forward as a target of the Boer rifle fire, so that they could not get away for hours, if at all. The Boers dominated the whole field of battle. At this point, on the right wing the British losses were not very heavy, and the men were not discouraged, but fell back reluctantly. [Sidenote: Bad Light and No Smoke] The failures in other parts of the contested ground could not be remedied there, for, "owing to the bad light, it was impossible to see the Boers, and as they used smokeless powder, firing did not reveal their position." This "bad light" on the right flank comes in as a last and lamentable resort, when there was so much complaint of the intensity of the suns.h.i.+ne in other parts of the field; and it is a strain to try to understand the strange story that the Boers were obscure at all times and places and the British everywhere conspicuous. The loss of the cavalry brigade was "something more than 100 killed and wounded," but, as a writer on the spot says, this was not "tremendous."

[Sidenote: Defeat Admitted]

The soldierly character of General Buller is that of a man in full command of his faculties in extra hazardous situations. This has been shown in the Ashantee, Egyptian, Soudan and Indian fighting in which he has partic.i.p.ated with great distinction. No other British officer has seen as much war in Africa as General Buller before his recent experience, and as his report of the reverse on the Tugela is read and examined line by line, it is seen the general felt he could afford better to take the blame on himself in full, with the exception of the placing of the batteries, than to make criticisms upon the conduct of any of the officers and men of his command; and he tells that he "heard," did not see, that "the whole of the artillery I had sent back," etc. The guns must have been used in the first attack on the left, and sending "back" was moving to the right. It is not in evidence that the batteries were exceptionally hurt until then, and there are accounts to show that they were not quickly put out of action, and so situated that they could not be helped to ammunition, nearly all the horses killed and the men wounded. The guns were not abandoned until after "continuous heavy firing we ran short of ammunition," and the men were "ordered under cover," but with "absolutely no thought of abandoning the guns, which were in no way disabled." There could be no more expressive admission of defeat.

[Sidenote: Dazed by Defeat]

As the case is critically examined, the magnitude of the British disappointment on the left, in the hook of the river, clearly amounted to a serious reverse. The general commanded the guns "back," and Colonel Long got with them too close to the river. The circ.u.mstances do not indicate that this movement was absolutely aggressive. The judgment of the general that nothing more could be done on the left was correct, but we can hardly appreciate the extreme surprise that he showed when the failure on the left was repeated with on the right; and it strikes one who strives to follow the changes of the engagement that the "pressure" from the Boers on the British right was the factor that determined General Buller to give the order to retreat. The explanation of this is that in the afternoon the situation of the British army was more critical than has been admitted, and yet General Buller had more than 15,000 neither killed, disabled nor captured. It must be true that the defeat added to the series of serious reverses of which it was the culmination, affected the army, so that the general was impressed there might be in the conditions the elements of a far greater disaster, and he took on himself more blame than was his share of the responsibility for the issue. If this is controverted, he must himself have been profoundly affected and awed, if not dazed, by the immense disappointment of the day, during which the three British attacks were successive demonstrations of an impracticable undertaking; and late in the day, the four o'clock march in the morning, the intense heat, the extreme exertion, and the discouraging results of all encounters with the enemy "took it out" of the British army for the day, until it was the belief of the general, whose fame has been that of coming out under desperate circ.u.mstances with striking achievements, that there would be more certainly risked than possibly gained in further efforts to save the guns and hold the field, and hence the order to return to camp.

[Sidenote: Startled and Disturbed but Haughty]

The call for Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener to save the campaign, the refusal of risks until Lord Roberts arrived, is based upon information that the War Office and the Commander-in-Chief have not shared with the world at large. The defeat of the army of General Buller in attempting to cross the Tugela River for the relief of the strenuously besieged city of Ladysmith was in the positive likeness of the preceding reverses of the British arms on three other lines and, therefore, more startling and disturbing to the people of Great Britain and the Greater Britain, but they met the renewed and increased demands upon them with a gloom that was haughty, and a resolution that did not falter, for they knew it was in the issue to lose or gain an empire. The official figures of British casualties in the Battle of Colenso were, officers killed 5, wounded 36; men killed, 145, wounded 751; missing, officers 21; men 332. Total, 1,290--about eight per cent.

[Sidenote: Buller Attacks]

The Boer account of the battle dated Colenso, December 15, 1899, said:

"At dawn to-day the long-expected attack by the British was made.

Commandant Pretorius, with the artillery, gave the alarm that General Buller's Ladysmith relief column was advancing on the Boer positions close to the Tugela and Colenso, and was in full battle array.

"The centre consisted of an immense body of infantry, while the flank was formed by two batteries of artillery. On each side were strong bodies of cavalry supporting the troops.

"The Boer artillery preserved absolute silence and did nothing to disclose their position. Two batteries of British artillery came up within rifle range of our foremost position, and the Boers then opened fire with deadly effect. Our artillery next commenced operations, and, apparently, absolutely confused the enemy, who were allowed to think the bridge open for them to cross the river.

"The British right flank meanwhile attacked the southernmost position held by the Boers, but our Mauser rifle fire was so tremendous that they rolled back like a spent wave, leaving ridges and ridges of dead and dying humanity behind them.

"Again the British advanced to attack, and again they fell back, swelling the heaps of dead. The cavalry charged up to the river, where the Ermelo commando delivered such a murderous fire that two batteries of cannon had to be abandoned. So tremendous a cannonade has seldom been heard. The veldt for miles round was covered with dead and wounded.

"The result of the engagement was a crus.h.i.+ng British defeat. Nine cannon were captured and brought across the river.

"The official returns of the Boer losses were thirty killed and wounded."

[Sidenote: "A Crus.h.i.+ng British Defeat."]

All this about a combat in which the British losses, the names of the killed, wounded and missing given, a.s.suring accuracy were one per cent.

of Buller's men in action were killed. One wonders what words the Boers will have left to use if they do win a great battle. The British account is in some respects less florid than that of the Boers. We quote the account least picturesque of the correspondents:

[Sidenote: A British Account]

"The Dublins and Connaughts advanced magnificently against the almost overwhelming fire, men falling at every step. As they approached the river the enemy's fire seemed to redouble. Every time a company rose to its feet to advance there was a perfect crash of musketry, and the plain all round them became a cloud of dust spurts. It seemed wonderful that any man could survive it. And yet there was nothing to tell where the enemy lay concealed. Not a single head even was visible; nothing but a long line of smoke, scarcely visible, and the incessant crackling roar. The batteries sent sh.e.l.l after sh.e.l.l wherever they could distinguish the line of the trenches, but they failed to silence the terrible fire. At last our men reached the river, but where there should have been a ford there was seven feet of water. The few who tried to cross it, overcome by the weight of rifle and ammunition, were drowned. The rest lined the bank, and poured in a tremendous fire on the still almost invisible enemy. Then came the general's order to retire."

A letter from General Buller's camp, showing that the British army, on the way presumably to relieve Ladysmith, consisted of twenty-three battalions (23,000 men), says, "It is not to be expected that a single battalion had 600 men in the firing line. Many barely had 400. I am making a generous calculation by allowing 500 men per battalion."

The press states Buller had 30,000 men, including the sick, camp guards, camp duties, lines of communication troops, standing pickets and standing posts, permanent signallers, clerks, orderlies, cooks, bakers, butchers.

[Sidenote: A Foredoomed Failure]

Then come the deductions made on the field escorts, flag signallers, orderlies, detached flankers, ammunition bearers, stretcher bearers, fall-outs, and Buller's attacking force was 10,000 infantry, 700 sabers and 48 guns. It requires infantry to take a position, and it is the drill book defined principle that an attack to have a chance of success must be four a.s.sailants to one defender. The Boers could put as many in the trenches as the British could send against them, and, therefore, the a.s.sault was a foredoomed failure.

CHAPTER IX

The Siege of Ladysmith.

[Sidenote: Location of Ladysmith]

The siege of Ladysmith began November 2, 1899, the third day after the British disaster at Nicolson's Nek, that is, the affair in which six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers marched out with four companies of the Gloucesters.h.i.+re regiment to seize the Nek, seven miles northwest of Ladysmith, and they were caught, the mules stampeded with artillery and ammunition, and the Fusiliers and supports were penned, and there were next day empty camps and the British Empire was shaken. The town of Ladysmith is 169 miles from Durban, 3,285 feet above the level of the sea, and is the chief town of the Klip River division of the Klip River country in Natal; it is on a tongue of land formed by the Klip River. There is a sheltering semi-circle of hills. The position of General White, the British commander, is out of town on the hill tops that overlook Ladysmith. The town hall in this place is of the Doric style, and cost $30,000. It is of blue whinstone and white freestone.

The town is an important railway center, and has shops for railway repairs. The distance from Colenso where Buller was checked is only sixteen miles. Dundee is distant forty-seven and a half miles; Glencoe forty-two miles; Estcort fifty-three miles. When General Symons won the fight at Dundee and was mortally wounded, he ordered that he and other wounded be placed in hospitals and his column marched to Ladysmith. General Symons had won the field, carried a very strong position brilliantly but with heavy loss, and retreated before the rus.h.i.+ng reinforcements of the Boers. General Yule set out with the able-bodied troops--four battalions of infantry, three batteries, and a small body of the 13th Hussars. By daybreak they were nine miles away in the hills. At 2 P.M. they had reached Beith, subsequently pa.s.sing unmolested through the rocky defiles of Waschbank, emerging safely on the third day into the open country. General White, finding a Boer attempt would be made to cut off Yule, sallied forth and drove the Boers from their position on a hill 8,000 feet high. [Sidenote: Timely Arrival of Naval Brigade] While General White was out fighting, the Naval Brigade, that has done so much to a.s.sist the British defence of Ladysmith, arrived. General White reported 3 P.M., October 30th:

"I sent No. 10 Mountain Battery with Royal Irish Fusiliers and Gloucester Regiment to take up a position on the hills to clear my left flank. The force moved at 11 P.M. last night, and during some night firing the battery mules stampeded with some of the guns, which, however, I hope to recover. The two battalions have not yet returned, but are expected this evening."

[Sidenote: First Serious Reverse]

This was the first notice of the disaster. At 11.35 P.M., October 30th, General White sent his announcement of the first "serious reverse," in these terms:

"I have to report a disaster to a column sent by me to take a position on hill to guard the left flank of the troops in these operations to-day.

"The Royal Irish Fusiliers, No. 10 Mountain Battery, and the Gloucester Regiment were surrounded in the hills, and, after losing heavily, had to capitulate.

"I formed the plan in carrying out which the disaster occurred, and am alone responsible for the plan.

"No blame whatever attaches to the troops, as the position was untenable."

[Sidenote: The Excitement in London]

The excitement and depression in London about this news was representative of that throughout the empire, and it was astonis.h.i.+ng in its degree. The Boers hastened to close around Ladysmith and cut off railroad and telegraphic communication, and very soon had connected railway tracks giving themselves free run into Natal and communication with Pretoria. In the gloom of these inauspicious incidents the siege of Ladysmith began, forcing the policy of relief of places in the most difficult country to prevail, and making costly combats certain, and scattered operations, according to ordinary judgment, necessary. It is a question that will long be discussed whether it would have been better to destroy the stores at Ladysmith and withdraw the troops to Colenso, or even further, for concentration and movement with one irresistible column, but this is all speculation. The siege of Ladysmith is a stirring chapter of history forever.

[Sidenote: Distribution of Forces]

Sir George White's official report was forwarded by Sir Redvers Buller from Cape Town, under date of November 9th. Sir George took command of Natal forces October 7th, and he says:

"The information available regarding the positions occupied by the armies of the two Dutch Republics showed the great bulk of the forces of the Orange Free State were ma.s.sed near the pa.s.ses of the Drakensberg mountains, west of Ladysmith. The troops of the South African Republic were concentrated at various points west, north, and east of the northern angle of Natal."

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE TREACHERY OF A WOUNDED DERVISH. An incident in the Soudan War 1898.]