Area Handbook for Romania Part 18

PCR leaders have feared the possibility of attempts by foreign elements to foster unrest among the country's larger minority groups. This was particularly true at the time of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Romanian leaders were apprehensive about the possibility of a similar intervention in their country. At that time PCR officials visited the areas where there were concentrations of Hungarian and German minorities, stressing national unity and equal rights for all national groups.

These efforts were followed in November 1968 by the establishment of nationality councils: the Council of Working People of Hungarian Nationality and the Council of Working People of German Nationality.

Units of the Hungarian council were established in fifteen counties, and units of the German council were established in nine counties. In counties where there existed substantial Serbian or Ukrainian populations, similar local councils were established for these groups, although only the Hungarian and German minorities maintained councils on the national level. The nationality councils were affiliated with the Socialist Unity Front. A month after the establishment of the councils the Grand National a.s.sembly, on the initiative of the party, pa.s.sed legislation granting the minorities increased representation on local government bodies.

In explaining the purposes of the nationality councils, Ceausescu declared that they would "cultivate socialist patriotism, socialist internationalism, and devotion for our new order and for the common fatherland ... against any backward nationalistic concepts and manifestations." Observers of Romanian political affairs pointed out, however, that the councils are closely tied to the party and, although they can serve as means of communication between the PCR and the minority groups, they function primarily as transmission belts for party policies and as instruments for PCR political and educational activities.

Social Democracy and Party Ideology

At the same time that the PCR has sought to present itself as a progressive force seeking the partic.i.p.ation of the people in political affairs, it has also carried on a campaign to strengthen what it calls the Marxist character of all ideological, cultural, and educational activities. Within limits, Ceausescu has encouraged what he has termed as "socialist democracy"--open communication between the ma.s.ses and the party leaders.h.i.+p--and he has publicly called for the people to express their views on political issues.

Socialist democracy is defined by Ceausescu as a spirit of social responsibility by which the citizens are inspired to perform their duties in accordance with the needs and imperatives of the society as a whole. The goal of socialist democracy is to stimulate the ma.s.ses to support the cause of socialism by involving them in the programs of the PCR to such an extent that the individual identifies his personal goals and values with those of the party.

In mid-1971 Ceausescu announced a new ideological program and the tightening of party controls over government, science, and cultural life. Observers gave various interpretations to the campaign. Some saw it as a move to respond to Soviet criticism of Romanian foreign policy by reminding Moscow that socialism was not endangered in Romania and that this pretext could not be used to justify Soviet interference; others considered it as an a.s.sertion of authority by Ceausescu at a time when he judged it necessary to combat ideological laxity at home. The action may also have been prompted by a concern that party authority and discipline were being undermined by Western cultural influences.

Partially directed at the youth of the nation, the campaign included curbs against alcohol in youth clubs and the screening of foreign television programs and music. Another objective of the campaign was increased party control over literature and cultural life; new ideological guidelines were issued for writers, publishers, and theaters. In speaking of the role of the arts, Ceausescu declared that they must serve the single purpose of socialist-communist education. At the same time, he called for increased guidance of the arts by all levels of the PCR and requested that works of art and literature be judged for their conformity with party standards and their service to the working cla.s.s. Ceausescu ruled out repressive measures, however, and a.s.serted that the party would rely on persuasion to implement the new ideological program (see ch. 7).

The campaign encountered some resistance, although more pa.s.sive than overt. A number of writers boycotted the literary magazines in protest against the restrictions imposed on publis.h.i.+ng and, despite the fact that the official writers' union circulated a statement in support of the party's stand, many of the more prominent writers refused to endorse it. In August 1971 the editor of a leading literary journal, who was also a member of the PCR Central Committee, resigned both positions as a protest against the stricter party controls.

Resistance was also evident in the party and state bureaucracy, where the ideological campaign was welcomed in principle but frequently ignored in practice. Many of the nation's youth also manifested disagreement with the restrictive content campaign. a.s.sessing the progress of the program in late 1971, Ceausescu admitted that the new approach had not been generally adopted among the youth and a.s.serted that the party organizations had not been diligent enough in the enforcement of the code. Particular criticism was directed at the Executive Committee and Secretariat for having failed to implement the decisions taken for the improvement of ideological activity.

Although it is difficult for outside political observers to detect differences within the top bodies of the party, in regard to the ideological campaign tensions have been more evident. For the first time since Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the Central Committee plenum, meeting in November 1971, did not report unanimous agreement on all issues. Some observers indicated that the effect of the campaign has stimulated opposition to some of Ceausescu's policies. There was no evidence, however, that such opposition is organized or that it provides any serious threat to Ceausescu's position, and no leading figure in either the government or the party has openly expressed views that differ from those of the general secretary.

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATt.i.tUDES

The Regime and the People

Inasmuch as the PCR has proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate source of political power and, as well, the leading force in all aspects of economic and cultural life, the development of independent political and cultural values has been thoroughly circ.u.mscribed. Party control extends to all aspects of the society and embraces educational and professional opportunities. Although PCR leaders have promised changes in the manner of selection for advancement, promotions have been based more frequently on party activity and doctrinal reliability than on professional competence.

Because of the breadth of party control, accurate information on the att.i.tudes of the people toward the regime and toward specific political issues is difficult to obtain. The Romanian press functions under the direct supervision of the PCR, and tight restrictions are placed on foreign correspondents reporting on events inside the country. Observers have indicated, however, that not all of the regime's domestic policies have been welcomed by all segments of the population and that some party policies have left a wake of latent resentments.

Some observers have pointed to the decrease in the number of peasants in the party (down 3 percent in the 1969-71 period) as an indication of peasant dissatisfaction with the poor living conditions in the rural areas and the low income of most of the agricultural cooperatives (see ch. 2). Frequently the party responds to signs of discontent by any segment of the population by increasing the ideological propaganda directed toward it, but the regime has also attempted various reforms to counter obvious inadequacies.

Among the more overt examples of discontent with party policy is the resistance to accepting job a.s.signments in rural areas shown by technical school graduates. Other graduates have also refused to leave their home areas to work on collectives; all of these were criticized in the party press for giving priority to personal interests instead of considering the interests of the society as a whole. PCR officials declared that the graduates had been trained at state expense and that their refusal to fulfill their obligations as a.s.signed by the party could not be tolerated. This resistance to party-decreed transfers was also evident among other groups during 1969 and 1970, including teachers, builders, and administrative workers.

Observers consider such situations as evidence that the party is having difficulty reconciling an essentially authoritarian system with a policy of socialist democracy that encourages public initiative and partic.i.p.ation. The persistence with which Ceausescu pursued the new ideological campaign during 1971 gave some observers the impression that he had opted to put his weight down on the side of continued authoritarianism.

Romanian Nationalism

The regime scored a marked success in basing its appeal for popular support on nationalistic sentiments and in giving emphasis to Romanian history and cultural traditions. Ceausescu has attempted to broaden the communist movement to include the aspirations of the people as a whole.

Whereas in the past the PCR leaders made reference only to communist achievements and attributed everything positive to the work of the party, Ceausescu has praised Romanian national heroes and has given positive emphasis to specifically Romanian contributions to socialist development.

To a significant degree the revival of nationalism has gone hand in hand with anti-Soviet att.i.tudes. The image of the party was bolstered by the PCR leader's refusal to follow the Soviet line on a number of significant national and international issues (see ch. 10). At the time of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Ceausescu's denunciation of the action and his call for national mobilization in the face of the crisis served to unite the population and strengthen his position. Observers have pointed out, however, that this unity has appeared to wane with the ebbing of the crisis and with the return to the realities of everyday life in Romania.

CHAPTER 10

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Throughout the 1960s Romanian foreign policy increasingly diverged from that of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe as the Romanian leaders a.s.serted the country's national interests. In early 1972 the government continued to declare that its foreign policy was based on national independence, sovereignty, and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. Government and party leaders a.s.serted that Romania would continue to seek development of friendly and cooperative relations with all states without regard to differences in sociopolitical systems.

Foreign policy was formulated under the direct control of the Standing Presidium of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist Roman--PCR) and administered through the government ministries. Although the regime of PCR General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu has steadfastly sought to maintain an independent stance in foreign affairs and to develop political and economic relations with both communist and noncommunist states, it has continued to a.s.sert the Marxist-Leninist character of both its domestic and foreign policies. PCR leaders have repeatedly affirmed the party's commitment to the international communist movement and to the solidarity of all socialist states.

In the development of an independent foreign policy position the PCR has sought to s.h.i.+ft away from economic and political domination by the Soviet Union and to develop a form of communism geared to the country's national interests and in keeping with the regime's perspective on world affairs. Although such a course brought the Romanian party and government into frequent conflict with the Soviet Union, the Romanian leaders.h.i.+p continued to insist on its own interpretation and adaptation of communism.

In early 1972 Romania maintained full diplomatic relations with more than ninety governments, over forty of which maintained emba.s.sies in Bucharest. In addition, trade and cultural relations were conducted with a number of other states with which formal relations had not been established. Romania is a member of the United Nations (UN) and a number of several UN specialized agencies. It is also a member of the communist military alliance known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) and the communist economic alliance called the Council for Mutual Economic a.s.sistance (COMECON).

During 1970 and 1971 the regime made increased efforts to cultivate and strengthen the country's relations with the developing states of Asia and Africa and to extend its relations with the nations of Latin America. Personal diplomacy by Ceausescu and other ranking party and government leaders served as an important means for maintaining the country's international relations.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Historical Factors

After coming under full communist control in the early post-World War II period, the country was closely aligned with the international policies and goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Romania's international and domestic policies generally supported the political and economic goals of the Soviet Union. Beneath the surface, however, an internal party struggle was being waged in Romania between certain communist leaders who were fully oriented toward the Soviet Union and others who sought an orientation that was less Soviet dominated (see ch.

2).

Although the internal struggle involved personal ambitions as much as political and ideological goals, the group surrounding party First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej urged the attainment of national goals through cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than a position of complete integration and exclusive dependence on the Soviets. By mid-1952 Gheorghiu-Dej was able to gain full control of the party, purge his leading opponents, and a.s.sume the dual role of party chief and head of the government. Shortly after a.s.suming the premiers.h.i.+p, Gheorghiu-Dej began a slow and cautious disengagement from Soviet domination, being careful, however, not to advocate goals that were at variance with the policies of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. Domestic politics, in fact, remained strongly Stalinist in orientation, and it was not until after Stalin's death in March 1953 that the first significant steps were taken to diminish Soviet control.

To a significant degree the country's foreign policy during the Gheorghiu-Dej era reflected the Romanian leader's struggle for his own political survival, particularly in the face of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's campaign to weaken the power of Stalinist-oriented Eastern European communist leaders. Important also was the growing Romanian determination to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in the country's internal affairs, especially in the realm of economic development. Political events within the communist world during the remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s provided Gheorghiu-Dej the opportunity to a.s.sert an increasingly independent stance and to gain concessions from the Soviets.

Faced with Khrushchev's emphasis on de-Stalinization and his demands for communist unity under Soviet leaders.h.i.+p, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime responded by giving lip service to Soviet policies while, at the same time, supporting moves aimed at weakening Soviet hegemony in the communist world. In early 1954 Gheorghiu-Dej sensed the political significance of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" theme for Romania and began to exploit the situation to gain leverage for the extracting of concessions from the Soviet Union. The first significant achievement came later that same year when negotiations led to the dissolution of the joint Soviet-Romanian industrial enterprises that had been the primary instrument of Soviet economic exploitation during the postwar period.

The regime also sought to gain increased domestic support by emphasizing the country's historical traditions, by calling for "Romanian solutions to Romanian problems," and by cautiously exploiting the population's latent anti-Soviet sentiments. In August 1954, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the country's liberation from n.a.z.i forces, Gheorghiu-Dej a.s.serted that the primary credit for driving out the occupiers belonged to Romanian Communists rather than to the Soviet army, a view that was subsequently condemned by the Soviets and supported by the Communist Chinese.

Although the Gheorghiu-Dej regime formally supported the Soviet action in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian revolt, the Romanian leaders attempted to exploit the situation in order to obtain additional concessions from the Soviets and to gain recognition of the legitimacy of the so-called Romanian road to socialism. At that time, one of their primary aims was the removal of Soviet occupation forces that had remained in the country throughout the post-World War II period. Although the regime was not successful in obtaining formal Soviet recognition of a Romanian variant of communism, an agreement was reached placing a time limit on the presence of the Soviet troops, the forces finally being withdrawn in 1958.

Important problems were posed to the Gheorghiu-Dej regime by the reactivation of COMECON and the Soviet intentions to integrate the economies of the member states. Initially established in 1949 as the Soviet counterpart to the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), COMECON was largely dormant until 1955, when Khrushchev decided to revitalize the organization as an instrument of Soviet economic policy in Eastern Europe. COMECON plans called for the subordination of national economic plans to an overall planning body that would determine economic development for the member states as a whole. Romania was to be a.s.signed the role of a supplier of raw materials and agricultural produce for the more industrially developed members (see ch. 2).

Gheorghiu-Dej rejected such a subservient role for Romania and proceeded with his own plans for the country's industrial development, a.s.serting the right of each COMECON member state to develop its own economy in accord with national needs and interests, a position that was, in turn, rejected by the Soviets. As a reaction to Soviet pressures and the need to lessen Romanian dependence on COMECON, the regime initiated a gradual and cautious expansion of economic relations with noncommunist states.

In 1957 Ion Gheorghe Maurer became minister of foreign affairs and, under the direction of Gheorghiu-Dej, initiated programs that emphasized the national character of Romanian foreign policy. Included in these programs were plans for the attainment of self-sufficiency in the machine-tool industry and in the production of iron and steel. At the same time, additional steps were taken to increase trade with Western Europe and the United States.

The conflict with the Soviet Union became more acute in 1962 when Gheorghiu-Dej again rejected the COMECON plan for Romania and, later in the year, announced that a contract for the construction of a large steel mill at Galati had been concluded with a British-French consortium. Romanian statements in support of Albania further antagonized the Soviet leaders. During 1963 and 1964 Romanian-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate as the Gheorghiu-Dej regime sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute and moved closer to the Communist Chinese position on the equality of communist states and the rejection of the leading role of the Soviet party. In November 1963 Maurer declared the readiness of Romania to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute, a suggestion that Moscow considered arrogant and anti-Soviet.

A statement issued by the party Central Committee in April 1964 declared the right of Romania and all other nations to develop national policies in the light of their own interests and domestic requirements. During the remainder of that year the volume of economic and cultural contacts with Western nations increased significantly. The increased role of the United States in the Vietnam hostilities, however, served to curb the Gheorghiu-Dej regime's efforts to improve relations with the United States, and the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965 raised questions as to the future direction of Romanian foreign policy.

Under Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's foreign policy continued to diverge from that of the Soviet Union and the other members of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Increasingly a.s.sertive of national interests, the Ceausescu regime antagonized the Soviet Union by its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1967 and by its refusal to follow the Soviet lead in breaking relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968 posed a particular threat to Romania. Observers of Eastern European political affairs saw the invasion as a severe blow to the basic a.s.sumptions of Romanian foreign policy, which included the belief that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily against another member of the Warsaw Pact as long as the system of communist party rule was firmly maintained and members.h.i.+p in the pact was continued.

From the outset of the Czechoslovak crisis the Ceausescu regime a.s.serted that the only basis for relations between states was respect for national independence and sovereignty and a policy of noninterference in another state's internal affairs. The actual invasion, however, marked a reversal for Romanian foreign policy and, although the initial response was one of condemnation and defiance, Romania was put on the defensive.