Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 127

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. G.o.d, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply Obj. 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and advent.i.tious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q.

82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appet.i.te obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A.

3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The advent.i.tious qualities are habits and pa.s.sions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 2]

Whether Free-Will Is a Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.

First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance, to a.s.sent to first principles: while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA.

1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and pa.s.sions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act.

And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain apt.i.tude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 3]

Whether Free-will Is an Appet.i.tive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appet.i.tive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the princ.i.p.al function of free-will is to choose.

But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of the appet.i.tive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appet.i.tive power.

_I answer that,_ The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appet.i.tive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appet.i.tive power, it is required that the appet.i.te should accept the judgment of counsel.

Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs princ.i.p.ally to the appet.i.tive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appet.i.tive intellect or an intellectual appet.i.te." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appet.i.te when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appet.i.te, it follows that choice is princ.i.p.ally an act of the appet.i.tive power. And thus free-will is an appet.i.tive power.

Reply Obj. 1: The appet.i.tive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel.

Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appet.i.te: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appet.i.te does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 4]

Whether Free-will Is a Power Distinct from the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that _thelesis_ is one thing and _boulesis_ another. But _thelesis_ is the will, while _boulesis_ seems to be the free-will, because _boulesis,_ according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appet.i.te. But in the intellect there are two powers--the active and the pa.s.sive.

Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appet.i.te, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.

_I answer that,_ The appet.i.tive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appet.i.te we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of _understanding_ implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to _reason,_ properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appet.i.te to "will" implies the simple appet.i.te for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we a.s.sent on account of the principles: just as, in appet.i.tive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q.

79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a pa.s.sive will.

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QUESTION 84

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (In Eight Articles)

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appet.i.tive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.

Furthermore, the acts of the appet.i.tive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

The former of these inquiries will be threefold:

(1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it;

(2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself;