Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 15

is placed in the definition of "mult.i.tude"; but "mult.i.tude" is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of mult.i.tude.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Is One?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not one. For it is written "For there be many G.o.ds and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).

Obj. 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of G.o.d, since quant.i.ty is not predicated of G.o.d; likewise, neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of G.o.d, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d is not one.

_On the contrary,_ It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our G.o.d is one Lord" (Deut. 6:4).

_I answer that,_ It can be shown from these three sources that G.o.d is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to G.o.d alone; for G.o.d Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way G.o.d is G.o.d, and He is this G.o.d. Impossible is it therefore that many G.o.ds should exist.

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that G.o.d comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many G.o.ds existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many G.o.ds to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they a.s.serted an infinite principle, a.s.serted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the _per se_ cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so _per se_ and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.ds are called many by the error of some who wors.h.i.+pped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were G.o.ds, and also the separate parts of the world.

Hence the Apostle adds: "Our G.o.d is one," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of G.o.d, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"

which is convertible with being is a metaphysical ent.i.ty and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in G.o.d there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of G.o.d; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of G.o.d that He is one.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Is Supremely One?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not supremely _one._ For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore G.o.d is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.

But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.

Therefore G.o.d is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is _one._

Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.

Therefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every being is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).

Therefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore G.o.d is not _one_ more than any other being is _one._

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."

_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is supremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.

Now both of these belong to G.o.d. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that G.o.d is _one_ in the supreme degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, _one._

Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a subject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple.

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QUESTION 12

HOW G.o.d IS KNOWN BY US (In Thirteen Articles)

As. .h.i.therto we have considered G.o.d as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of G.o.d?

(2) Whether the essence of G.o.d is seen by the intellect through any created image?

(3) Whether the essence of G.o.d can be seen by the corporeal eye?

(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of G.o.d?

(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of G.o.d?

(6) Whether of those who see G.o.d, one sees Him more perfectly than another?

(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of G.o.d?

(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of G.o.d, knows all things in it?

(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?

(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in G.o.d?

(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of G.o.d?

(12) Whether by natural reason we can know G.o.d in this life?

(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of G.o.d through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 1]

Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of G.o.d. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, "No man hath seen G.o.d at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen G.o.d. For how can a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of G.o.d: "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."

Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But G.o.d is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.

For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now G.o.d is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore G.o.d is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and G.o.d; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 John 2:2).