Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 18

_On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in G.o.d as in an intelligible mirror.

Therefore if G.o.d Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas.

_I answer that,_ Those who see the divine essence see what they see in G.o.d not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be a.s.similated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is a.s.similated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in G.o.d, is to see them in G.o.d. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of G.o.d, they are seen in G.o.d Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also G.o.d Himself is seen.

Reply Obj. 1: The created intellect of one who sees G.o.d is a.s.similated to what is seen in G.o.d, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply Obj. 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees G.o.d, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of G.o.d. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in G.o.d.

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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 10]

Whether Those Who See the Essence of G.o.d See All They See in It at the Same Time?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of G.o.d do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in G.o.d, is understood; for G.o.d is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see G.o.d do not see all in Him at the same time.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22, 23), "G.o.d moves the spiritual creature according to time"--i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees G.o.d.

Therefore those who see G.o.d understand and are affected successively; for time means succession.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance."

_I answer that,_ What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in G.o.d, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of G.o.d. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.

Reply Obj. 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.

Reply Obj. 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in G.o.d, they see all at the same time.

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 11]

Whether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen G.o.d face to face" (Gen. 32:30).

But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a gla.s.s and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12).

Obj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see G.o.d in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of G.o.d in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in G.o.d; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. x.x.x) that, "We judge of all things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see G.o.d Himself.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24, 25). Therefore since G.o.d is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.

32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life G.o.d can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature."

_I answer that,_ G.o.d cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of G.o.d by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of G.o.d. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see G.o.d in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen G.o.d face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing G.o.d. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that G.o.d seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (II-II, Q. 174) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

Reply Obj. 2: As G.o.d works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26, 27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (II-II, Q. 175).

Reply Obj. 3: All things are said to be seen in G.o.d and all things are judged in Him, because by the partic.i.p.ation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a partic.i.p.ation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely G.o.d. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.

And thus G.o.d is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.

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TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]

Whether G.o.d Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know G.o.d in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But G.o.d is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of G.o.d, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know G.o.d by natural knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of G.o.d belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore G.o.d cannot be known by natural reason.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of G.o.d," namely, what can be known of G.o.d by natural reason, "is manifest in them."

_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.

But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of G.o.d; because the sensible effects of G.o.d do not equal the power of G.o.d as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of G.o.d cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.

But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of G.o.d "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relations.h.i.+p with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

Reply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of G.o.d's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.

i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'G.o.d who willest that only the pure should know truth.'

For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.

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THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]

Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of G.o.d Can Be Obtained Than by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of G.o.d is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.

i) that whoever is the more united to G.o.d in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to G.o.d while ignoring of Him "what He is,"

comes about also by natural reason. Therefore G.o.d is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to s.h.i.+ne upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know G.o.d more fully by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to G.o.d by grace of faith.

But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of G.o.d by grace.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that "G.o.d hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.

_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of G.o.d by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.