Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 56

Obj. 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.

_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written (Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end."

_I answer that,_ Plato held neither with the Stoics, who a.s.serted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good.

But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 8, ad 2); but also in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.

Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and unpartic.i.p.ated by, all else, in which sense G.o.d is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either G.o.d Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of G.o.d, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.

Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by partic.i.p.ation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good.

Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8.

Reply Obj. 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely good, but not every science is.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]

Whether Pleasure Is the Measure or Rule by Which to Judge of Moral Good or Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.

Obj. 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

Obj. 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is G.o.d," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the princ.i.p.al, "end [*St. Thomas took _finis_ as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive--_tou telous_; and the Greek reads "He"

(i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."

_I answer that,_ Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appet.i.te in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.

On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appet.i.te are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appet.i.te both of good and of evil men.

But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.

Reply Obj. 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appet.i.te in something good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

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QUESTION 35

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (In Eight Articles)

We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain is a pa.s.sion of the soul?

(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?

(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary [to] pleasure?

(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?

(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?

(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?

(8) Of the species of sorrow.

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]

Whether Pain Is a Pa.s.sion of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

Because no pa.s.sion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, every pa.s.sion of the soul belongs to the appet.i.tive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appet.i.tive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body."

Therefore pain is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, every pa.s.sion of the soul belongs to the animal appet.i.te. But pain does not belong to the animal appet.i.te, but rather to the natural appet.i.te; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the pa.s.sions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733):

"hence wild desires and grovelling fears And human laughter, human tears."

[Translation: Conington.]

_I answer that,_ Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the appet.i.te. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appet.i.te.

Now every appet.i.tive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appet.i.te: since the inclination of the natural appet.i.te is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appet.i.te, but to the apprehension of another, as stated in the First Part (Q. 103, AA. 1, 3). Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appet.i.te.

Again every movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is called a pa.s.sion, as stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appet.i.te, is most properly called a pa.s.sion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called pa.s.sions of the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 8 [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment.

Reply Obj. 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm. 87:4).

Reply Obj. 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.

Reply Obj. 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appet.i.te, but because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the pa.s.sion of pain in the sensitive appet.i.te.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]