Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 25

Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of G.o.d is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is not the cause of things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does G.o.d know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are."

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things. For the knowledge of G.o.d is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appet.i.te, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that G.o.d causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of G.o.d as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of approbation."

Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why G.o.d foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that G.o.d knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why G.o.d knows them.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of G.o.d; hence although the knowledge of G.o.d is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of G.o.d and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which G.o.d is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of G.o.d is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 9]

Whether G.o.d Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of G.o.d is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is not of things that are not.

Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to G.o.d, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore G.o.d has no knowledge of things that are not.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Who ... calleth those things that are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).

_I answer that,_ G.o.d knows all things whatsoever that in any way are.

Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of G.o.d Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or pa.s.sive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to G.o.d, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and G.o.d is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since G.o.d's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of G.o.d extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in G.o.d's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: Since G.o.d is very being everything is, in so far as it partic.i.p.ates in the likeness of G.o.d; as everything is hot in so far as it partic.i.p.ates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by G.o.d, although they are not in act.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of G.o.d, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever G.o.d knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of G.o.d not that they be, but that they be possible.

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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 10]

Whether G.o.d Knows Evil Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of G.o.d is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that G.o.d does not know evil things.

Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of G.o.d is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore G.o.d does not know evil things.

Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever G.o.d knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore G.o.d does not know evil things.

Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by G.o.d; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of G.o.d is not imperfect. Therefore G.o.d does not know evil things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 15:11), "h.e.l.l and destruction are before G.o.d [Vulg: 'the Lord']."

_I answer that,_ Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence G.o.d would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that G.o.d knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "G.o.d through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. G.o.d therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of G.o.d is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of G.o.d, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]

Whether G.o.d Knows Singular Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore G.o.d does not know singular things.

Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in G.o.d things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.

Therefore G.o.d does not know singular things.

Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in G.o.d; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike G.o.d, Who is pure act. Therefore G.o.d cannot know singular things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."

_I answer that,_ G.o.d knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in G.o.d in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence G.o.d must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to G.o.d; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._ iii) that G.o.d would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in G.o.d; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless G.o.d knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wis.h.i.+ng to show how this can be, said that G.o.d knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, G.o.d would not know singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that G.o.d knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since G.o.d is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of G.o.d extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the knowledge of G.o.d must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of G.o.d, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it G.o.d knows not only universal, but also singular things.

Reply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

Reply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to G.o.d, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

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TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 12]

Whether G.o.d Can Know Infinite Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,"