Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 37

Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now G.o.d loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.

_On the contrary,_ Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to G.o.d. Therefore the better things are more loved by G.o.d.

_I answer that,_ It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that G.o.d loves more the better things. For it has been shown (AA. 2, 3), that G.o.d's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because G.o.d's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that G.o.d wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true G.o.d. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when G.o.d delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to Isa. 9:6.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d loves the human nature a.s.sumed by the Word of G.o.d in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the G.o.dhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found n.o.bler than some men, and some men n.o.bler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. G.o.d therefore did not a.s.sume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.

Reply Obj. 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves G.o.d more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to G.o.d. G.o.d, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them G.o.d loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pa.s.s judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).

Reply Obj. 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the n.o.bler thing and the more beloved. G.o.d is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.

Reply Obj. 5: Since G.o.d's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by G.o.d is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness.

According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.

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QUESTION 21

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF G.o.d (In Four Articles)

After considering the divine love, we must treat of G.o.d's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is justice in G.o.d?

(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?

(3) Whether there is mercy in G.o.d?

(4) Whether in every work of G.o.d there are justice and mercy?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Justice in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in G.o.d. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in G.o.d: neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "G.o.d worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).

Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But G.o.d is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to G.o.d.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is in G.o.d, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."

_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to G.o.d, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom.

11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of mult.i.tude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of G.o.d. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that G.o.d is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."

Reply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the pa.s.sions, as temperance with concupiscence, fort.i.tude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to G.o.d; since, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1), in G.o.d there are no pa.s.sions; nor a sensitive appet.i.te, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to G.o.d; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise G.o.d for His political virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for G.o.d to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, G.o.d is a law unto Himself.

Reply Obj. 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause.

In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to G.o.d. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to G.o.d, or to creatures, and in either way G.o.d pays what is due. It is due to G.o.d that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, G.o.d's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also G.o.d exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although G.o.d in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in G.o.d is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."

Reply Obj. 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of G.o.d; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 2]

Whether the Justice of G.o.d Is Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that the justice of G.o.d is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rect.i.tude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.

_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.

_I answer that,_ Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (Q. 16, A. 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things.

When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.

Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore G.o.d's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth.

Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this pa.s.sage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Can Be Attributed to G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to G.o.d. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).

But there is no sorrow in G.o.d; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Obj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But G.o.d cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself."

But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."