Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 39

For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.

_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual alteration, be pa.s.sed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection.

Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a partic.i.p.ation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. G.o.d, is possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.

Reply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.

Reply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor.

6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of receiving a further increase.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the same kind of quant.i.ty, but not in those which have different kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quant.i.ty of a superficies. Now the quant.i.ty of a wayfarer's charity which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quant.i.ty of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.

Hence the argument does not prove.

_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu. 36) that "whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above (A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now G.o.d is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of G.o.d alone can, whereby He loves Himself.

On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's whole heart is always actually borne towards G.o.d: this is the perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always actually of G.o.d, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to G.o.d and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to G.o.d habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of G.o.d; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same pa.s.sage says that "he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads."

Reply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.

_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9]

Whether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees, Beginning, Progress, and Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.

Therefore it is not right to put only one.

Obj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as progressing and as beginning.

Obj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may be, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably a.s.signed to charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.

_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of p.u.b.erty when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection.

In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the increase of charity. For at first it is inc.u.mbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of G.o.d: this belongs to the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."

In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly, rest in this term.

Reply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of continuous things is included in these three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who built up Jerusalem.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is princ.i.p.ally directed towards union with G.o.d. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.

_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10]

Whether Charity Can Decrease?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4), it seems that it can also decrease.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to G.o.d, says (Confess. x) "He loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu.

36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." From this it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides G.o.d, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "G.o.d makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man turns away from G.o.d, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation." From this we may gather that when G.o.d preserves charity in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of charity G.o.d infuses less charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.

_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts.

Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.

_I answer that,_ The quant.i.ty which charity has in comparison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as stated above (A. 4, ad 2).

Since, however, it increases in that quant.i.ty which it has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53, A. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friends.h.i.+p (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friends.h.i.+p."

Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by G.o.d alone, as stated above (A.

2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a sin.

The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except either by G.o.d or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by G.o.d, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.

It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that G.o.d should withdraw charity from him.

In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the cert.i.tude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For G.o.d does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love G.o.d less (i.e.

less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminis.h.i.+ng charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial sin, is loved for G.o.d's sake habitually though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.

_______________________