Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 41

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from G.o.d: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that G.o.d gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of G.o.d produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. 22, A. 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that G.o.d pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of G.o.d for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of grace foreknown by G.o.d is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of G.o.d as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of G.o.d. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that G.o.d's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of G.o.d. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.

That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, G.o.d allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. G.o.d wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punis.h.i.+ng them. This is the reason why G.o.d elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. 9:22, 23): "What if G.o.d, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.

2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be a.s.signed, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fas.h.i.+oned by G.o.d from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.

Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of G.o.d; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in G.o.d, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives n.o.body of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"

(Matt. 20:14,15).

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]

Whether Predestination Is Certain?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.

Therefore predestination cannot be certain.

Obj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever G.o.d could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.

Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of G.o.d, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."

_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.

1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.

Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 19, A. 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply Obj. 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by G.o.d's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For G.o.d does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are subst.i.tuted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is subst.i.tuted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (A. 4): and the fact that G.o.d wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that G.o.d is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, G.o.d can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 7]

Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?

Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.

But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Deut. 1:11): "The Lord G.o.d adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by G.o.d, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.

Obj. 2: Further, no reason can be a.s.signed why G.o.d pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by G.o.d without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by G.o.d cannot be certain.

Obj. 3: Further, the operations of G.o.d are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by G.o.d at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matt. 7:13,14: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!"

Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by G.o.d to be saved is not certain.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."

_I answer that,_ The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6).

Therefore we must say that to G.o.d the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to G.o.d, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to G.o.d); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite (Q. 7, AA. 2 ,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not princ.i.p.ally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number _per se_; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning G.o.d in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although G.o.d knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by G.o.d _per se_; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to G.o.d; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a princ.i.p.al pre-ordination.

It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by G.o.d for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.

8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by G.o.d.

It is, however, better to say that, "to G.o.d alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by G.o.d beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason of the quant.i.ty of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in G.o.d the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the princ.i.p.al parts to the good of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of G.o.d, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of G.o.d, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 8]

Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is no need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of G.o.d when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered.

But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.

_On the contrary,_ It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (Gen. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

_I answer that,_ Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.

Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29); and that "the gifts and the calling of G.o.d are without repentance"

(Rom. 11:29).

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by G.o.d. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by G.o.d in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by G.o.d in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).

Reply Obj. 1: This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.

Reply Obj. 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of G.o.d, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way G.o.d is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are G.o.d's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of G.o.d, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply Obj. 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (Q. 19, A. 6), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.

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QUESTION 24

THE BOOK OF LIFE (In Three Articles)