Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 45

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.

For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love G.o.d, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and G.o.d is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to G.o.d precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from G.o.d, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love G.o.d more than we love our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, G.o.d is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess G.o.d's goodness equally with G.o.d, for G.o.d has it essentially, and our neighbor by partic.i.p.ation.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love G.o.d More Than Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love G.o.d more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.

Therefore man's friends.h.i.+p towards himself is greater than his friends.h.i.+p for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.

Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love G.o.d more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, a man loves G.o.d as much as he loves to enjoy G.o.d.

But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy G.o.d; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love G.o.d more than himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for G.o.d's sake." Now "the cause of a thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love G.o.d more than himself.

_I answer that,_ The good we receive from G.o.d is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellows.h.i.+p of natural goods bestowed on us by G.o.d is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves G.o.d above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the princ.i.p.al inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friends.h.i.+p of charity which is based on the fellows.h.i.+p of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love G.o.d, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in G.o.d as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friends.h.i.+p, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy G.o.d pertains to that love of G.o.d which is love of concupiscence. Now we love G.o.d with the love of friends.h.i.+p more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves G.o.d more than himself.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the princ.i.p.al object of charity is G.o.d, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to G.o.d than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.

Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): "Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), G.o.d is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellows.h.i.+p in that good. Now fellows.h.i.+p is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to G.o.d. Wherefore just as unity surpa.s.ses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quant.i.ty not only from its object which is G.o.d, but also from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as the quant.i.ty of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to G.o.d, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.

Reply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, "'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated above (A. 3).

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's body more than his own.

Obj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."

_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellows.h.i.+p in the full partic.i.p.ation of happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, than the partic.i.p.ation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.

Reply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the const.i.tution of our own nature: but as regards the partic.i.p.ation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely a.s.sociated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

Reply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6]

Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circ.u.mstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.

Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is G.o.d, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.

Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.

Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appet.i.te, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the principle of love is G.o.d, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.

Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally.