Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 51

_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus G.o.d's joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite goodness of G.o.d: but the joy of any creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to G.o.d by grace, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be full enjoyment of G.o.d, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at rest, not only our desire for G.o.d, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for "neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things G.o.d hath prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to G.o.d, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy Lord."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice.

Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will approach nearer to G.o.d than others. Hence each one's joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a fuller partic.i.p.ation of the Divine happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding."

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are pa.s.sions, the object of which is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.

But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and h.o.m.ogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the pa.s.sions (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the appet.i.tive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of G.o.d is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.

_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act.

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QUESTION 29

OF PEACE (Four Articles)

We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?

(2) Whether all things desire peace?

(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?

(4) Whether peace is a virtue?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]

Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "G.o.d is not the G.o.d of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as concord.

_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.

But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.

_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.

Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appet.i.tive powers: thus the sensitive appet.i.te tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appet.i.te, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit."

Secondly, in so far as one and the same appet.i.tive power tends to diverse objects of appet.i.te, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clas.h.i.+ng of the movements of the appet.i.te. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appet.i.tes among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appet.i.tes even in one man.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appet.i.tive movements in one man being set at rest together.

Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appet.i.tive movements be in agreement.

Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]

Whether All Things Desire Peace?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

Obj. 2: Further, the appet.i.te does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.

Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appet.i.te. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.

10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.

Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).

_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."

Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appet.i.te, or of the animal appet.i.te, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appet.i.te. Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appet.i.tes proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural appet.i.tes.

Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appet.i.te. Now just as the appet.i.te may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appet.i.te is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appet.i.te in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appet.i.te to remain restless and disturbed.

Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."

Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in G.o.d, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.

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