Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 53

Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Obj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.

_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2).

Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend" as being one of the signs of friends.h.i.+p, and the Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep."

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pa.s.s to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own pa.s.sion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly pa.s.sions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.

27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.

x.x.xiv) that "false G.o.dliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compa.s.sionate but disdainful."

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled"

(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sall.u.s.t (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from ... anger ... and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way."

Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy pa.s.sion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.

Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appet.i.tive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not G.o.d for its object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it about pa.s.sions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).

Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fas.h.i.+on at once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a pa.s.sion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appet.i.te, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.

This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appet.i.te may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."

And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59, AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sall.u.s.t are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a pa.s.sion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as pa.s.sions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (Q. 36, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.

Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the pa.s.sions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet.

ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as pa.s.sions, because, even as pa.s.sions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they a.s.sume the character of a virtue.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.

For the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.

12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "G.o.dliness is profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and G.o.dliness." Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"

according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like G.o.d, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like G.o.d. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of G.o.d is it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye ... merciful, as your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye on ... as the elect of G.o.d ... the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to G.o.d: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpa.s.sed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has G.o.d above him, charity which unites him to G.o.d, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpa.s.ses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

Reply Obj. 1: We wors.h.i.+p G.o.d by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices G.o.d's favor is obtained."

Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to G.o.d preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to G.o.d by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpa.s.ses mercy, which likens us to G.o.d as regards similarity of works.

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QUESTION 31

OF BENEFICENCE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?