Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 84

Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals."

_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rect.i.tude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rect.i.tude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of "proper."

Reply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.

Reply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]

Whether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic?

Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to _Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.

Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a mult.i.tude, "one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political."

_I answer that,_ Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is princ.i.p.al as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.

Reply Obj. 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in _Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"

as regards the conduct of the household. In _Ethic._ i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.

Reply Obj. 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.

Reply Obj. 3: The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4]

Whether Military Prudence Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8).

Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be a.s.signed to military business.

Obj. 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fort.i.tude rather than to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels."

Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military."

_I answer that,_ Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward a.s.sailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an a.s.sailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

Reply Obj. 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fort.i.tude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good.

Reply Obj. 3: The execution of military service belongs to fort.i.tude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.

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QUESTION 51

OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (In Four Articles)

In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether _euboulia_ is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

(3) Whether _synesis_ is a special virtue?

(4) Whether _gnome_ is a special virtue?

[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well (_euboulia_), of judging well according to common law (_synesis_), and of judging well according to general law (_gnome_), respectively.]

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]

Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) "no man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii.

But _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many G.o.dly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) _euboulia_ "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).