Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 49

Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who a.s.serted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.

Reply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether the Word "Person" Should Be Said of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of G.o.d. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.

Therefore "person" is not to be applied to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes."

This, however, can apply to G.o.d only in a metaphorical sense.

Therefore the word "person" is only applied to G.o.d metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to G.o.d, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.

Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in G.o.d. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person"

should not be said of G.o.d.

Obj. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given above, does not apply to G.o.d. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to G.o.d, as we proved above (Q. 14, A. 12); and thus G.o.d cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because G.o.d cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while G.o.d is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."

_I answer that,_ "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to G.o.d, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is fittingly applied to G.o.d; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to G.o.d; as we showed above when treating of the names of G.o.d (Q. 13, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to G.o.d in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of G.o.d in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of G.o.d only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about G.o.d in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about G.o.d. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).

Reply Obj. 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to G.o.d as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to G.o.d in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to G.o.d as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"

forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply Obj. 4: It may be said that G.o.d has a rational _nature,_ if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But G.o.d cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance"

can be applied to G.o.d in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.

There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in G.o.d. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that "Person" in G.o.d is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature."

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether This Word "Person" Signifies Relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to G.o.d, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.

vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son."

Obj. 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies essence.

Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.

Therefore "person" signifies substance.

Obj. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in G.o.d it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in G.o.d, in man, and in angels.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person" signifies relation.

_I answer that,_ A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word "person" in G.o.d, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name "G.o.d" and this word "Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguis.h.i.+ng adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person" in G.o.d signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person"

means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.

To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of "person" as applied to G.o.d. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.

Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in G.o.d is only by relation of origin, as stated above (Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in G.o.d is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the G.o.dhead is G.o.d so the divine paternity is G.o.d the Father, Who is a divine person.

Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in G.o.d the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in G.o.d essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in G.o.d what He is, and whereby He is are the same.

Reply Obj. 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the _suppositum,_ as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.

Reply Obj. 3: In G.o.d the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an a.s.s have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both.

So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of G.o.d and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5).

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QUESTION 30

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN G.o.d (In Four Articles)

We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are several persons in G.o.d?

(2) How many are they?

(3) What the numeral terms signify in G.o.d?

(4) The community of the term "person."

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Several Persons in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in G.o.d.

For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then there are several persons in G.o.d, there must be several substances; which appears to be heretical.

Obj. 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, either in G.o.d, or in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in G.o.d there is no plurality but of relations (Q. 28, A. 3). Therefore there cannot be several persons in G.o.d.