Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 179

Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against G.o.d is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appet.i.te is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appet.i.te is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appet.i.te is subjected. Hence we must a.s.sert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appet.i.te is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because while he liveth he hath cast away"--that is, despised--"his bowels,"

in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns G.o.d's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.

Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for wors.h.i.+p. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6]

Whether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh.

Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.

_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or pa.s.sions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the pleasures of the table and s.e.xual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and not from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7]

Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a princ.i.p.al virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have princ.i.p.al ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wis.h.i.+ng to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appet.i.te at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles.

10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appet.i.te. Now reason and sensitive appet.i.te do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that princ.i.p.al vice is opposed to princ.i.p.al virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a princ.i.p.al virtue, since it does not regard the princ.i.p.al good of the reason, yet covetousness is a princ.i.p.al vice, because it regards money, which occupies a princ.i.p.al place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable princ.i.p.ally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave."

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 8]

Whether Treachery, Fraud, Falsehood, Perjury, Restlessness, Violence, and Insensibility to Mercy Are Daughters of Covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.

Obj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints [*_kyminopristes_], misers [*_kimbikes_], who do illiberal deeds,"

and of those who "batten on wh.o.r.edom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.

Obj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.

But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,"

i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) a.s.signs to covetousness the daughters mentioned above.

_I answer that,_ The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to _insensibility to mercy,_ because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to a.s.sist the needy with his riches [*See Q. 30, A. 1]. In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought (_affectu_). In this way it gives rise to _restlessness,_ by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution (_effectu_). In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to _violence,_ sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is _falsehood,_ if it be mere words, _perjury_ if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have _fraud_; if persons, then we have _treachery,_ as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.

Reply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.

Reply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is "tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be _kyminopristes_ ("skinflint"), a c.u.min-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as wh.o.r.edom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.

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QUESTION 119

OF PRODIGALITY (In Three Articles)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?