Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 197

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Obj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Isa. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fort.i.tude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

_On the contrary,_ Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways.

First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appet.i.te is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3, or in accomplis.h.i.+ng what is within one's power.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fort.i.tude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv.

Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence it proceeds.

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QUESTION 134

OF MAGNIFICENCE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) What is its matter?

(4) Whether it is a part of fort.i.tude?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1]

Whether Magnificence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.

1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as stated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117, A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a partic.i.p.ation of Divine power.

But magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds."

Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, "we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quant.i.ty of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend princ.i.p.ally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in _Ethic._ iv.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appet.i.te is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 2]

Whether Magnificence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"

and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q.

81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.

Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).

_I answer that,_ It belongs to magnificence to do (_facere_) something great, as its name implies [* magnificence = _magna facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Now _facere_ may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly _facere_ means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense _facere_ is employed to denote any action, whether it pa.s.ses into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing (_factio_) being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced (_factum_) by the act is something great, namely in quant.i.ty, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing (_facere_) being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" (_facere_) be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making (_faciendo_), or by any kind of action, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their princ.i.p.al intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" (_facere_) being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and n.o.ble purpose of mind," "discussion" referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment.

Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter (_factibili_).

Reply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of G.o.d: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 3]

Whether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure?

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2).

Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 197

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