Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 230

Whether the Philosopher Suitably a.s.signs the Species of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably a.s.signed by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered"

or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this apparently pertains to the circ.u.mstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circ.u.mstances.

Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or "stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]

says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.

46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and "rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.

For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division a.s.signed by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the pa.s.sion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the pa.s.sions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be applied to the pa.s.sion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards "choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.

Reply Obj. 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.

Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is a.s.signed as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is a.s.signed, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is a.s.signed, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is a.s.signed "h.e.l.l-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6]

Whether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay: 'pa.s.sionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4).

[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.]

The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the pa.s.sion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A.

4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7]

Whether Six Daughters Are Fittingly a.s.signed to Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly a.s.signed to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

Obj. 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride.

Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. x.x.xi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) a.s.signs these daughters to anger.

_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man ... fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor,"

which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against G.o.d, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against G.o.d: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from G.o.d," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure.

Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.

Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fort.i.tude.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8]

Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to G.o.d. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to G.o.d, Who judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless.

But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."

_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through pa.s.sion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment.

For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of pa.s.sion": and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from pa.s.sion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, which is with pa.s.sion resulting from a bodily trans.m.u.tation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appet.i.te necessarily follows the movement of the higher appet.i.te, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appet.i.te cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the pa.s.sion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates G.o.d as to lack of pa.s.sion, but not as to G.o.d's punis.h.i.+ng by judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: The pa.s.sion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appet.i.te in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the pa.s.sion in the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

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