Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 66

(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?

(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?

(6) Whether they are equal in power?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Equality in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quant.i.ty as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quant.i.ty, neither continuous intrinsic quant.i.ty, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quant.i.ty, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quant.i.ty, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

Obj. 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (Q. 39, A. 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal.

Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.

Obj. 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.

Obj. 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another."

_I answer that,_ We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.

For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15, 16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of G.o.dhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguis.h.i.+ng degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quant.i.ty. But quant.i.ty, in G.o.d, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one G.o.d; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Quant.i.ty is twofold. There is quant.i.ty of "bulk" or dimensive quant.i.ty, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in G.o.d. There is also quant.i.ty of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quant.i.ty we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quant.i.ty is measured firstly by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quant.i.ty is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quant.i.ty is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpa.s.ses in power."

Reply Obj. 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quant.i.ty, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not partic.i.p.ate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one partic.i.p.ates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness in G.o.d may be designated in two ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's.

Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is princ.i.p.ally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in G.o.d, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both--namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, x.x.xi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 2]

Whether the Person Proceeding Is Co-eternal with His Principle, As the Son with the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from G.o.d; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of bra.s.s; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in G.o.d, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind.

The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.

Obj. 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle.

But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Obj. 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be a.s.signed for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other."

_I answer that,_ We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.

Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (Q. 41, A. 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impa.s.sibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect pa.s.sing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply Obj. 4: In time there is something indivisible--namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (Q. 10, A. 2, ad 1; A. 4, ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 3]

Whether in the Divine Persons There Exists an Order of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in G.o.d is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.

But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.

Obj. 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in G.o.d. Therefore neither is there of nature.

_On the contrary,_ Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in G.o.d order exists.

_I answer that,_ Order always has reference to some principle.

Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in G.o.d as we have stated (Q. 33, A. 1): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another."

Reply Obj. 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply Obj. 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in G.o.d the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.

Reply Obj. 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin.

Reply Obj. 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Greatness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (John 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him."

Obj. 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.