A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution Part 8

"_Axiom 1._--Actions, like objects, are capable of being cla.s.sified according to their properties, and of being measured by a definite standard.

"_Obs._--This axiom merely means that the qualities of actions, like those of objects, are fixed and constant, so that the same action has always the same properties and moral value, and, under the same circ.u.mstances, always produces the same effect.... It follows from this axiom that it is possible to act so as to attain a definite object, and thus a general end of action may be arrived at....

"_Axiom 2._--The end of action (being some common property or effect) is a possible object of knowledge.

"_Axiom 3._--We are capable of being affected by any external object only through our faculties, or (in other words) as a part of our consciousness.

"_Axiom 4._--Faculties are known only by their action, or (in other words) so far as they are portions of our consciousness.

"_Axiom 5._--The sphere of action lies in the adaptation of 'inner' to 'outer' sequences, of faculties to the laws of nature.

"_Axiom 6._--The const.i.tution of man and other animal beings is an organism consisting of a number of parts, each having its appropriate function, and the end of each part results from the performance of its function.

"_Axiom 7._--Approbation is the standard whereby we judge of the moral value of actions, and is the universal mark of the due performance of a function and of the attainment of an end."

DEFINITIONS

"1. Good is the object of moral approbation. The highest good is, therefore, the ultimate object of such approbation, the end of action.

"2. Pleasure is that state of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance (as such) of its function, by one or more of the parts of our organism."

PROPOSITION I

"The Good is relative to our faculties. For no object can affect us except through our faculties (Axiom 3); but to be known by us is to affect us;

"Therefore, nothing can be known except through our faculties, or (in other words) except in relation to our faculties;

"But the Good, or End of Action, is a possible object of knowledge (Axiom 2);

"Hence the Good is relative to our faculties.

"_Corollary 1._--The highest good of man at any time is relative to his faculties at that time.

"_Corollary 2._--Since ideas derive their elements from experience, the idea of perfect Good, or G.o.d, can only be an idealization of humanity.

PROPOSITION II

"The Good is a state of Consciousness. For, the Good is a possible object of knowledge (Axiom 2); but all objects of knowledge are states of consciousness;

"Hence the Good is a state of Consciousness. Or, the Good exists (or is capable of being known) only by affecting our faculties, or, in other words, only as an affection of our faculties (Proposition I);

"But an affection of our faculties is a state of consciousness;

"Hence the Good exists only as a state of consciousness.

"_Obs._--... To speak of anything existent external to our consciousness, is, as we saw, a pure hypothesis, incapable of proof, perfectly unintelligible and void of utility. When, therefore, we make use of the ordinary dualistic phraseology, we must remember that the two worlds there distinguished are merely two divisions of the universe of self considered as distinct for convenience of language, but differing only as two cla.s.ses comprehended under a common genus.

PROPOSITION III

"The Good is relative to circ.u.mstances. For, the Good is determined by, and therefore lies in action (Axioms 7, 6, Obs.); but Action is relative to circ.u.mstances (Axiom 5). Hence the Good is relative to circ.u.mstances.

PROPOSITION IV

"The Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circ.u.mstances.

"For, the Good is identical with the end (Def.); which results from the performance of function by each part of the organism (Axiom 6).

"But the function of each part is its adaptation to circ.u.mstances (Axioms 5, 6): Hence the Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circ.u.mstances.

"_Corollary._--Since man is an organism composed of parts (Axiom 6), the whole good of man is the sum of the goods of his parts, and therefore depends upon the adaptation of all his parts to their corresponding circ.u.mstances.

PROPOSITION V

"The Good is Pleasure.

"For the good results from the due performance of functions (Prop. IV); but the Good is a state of consciousness (Prop. II), therefore the Good is the state of consciousness which results from the due performance of functions (as such). Hence (by Definition), the Good is Pleasure.

"_Obs._--By our definitions of Good and Pleasure it was evident that they were coextensive, being both marks of the same thing; to prove their ident.i.ty it was necessary to show that Good is a state of consciousness."

Of these propositions Barratt says that I and II are perhaps the most important, since they a.s.sert the impossibility of Transcendentalism.

_Part Second_ of "Physical Ethics" is a "Verification by Special Experience."

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL SENSE

The a.s.sumption of a moral sense has already been made in the definition of Good as the object of Approbation.

Our previous reasoning would lead us nevertheless to guess that this sense is not, in its nature, a simple and indecomposable faculty. How, then, did this sense arise, and what is its nature and composition?

In the lowest animal organization, there are merely vague and indefinite states of consciousness corresponding to the undeveloped state of physical function. With the development and specialization of advancing evolution arises Perception; by which likeness and unlikeness among sensations are distinguished, and cla.s.sification is begun.

"At first only the most obvious resemblances are noticed, but as experience progresses, wider and wider cla.s.ses ever tend to be formed, till at last we arrive at those highest ideas which are coextensive with experience. These, though the last in order of birth, become the starting-points of science--just as men formed the idea of stones falling long before they discovered the law of attraction, yet by that law they afterwards 'explain' the former fact. Thus we trace the whole of Perception or Knowledge to this power of comparison and noting likenesses, and this we see to be coincident with the organization of consciousness into central meeting-places or ganglia, in which different sensations are presented to a common tribunal and so compared together.

We see, therefore, that Perception does not originate consciousness; it only organizes and develops it. We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr.

Herbert Spencer, who will not allow consciousness to the lowest animals."[63]

The process of perception or Knowledge works, not only on states of consciousness themselves, but on the changes from one state to another, or, in other words, on relations. Thus results, on the one hand, recognition of objects; on the other, argument and reasoning, for the most abstruse reasoning is nothing more than a cla.s.sification of relations.

"We have now, therefore, two distinct divisions of Consciousness: _Sensation_, which as before consists only of pleasure and pain, though now of different kinds; and _Perception_, which cla.s.sifies states of consciousness and their relations, and is therefore concerned only with change. Knowledge, therefore, has originally no other object than different pleasures and pains, but eventually it attends so much to the differences and resemblances that it ceases to remember the pleasure or pain; in its absorption in the relation it well-nigh forgets the things related. This process is furthered by the fact that, as the medium gets more extended, each part of it has less average effect upon the organism: the primary pleasures and pains being spread over a larger surface are less intense, and so obtrude themselves less. This is exemplified by the common observation that sensation and perception tend to exclude each other.... Nevertheless pleasure and pain ever remain indissolubly connected with consciousness, though their presence is often unheeded, and only the more violent forms force themselves on the attention.

"What is true of these simple forms of consciousness, is true of their later development. The relation of sensation to perception is the same as that between the faculties of which these are respectively the germs, emotion and intellect. For emotion is a.s.sociated sensations of pleasure and pain; and intellect is a.s.sociated perceptions of change and relation. Hence by their very nature these are at once mutually exclusive and inseparable. A strong emotion drives out reason, and much reasoning chills emotion.... Yet we can give _some_ reason for any emotion; and we feel some emotion in working a mathematical problem....

In every intentional act it is evident that both are involved; the end being given by emotion, the means by reasoning. Reasoning can give no end, it can only arrange, elicit, suggest; emotion can give no means, for it cannot cla.s.sify or observe relations. In the building up, therefore, of any moral faculty, both these elements must take a part.