History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16
You’re reading novel History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16 online at LightNovelFree.com. Please use the follow button to get notification about the latest chapter next time when you visit LightNovelFree.com. Use F11 button to read novel in full-screen(PC only). Drop by anytime you want to read free – fast – latest novel. It’s great if you could leave a comment, share your opinion about the new chapters, new novel with others on the internet. We’ll do our best to bring you the finest, latest novel everyday. Enjoy!
[Sidenote: Reduced fire.]
[Sidenote: Symons gives impulse.]
[Sidenote: He receives his mortal wound.]
Such was the situation at eight o'clock. At that hour the 69th and 13th batteries, quitting the position from which they had silenced the Boer artillery, moved through the town, and unlimbered on rising ground between the eastern boundary of Dundee and the Sand Spruit.
Thence they opened again, the 69th upon Talana at 2,300 yards, the 13th upon Lennox Hill at 2,500. Though they and their escort of King's Royal Riflemen were targets for both hills, their practice was admirable, and had it been more rapid, must speedily have smothered the enemy's fire. But the artillery commander, fearing to run short, and knowing his inability to replenish, was obliged continually to check expenditure.[92] For a time the fight remained stationary. The momentum of the attack had died away, and Yule found it impossible to get it in motion again at once, in spite of numerous messages he received from Sir W. Penn Symons urging immediate advance. At 9 a.m.
the infantry being still inert, the patience of the General was exhausted. Despite the remonstrances of his staff, he, with three staff officers and orderlies, rode into the wood, and, dismounting, hurried into the foremost lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at its northern angle. Calling to these to "push on!" he then pressed along inside the boundary, animating by word and gesture all the troops he pa.s.sed, and halted for a moment to face the hill a little beyond where the afore-mentioned donga disappeared into the wood. Here Major F.
Hammersley, of his staff, was wounded, and, immediately after, the General himself was shot in the stomach. Directing Brigadier-General Yule to proceed with the attack, he turned and walked calmly to the rear. Then, meeting his horse, he mounted, and not until he had pa.s.sed entirely through the troops was any sign of suffering allowed to escape him. At the station of the Bearer company he dismounted, and was carried to the dressing station in a dhoolie. Five minutes later, at 9.35 a.m., the surgeon p.r.o.nounced his wound to be fatal, and the news was telegraphed to Ladysmith.
[Footnote 92: There were for each gun 154 rounds, including 60 reserve.]
[Sidenote: His impulse tells.]
[Sidenote: K.R.R. seize wall of upper terrace.]
[Sidenote: R.I.F join and also threaten Boer right.]
The life of the General was not thrown away; his action had immediate effect. Before he had quitted the wood a dying man, parties of soldiers were already pus.h.i.+ng forward from its front wall across the 100 yards of bullet-swept flat intervening between them and the first slopes of Talana proper. On the right, the first to break cover, four and a half companies of the King's Royal Rifles emerged in small parties from Smith's farm. Leaving there two companies in support, they pushed up along the right side of the transverse wall, in full view of Lennox Hill, and suffering from its fire. So rapid were their movements that the Boer shooting was hasty and ill-aimed, and the losses were but few. Some distance forward they leapt across to the left of the transverse wall, and reconnoitring that bounding the upper terrace, found it, to their surprise, unoccupied by the enemy.[93]
Other groups, in response to signals, then worked their way upward, until soon a considerable number of Riflemen were under the wall. On their left the Royal Irish Fusiliers supported the attack. Two and a half companies ("E.," "F." and half of "C.") of this battalion had, when General Symons came to the front, been sent to the edge of the wood, and these, seeing what the Rifles had done, streamed straight up to the wall. "A." and half of "D." companies, which had been boldly and independently handled wide on the left, avoiding the dongas, pushed on gradually to well within five hundred yards of the enemy's extreme right, on which they brought their rifles to bear. The other half of "C." company, with men of other battalions, amounting to about one hundred in all, had lain with the three companies of King's Royal Rifles in the enclosure of Smith's farm, and advanced with them. One company ("B.") Royal Irish Fusiliers had been ordered forward on the left by General Symons himself immediately he arrived in the wood.
This company, perceiving the fallacious donga winding apparently to the front, had dropped into it, and following it up with the same expectations as had encouraged the Dublin Fusiliers, was speedily in the same predicament at its open extremity. Another company ("H."), taking this route with many losses, was similarly blocked at the same point. But with the exception of these two companies, which could not move for a time, the advance of the King's Royal Rifles to the wall was strongly backed by the Royal Irish Fusiliers, whose men appeared from all the near parts of the hill to join in with the rest. With them ran many of the Dublin Fusiliers. This regiment, much entangled in the watercourse already mentioned and in others equally exposed and useless more to the right, could not progress, and, though a few men managed to reach the upper wall direct, it was only possible to do so by first going back to the edge of the wood, an attempt of great hazard.
[Footnote 93: The omission of the Boers to man this breastwork, situated as it was within 400 yards of the edge of the wood, and commanding every inch of the ground in front, was not owing to any fears on the part of Lukas Meyer as to its not being tenable. The orders of that general had been plainly that the wall was to be held, but as he did not remain to see them carried out, the burghers, fearing to hold what appeared to them isolated and inadequate cover, neglected it entirely.]
[Sidenote: Two hours check.]
[Sidenote: Guns gallop forward.]
[Sidenote: The Infantry dash in.]
[Sidenote: The onslaught having weakened, the Artillery opens fire again.]
The battle came to a standstill once more. The upper wall was won, but the heavy and incessant fusilade directed upon it and upon the ground below it, rendered its occupation precarious, and reinforcement a matter of extreme difficulty. Not until two hours had pa.s.sed were sufficient men collected under it to render the last stage possible, and the long delay cost many casualties. At 11 a.m. the officer commanding the artillery received a request by flag-signal to cease firing, as the a.s.sault was about to be delivered. He did so; but time to acquire strength was still needed, and the artillery, itself hara.s.sed by musketry, re-opened. At 11.30 a.m. the order was repeated, and once more Colonel E. H. Pickwoad stopped his guns. Immediately after, the batteries galloped forward, awaking against themselves the full energy of all parts of the Boer line. They crossed a wide donga and came into action again on the flat plain between the Sand Spruit and Talana, sending their sh.e.l.ls clear over and past the left edge of the wood at a range of 1,400 yards from the crest of the enemy's stronghold. Under the rapid bombardment the Mausers slackened and at last were silent. For the third time the order was signalled to cease firing. It was duly obeyed. Colonel Gunning, of the King's Royal Rifles, who had called up his two supporting companies from Smith's farm, pa.s.sed the word, "Get ready to go over!" The men rose to their knees; then, at the command "Advance!" scrambled and fell over the obstacle. A blaze burst from the crest as the first figures wavered on the wall, and many fell backward dead or wounded. Some could not surmount the obstruction, which in parts was over-high for vaulting; some, falling on the far side, picked themselves up and were struck down in the first leap of their charge. A few, more fortunate, held on. But the onset had not much weight, and losses quickly lightened it still further. Many of the Boers had fled at the first sight of the soldiers rus.h.i.+ng forward, but of those who remained, not a few actually came towards them, and shot rapidly point-blank at the a.s.sailants, who were clawing their way up the last precipitous rampart of the natural fortress. The artillery, therefore, knowing only that the onslaught had been checked, about 12.30 p.m. re-opened with quick and devastating rounds. But during the charge, the light had been bad, and the gunners had not all observed the foremost groups of their comrades lying amongst the rocks close to the crest. Soon sh.e.l.l after sh.e.l.l burst amongst the latter.
[Sidenote: It checks both sides.]
A signaller of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, standing up near the top of the hill, attracted the attention of the artillerymen, but was unable to make them understand his message. Another of the same regiment failed similarly from the wall. As the discharges, destroying both combatants alike, became more overwhelming, both drew back. On the extreme right a few of the Rifles still clung on. At first the Boers melted from the front alone, but the shrapnel beat all over the hill, and the retreat became a run before the rear edge was reached.
[Sidenote: The final charge.]
Behind the wall the regimental commanders, taking the cessation of Boer fire as signal for a last successful attack, met in hasty conference, and agreed to lead their men forward simultaneously. Soon after 1 p.m. the whole British line surged over the wall, and clambering up the hill, flooded its flat summit from end to end.
[Sidenote: The Boers abandon Lennox Hill.]
[Sidenote: Cavalry and guns both fail to make defeat crus.h.i.+ng.]
[Sidenote: A fatal error.]
From Lennox Hill this final charge was marked, and in a few moments it, too, was empty of Boers. Before 2 p.m. the entire position was won, and Brigadier-General Yule, to whom the loss of General Symons had given the command, at once ordered the artillery to the summit of Smith's Nek, from whence they might sh.e.l.l the now flying foe. The cavalry, looked for amongst the defeated Boers, who covered the plain for miles in the direction of the Buffalo river, were nowhere to be seen. On the guns then rested the last hope of confirming the victory, but they, having gained the Nek, were, to the wonderment of all, pointed silently at the receding commandos. Doubt had at this critical moment a.s.sailed the artillery commander. Just before the final stroke, about 1.30 p.m., a message, purporting to come from Lukas Meyer, proposing an armistice to look for the wounded, had pa.s.sed through his hands on its way to the General. No authoritative information as to its having been accorded or not having reached him, he, with other officers, became uncertain as to the propriety of continuing the battle. At this time a bystander exclaimed that the Boer hospital was retreating before him, and believing that he himself saw red-crossed flags waving over the Boer column moving slowly away within shrapnel range, his hesitation deepened. He refrained from opening fire, and the Boer army, defeated, but not crushed, made despondently, but without further losses, for the laager under the Doornberg, from which it had marched the night before.
[Sidenote: The return to camp.]
Brigadier-General Yule, beset with anxiety concerning the Boer army, which had menaced his flank all day from Impati, had no thought but to secure his men in quarters before night and the still expected attack fell upon them together. The infantry, therefore, after searching the hill for wounded, were sent from the field. By 6 p.m., as evening fell amid a storm of rain, all were back in camp. The mounted troops alone, unseen since the early morning, did not return to their lines, nor was there any sign of them until, at 7 p.m., two squadrons of the 18th Hussars, under Major Knox, reported themselves. No more came in that night, nor next morning, nor at any time.
[Sidenote: Moller's disastrous day.]
The brief orders given to Colonel Moller at the commencement of the action have already been detailed, and even before the enemy's guns were silenced that officer began to put them into execution with promise of brilliant results. As early as 5.45 a.m. he despatched a squadron of the 18th Hussars, with instructions to move round the northern extremity of Talana, and report if it were possible to take ground on the flank from which the enemy's retreat or, at least, his loose ponies might be threatened. The reconnaissance was perfectly successful. Moving northwards a mile down an arm of the Sand Spruit, under the harmless fire of two guns, Major E. C. Knox guided his squadron across the watercourse, and hidden, by the mist from Impati, by a spur from Talana, turned north-east. Then crossing the main spruit, above the point where its northerly trend is deflected by the spurs of the two mountains, he swung boldly south-east and, unperceived by the enemy, seized a kopje from which he could actually look into the right rear of their position upon Talana, only 1,200 yards distant to the south-west. Behind the mountain stood herds of saddled ponies, whose masters lay out of sight in action along the western crest. A message despatched to Colonel Moller informing him of this achievement, and asking for reinforcements, brought to the spot another squadron of the 18th and the regimental machine gun, with the section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry. These made their way at first through a sharp fire from the pom-pom near the northern end of Talana, but, like their predecessors, were neglected as soon as they moved out of sight around the spur swelling up from the Sand Spruit to the right flank of the Boer fastness. Shortly afterwards, in response to a message from the General, who thought that the enemy's guns, now suddenly silent, were being withdrawn, and that a general retreat would shortly follow, Colonel Moller himself hurried after with the remaining squadron of the 18th and the mounted infantry company of the Dublin Fusiliers. The cavalry were now in rear of the flank of an enemy already wavering, and certain to fly shortly, whose lines of retreat would be at their mercy, whose means of retreat, the ponies, they could already partially destroy. But here, Moller, refusing the requests of his subordinates to be allowed to open fire on the closely-packed ponies on Talana, first despatched a squadron under Major Knox towards the rear of Talana, then himself quitted his vantage ground and lined up his force in some plough land towards Schultz' farm, and later in the open veld astride of the Landman's Drift road, two and a half miles in rear of the centre of the Boer position. Whilst moving in accordance with these dispositions, a section of the Dublin Fusiliers mounted infantry, turning aside to a.s.sail a party of Boers in a small farmhouse on the flank, captured seven of them.
[Sidenote: Knox's happy charge.]
Meanwhile the squadron under Knox, reconnoitring towards the rear of Smith's Nek, had been hara.s.sed by hostile patrols on its left flank.
These were speedily dispersed with a loss of ten prisoners by the charge of a troop. But other and stronger patrols coming up from the direction of Landman's Drift hung so persistently on the flank that a charge by the whole squadron was necessary. It was completely successful, two of the enemy being killed and about twenty-five captured. The other patrols then drew off, and the squadron, finding nothing more to do, returned to hand over the prisoners. But Moller, seeing the enemy swarming about the rear of Lennox Hill, at once ordered Knox out again in that direction, this time with two squadrons and a troop, directing him to get behind the hill, which, in prolongation of Lennox Hill to the south, overlooks the coalfields on one side and on the other abuts on the heights of Halifax.
[Sidenote: Moller's surrender.]
He himself remained out in the open with his diminished force of mounted infantry and two troops of cavalry. Now the enemy were quitting Talana and Lennox Hills in numbers which increased momentarily, and when the mounted infantry opened fire upon them, they began to converge on the insignificant party which barred the road to safety. Moller at length perceived his danger, and commencing a series of rapid retirements towards the northern spur of Impati, fixed his only hope on the possibility of riding completely around that mountain, outwork though it was of the main Boer army in its descent from the frontier. In a spruit, a branch of the Sand river, which runs through Schultz' farm, the Maxim, outpaced and overdriven, stuck fast, and it was promptly attacked and captured by a party of twenty-five of the enemy who had descried its plight from Talana, its detachment holding out until all were killed or wounded. In this affair nine Boer prisoners were also released. About 1.15 p.m., a party of two hundred Boers was seen descending Impati through the collieries at its northern extremity. The mountain already held the enemy's van; Moller's retreat was cut off. Adelaide farm lay close ahead, and here for the first time he faced about for a stand. The men of the 18th Hussars, with the section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry, and one of the Dublin mounted infantry, lined the farm walls; the remaining two sections of the mounted infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers held a small kopje, two hundred yards from the building. The Boers closed around in force and poured a bitter fusilade upon the troopers.
A gun, which had opened ineffectively from the colliery, was then brought forward to 1,400 yards, and its projectiles shattered the buildings, and scattered the horses. In a few moments another gun opened more to the left and 1,100 yards distant. At 4 p.m. the white flag was by Moller's order waved in the farmyard, and he capitulated to Commandant Trichardt. Nine officers and 205 men laid down their arms after a loss of 8 men killed, 3 officers and 20 men wounded. This affair all but doubled the day's casualties, which now numbered 500.[94]
[Footnote 94: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.]
[Sidenote: Knox wins his way home.]
Meanwhile Knox's two squadrons were in little less danger in the opposite direction. Attempting to intercept with dismounted fire parties of the enemy, who were retiring towards Halifax, the little force became the focus of every wandering party of the enemy, not only of those evacuating the positions of Talana and Lennox Hill, but also of many riding in from the Buffalo. For the hills and plain were full of Boers who had taken no part in the battle. But Knox was not to be trapped. Moving swiftly towards Malungeni, and favoured by a slight mist, he slipped away, though nearly surrounded, and halted for half an hour under cover. Then, whilst the Boers were puzzled by his circuitous track, he dashed westwards through their intervals and escaped.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE, AND THE ACTION OF RIETFONTEIN.[95]
[Footnote 95: See maps Nos. 3, 5 and 7.]
[Sidenote: Yule decides not to retreat, but s.h.i.+fts his ground.]
At 5, on the morning of October 21st, the troops again stood to arms.
There was no sign of life upon Talana; the cavalry scouted out unmolested on that side. The mounted patrols, however, supported by "F." company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, reconnoitring northward, discovered the enemy on the Dannhauser road, and the foremost scouts were driven in. At the same time information came of a hostile movement to the westward. Whatever illusions may have existed previously about the strategical situation, none now remained. General Yule himself had at no time shared them; yet he was disinclined to retreat. He re-created a staff,[96] examined a fresh defensive position, and determined to stand his ground. Sending for his commanding officers shortly after midday, he pointed out the new site he had selected below the sloping shoulder of one of the foremost spurs of Indumeni, about a mile south of their present camp, and desired them to rendezvous upon it with their commands at 2.30 p.m., less, however, with any intention of occupying it definitely than of seeing how the troops "fitted into the ground." In view of the expected bombardment from Impati, the whole of the tents except those of the hospital had previously been lowered, and in them the men's kits had been left ready packed for a move. The cavalry and artillery started at once. Before the hour appointed for the march of the rest of the troops the enemy made his presence on Impati felt. At 1.35 p.m.
a squadron of the 18th Hussars, reconnoitring near the Dannhauser road, came suddenly under the fire of four guns and many rifles from the north-western slopes of the mountain.
[Footnote 96: Appointing Major A. J. Murray, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, (late D.A.A.G.I.) as A.A.G., Lieut.
G. E. R. Kenrick, the Queen's Regiment, as acting D.A.A.G., Captain C. K. Burnett, 18th Hussars, as Brigade Major to the 8th infantry brigade, and Lieut. F. D. Murray, the Black Watch, as A.D.C.]
[Sidenote: Yule asks for reinforcements.]
The Royal Irish Fusiliers led off towards the rendezvous at 2 p.m. By 3 p.m. all were in their places, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Leicesters.h.i.+re regiment and King's Royal Rifles, in the order named from right to left. It was cold and dull, and the slight rain turned to a heavy downpour, which filled the shallow trenches as soon as they were made. At 3.30 p.m. Yule, receiving reports from his patrols that the enemy was mounting guns upon Impati, and realising more fully his peril, despatched a telegram to Ladysmith reporting his arrangements, declaring his expectation of being attacked from both sides, and asking for reinforcements. Before the message had reached its destination, a sh.e.l.l from a heavy piece upon the western shoulder of Impati burst in front of the new line. Others followed quickly, some into the deserted camp where the hospital tents stood up as a target, some into the entrenchments, others into the cavalry, who had taken ground in the rear of the line of defence, and further up the slopes of Indumeni. One falling into a tin house, which lay behind the left, killed Lieut. W. M. J. Hannah, of the Leicesters.h.i.+re M.I., who was sheltering from the storm, and wounded two of his men; elsewhere a gunner was killed and another wounded. Another and a smaller gun then opened from a point below the western crest of Impati. The accuracy of the piece and the smallness of its calibre challenged the British batteries to reply. But the first shrapnel burst at the foot of the mountain, far below the Boer artillery, and when sinking the trails failed to give the necessary elevation by some two thousand yards, the gunners desisted.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements cannot be sent.]
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16
You're reading novel History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16 online at LightNovelFree.com. You can use the follow function to bookmark your favorite novel ( Only for registered users ). If you find any errors ( broken links, can't load photos, etc.. ), Please let us know so we can fix it as soon as possible. And when you start a conversation or debate about a certain topic with other people, please do not offend them just because you don't like their opinions.
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16 summary
You're reading History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 16. This novel has been translated by Updating. Author: Frederick Maurice already has 851 views.
It's great if you read and follow any novel on our website. We promise you that we'll bring you the latest, hottest novel everyday and FREE.
LightNovelFree.com is a most smartest website for reading novel online, it can automatic resize images to fit your pc screen, even on your mobile. Experience now by using your smartphone and access to LightNovelFree.com
- Related chapter:
- History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 15
- History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 17