History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 40

[Sidenote: The march of the 14th and 66th batteries and six Naval 12-pounders.]

[Sidenote: and 6th brigade.]

[Sidenote: Dundonald and 7th battery.]

[Sidenote: 2nd and 4th brigades.]

Meanwhile the larger units had begun to carry out their orders. The 14th and 66th Field batteries of No. 1 brigade division, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, and six Naval 12-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, R.N., moved across the railway line at 3.30 a.m., accompanied by the officer commanding the whole of the Royal Artillery then in Natal, Colonel C. J. Long, who had been directed by General Buller personally to supervise the movements of these batteries. East of the railway these guns joined the 6th brigade and advanced at 4 a.m. with that unit, northward. Lord Dundonald's brigade moved also at 4 a.m., accompanied by the 7th Field battery.

The 2nd brigade, at the same hour, left camp and marched towards Colenso, followed at 4.30 a.m. by the 4th brigade.

[Sidenote: 5th brigade. 2nd brigade division.]

The 5th brigade moved off at the same time. Lieut.-Colonel Parsons, commanding No. 2 brigade division, although directed by the written operation orders to follow the 4th brigade (Lyttelton) in order to enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge, had received verbal instructions from Sir R. Buller through Colonel Long that at least one of his batteries was to cross the river with Hart's brigade. He accordingly marched with his guns on the right rear of the 5th brigade.

[Sidenote: Hart's instructions, guide, and map.]

Major-General Hart had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir guide, and a colonist as interpreter to a.s.sist him in finding "the Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela," by which he was to cross the river. This map was a plane-table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen from a distance. Unfortunately it had not been verified by any close reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders were misleading. A Bridle Drift, used by natives in the dry season of the winter but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed, moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the spruit, and placed, also immediately to the west of the Drift, another loop of the river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop, near 2 on map No. 15. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the eastern, not the western bend of the loop. The Bridle Drift lies, not near to the western bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward.

Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map, and in the written orders was further enhanced by another serious misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it.

Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been given wrong instructions, for he conceived that he was intended to lead the column, not to the Bridle Drift, but to a point (marked 4 on map No. 15) close to his own kraal, at the head of and inside the loop, where, owing to the existence of rapids, the river was fordable, breast-high, by men on foot. The practicability of this drift had been personally verified by the native on the two previous nights, but no staff officer had accompanied him. Another similar foot-ford might have been found at point 6 immediately below the junction of the Doornkop Spruit with the Tugela, but the existence of neither of these fords was known to Major-General Hart or to the Headquarter staff.[228]

[Footnote 228: General Buller's telegram to the War Office, dated 15th December, 1899, states: "There are two fordable places in the Tugela ... they are about two miles apart ...

General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard the right."]

[Sidenote: The march of Hart's (5th) brigade.]

The 5th brigade marched from its parade ground in ma.s.s of quarter-columns, the battalions being arranged in the following order:--

2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commanded by Col. C. D. Cooper.

1st Connaught Rangers, commanded by Col. L. G. Brooke.

1st Border regiment, commanded by Col. J. H. E. Hinde.

1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, commanded by Lt.-Col. T. M. G.

Thackeray.

Half of the 17th Company, R.E., under the command of Major H. H.

Ma.s.sy, followed in rear. A squadron of the Royal Dragoons acted as advance guard as far as Doornkop Spruit, where the cavalry moved off to the left.

[Sidenote: Hart's intention.]

The Brigadier had informed the commanding officers on the previous evening that he intended the leading battalion to line the right bank of the Tugela, while the remainder crossed. After pa.s.sing, the brigade was to move eastward, and attempt to close the enemy into the Colenso loop of the river.

[Sidenote: Hart plunges into the loop.]

[Sidenote: The Boer artillery opens fire, shortly after 6 a.m.]

[Sidenote: Unseen riflemen enfilade the attack.]

Hart, following the directions of the Kaffir guide, led his brigade in a north-westerly direction to the first drift over the Doornkop Spruit,[229] and thence northward, the formation of the leading battalion being now changed to an advance in fours from the right of companies at deploying interval, the three rear battalions continuing in ma.s.s of quarter-columns. A few cavalry scouts preceded the brigade: the main body of the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel J. F.

Burn-Murdoch, watched the left flank, his officers' patrols moving down to the river's bank, without provoking any fire. Colonel Burn-Murdoch despatched three successive gallopers to inform General Hart that these patrols reported the enemy in force on his front and left. General Hart replied that he intended to cross by the drift in front of him, and would ignore the enemy on his left, unless they attacked in strength. The column, therefore, continued to move steadily on the point, near to the western bend of the loop, where the sketch had placed the Bridle Drift. But, as the brigade was crossing a newly-ploughed mealie-field, within 300 yards of the entrance of the loop, the Brigadier riding at its head perceived that the map was misleading, and on enquiry, the Kaffir guide pointed up the loop, and stated, through the interpreter, that it was in that direction that the ford lay. Almost simultaneously a Boer gun opened on the column from the underfeature below Grobelaar Mountain, and its sh.e.l.l, pa.s.sing over the whole depth of the brigade, burst behind the rear battalion.

A second sh.e.l.l, pa.s.sing over the heads of the Dublin Fusiliers, fell in front of the Connaught Rangers. A third almost immediately followed and knocked over nine men of that battalion. These, the first shots from the Boer side, were fired by their artillery, in disobedience to the orders of Louis Botha, who had not given the signal, and hoped to entice the attack to closer range. The time was now a little after 6 a.m. The Dublin Fusiliers immediately front-formed and extended to the right; the battalions in rear were deployed to the left in single rank in quick time, and were subsequently opened out with from two to three paces interval, the enemy meanwhile continuing to sh.e.l.l them with shrapnel. The ground on the far side of the river presented a formidable appearance to these troops while deploying. It rose rapidly from the left bank to a line of hills, which, towards their crest, seemed steep, rugged, and inaccessible. After Hart had deployed, his brigade moved on the same point by rushes, the right half-battalions being directed on the gorge of the loop, while the left half-battalions overlapped this gorge, and were cramped by the bank on their western flank. As the brigade came near the river it was subjected to a very heavy fire from the long Boer trench to the north, occupied by the Standerton commando. The battalions were also enfiladed from trenches on the right and left. At the time it was only possible to guess from the course of the bullets where these shelter trenches were. The left half-battalions temporarily obtained a certain amount of cover from the bank of the river. The right half-battalions, when a little further on, gained for the moment some shelter from a long, narrow underfeature, towards the centre of the loop. With the exception of the 1st Border regiment, which was on the extreme left, the units rapidly intermingled. This mixture of commands was soon increased when the left half-battalions of the Dublin Fusiliers and Connaught Rangers, followed by two companies of the Border regiment, came up. They had been ordered to cross the donga, near 2 on map No.

15, and move eastward in succession in support of those in front. The pa.s.sage to the flank in file of these half-battalions was carried out under a severe and accurate cross musketry fire, while the Boer guns continued to make excellent practice with shrapnel on the extended British lines.

[Footnote 229: It is noteworthy that Major-General Hart is emphatic in a.s.serting that "he did not cross the Doornkop Spruit." It will be understood from the explanation given in the text that he did not cross what was marked for him on the map as the spruit. The map was wrong. He crossed the spruit shown as "Doornkop Spruit" on map 15.]

[Sidenote: The guide disappears.]

As the Kaffir guide had disappeared, the actual position of the ford was unknown. Major C. R. R. McGrigor, King's Royal Rifle Corps, General Hart's brigade-major, had ridden up the river in search of the Bridle Drift, and, finding a spot where there appeared to be a ford, entered the river on foot, but was soon out of his depth, and was compelled to swim back to the right bank.

[Sidenote: Hart's brigade struggles forward up the loop.]

Meanwhile parties of the Connaught Rangers, the Dublin, and Inniskilling, Fusiliers, had worked their way up the loop by a series of rushes in extended order at about three to four paces interval, suffering heavy loss. Each group followed the nearest officer, irrespective of his corps, of its own volition, and worked forward, as it were, automatically, the rushes, however, varying in length, sometimes carrying the men through the group in front, sometimes not reaching it. There was very little shooting, as nothing could be seen to aim at. The enemy's fire was too heavy to allow of any combined command of the movement. Nevertheless, there was little or no confusion, and the advance continued with the steady progress of an incoming tide. Eventually a detachment of the Dublin Fusiliers, under Lieut. T. B. Ely, and Major M. G. Moore's company of the Connaught, mingled with men of other regiments, reached the kraal, about two hundred yards from the head of the loop; others of the Inniskilling, and Dublin, Fusiliers and of the Connaught Rangers pushed on to the river bank; there these handfuls of men remained for several hours, little more than one hundred yards from the Boer trenches on the far bank, but in face of the storm of bullets it was impossible to cross the river, nor were either officers or men aware that they were near a ford. The rest of the brigade, except the left half-battalion of the Inniskilling Fusiliers and one or two companies of the Border regiment who lined the river bank west of the loop, were on, or in rear of, the knoll, the cohesion of units being now almost entirely lost. The artillery and rifle fire, concentrated on the British troops from the far bank, was too continuous and accurate to permit of any further advance being attempted for the moment. The shrapnel of the two field guns, posted in emplacements on the lower ridge to the north-west, was particularly effective, and the Boer riflemen did not disclose whence their deadly shots came. Volleys were fired from time to time by the British infantry, but comparatively little ammunition was expended.

Yet, notwithstanding these trying conditions, the men clung on steadfastly, each group being well under the control of the officer nearest to them, whether of their own corps or of another.[230]

Meantime, Parsons' batteries, the 64th and 73rd, had come into action on the right bank of the Doornkop Spruit, and were busily engaged in sh.e.l.ling a kraal immediately in front of the loop, and in endeavouring to silence the Boer guns. These somewhat outranged the Field artillery, and an attempt to cross over the spruit so as to come into closer action on its left bank was for the moment frustrated by a Boer sh.e.l.l bursting on the team of the leading gun, killing two horses, upsetting the gun, and thereby blocking the ford of this stream. On this the two batteries re-opened fire from the right bank of the spruit.

[Footnote 230: In consequence of the heavy losses suffered by the commissioned ranks in previous actions all the +infantry+ officers had been ordered to discard their swords, and for the most part carried a rifle and men's equipment.]

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers recalls Hart.]

Sir Redvers Buller had watched from Naval Gun Hill the original advance of the 5th brigade. As soon as he observed the movement into the loop, he despatched a galloper to order General Hart to halt; the messenger was caught in a bog and failed to reach his destination. A second officer was sent, but was unable to find the Brigadier.

Finally, when the brigade had become heavily engaged, Colonel Stopford was instructed by Sir Redvers to direct Major-General Hart to retreat, and to inform him that his retirement would be covered by artillery fire. Major Cooper, A.D.C. to General Clery, conveyed orders to Lieut.-Colonel Parsons to move his guns across the spruit and divert the fire from Hart's brigade during the withdrawal. Subsequently, fearing a flank counter-attack on the left, General Buller directed Major-General Lyttelton to support the 5th brigade with two battalions of the 4th.

[Sidenote: Barton's (6th) brigade marches.]

[Sidenote: Col. Long's guns move off with Barton, then diverge.]

Major-General Barton at 4 a.m. had moved off with the 6th brigade on the east side of the railway in the following order: the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with six companies in line, each company having a sub-section in its front, and two companies in support; the half-battalion of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in echelon of companies on the left flank, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers in echelon of companies on the right flank, and the half-battalion 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers in rear, at a distance of 1,500 yards from the leading battalion.[231] The direction of the brigade's advance was to the north-east, towards Hlangwhane Hill, in conformity with the operation orders of the previous evening.

[Footnote 231: The other half-battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, under command of Lieut.-Col. J. Reeves, was on baggage guard. Headquarters and four companies of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers were at Frere.]

Colonel Long's guns accompanied the brigade for some distance, the field batteries leading, with the Naval guns, dragged by spans of oxen, in rear. After a time, however, the respective directions a.s.signed by Sir R. Buller to the guns and the infantry brigade were found to diverge, and General Barton accordingly detailed two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers to continue with the guns as escort. At 5.30 a.m. the Brigadier halted his command, his leading battalion being then about two miles from the river.

[Sidenote: Col. Long's mission.]

The specific task a.s.signed to No. 1 brigade division by the operation orders was, "to proceed to a point from which it can prepare the crossing for the 2nd brigade." Sir Redvers Buller, at the conference of the previous afternoon, had thought it desirable to supplement and antic.i.p.ate this written order with verbal instructions as to the exact point at which the batteries should come into action. He had intended to convey to Colonel Long by these verbal instructions that the purposed preparation should be carried out at long range. But the impression left on the subordinate officer's mind, when he left the conference, was that medium range was meant. As he rode therefore with Lieut.-Colonel Hunt and Lieut. Ogilvy, R.N., at the head of the field artillery, now marching in battery column, Long was on the look out for a suitable position at a distance of not less than 2,000 yards and not more than 2,500 yards from Fort Wylie, the southernmost of the kopjes which had been pointed out as the brigade division's targets.

Had a site between those limits been selected, the batteries would not have been seriously molested by the Boer riflemen entrenched on the far bank of the river, and could, by superior strength, have crushed the enemy's gunners posted among the Colenso kopjes.

[Sidenote: Long brings his guns into action, after Boer guns open on Hart, _i.e._, about 6.15 a.m.]

It was not until after 6 a.m. that Long arrived at the distance from the river at which he had intended to come into action. The batteries were still at a walk, with the Naval guns in rear, when suddenly heavy firing was heard on the left flank. It was evident that part of the British force was closely engaged. Anxious to afford immediate effective support, and deceived by the light as to his actual distance from Fort Wylie, Long ordered Hunt's brigade division to push on, and come into action at a point about eighty yards to the north of a broad and shallow donga, which runs at right angles to the railway and was just in front of his guns. Ogilvy's Naval guns were to follow with the infantry escort and to unlimber on the left of the field batteries.

The ground scouts of the brigade division had by this time reached the bush, lining the south bank of the river, and had ascertained that this bank was clear of the enemy. A section of the infantry escort had also been sent forward to reconnoitre Colenso. Not a sign had been given by the Boer guns and riflemen concentrated in front of Hunt, on the far side, for the defence of the Colenso crossings. As soon as the batteries approached the spot selected by the artillery commander, it proved to be within 1,250 yards of Fort Wylie, and not much more than 1,000 yards from the Boer infantry entrenchments between that work and the river. Then Louis Botha, fearing that their further advance would intimidate his inexperienced burghers, gave the order to fire.

Immediately a storm of bullets and sh.e.l.ls burst on the British guns, both field and Naval. The Boers knew the exact range from whitewash marks on the railway fence and adjacent stones; their fire was therefore from the outset accurate.[232] The field batteries, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt, continued to go forward at a steady trot and came into action at the chosen place in an excellent line. The limbers were taken to the rear and wagons were brought up in the ordinary manner.

[Footnote 232: In addition to the field guns on the Colenso kopjes, a heavy gun, north of them, was observed by the Naval officers of Capt. Jones', R.N., battery.]

[Sidenote: The Naval guns also come into action.]

The two leading Naval guns, under Lieutenant James, R.N., had at this moment just crossed the drift of a deep donga, about 400 yards behind Hunt. The central section of the battery was still in the drift, and the rear section on the south side. The leading section, by direction of the battery commander, Lieutenant Ogilvy, moved a little to the left and opened fire against Fort Wylie. The native drivers of the ox-spans of the other four guns had bolted, and the central guns were, for the moment, jammed with their ammunition wagons in the drift, but eventually the oxen were cut loose, and the guns, together with those of the rear section, brought into action on the south side of the donga, whence they also fired on Fort Wylie. During all this delay the enemy's artillery, and in particular a pom-pom, had maintained a well-directed fire on the drift.

[Sidenote: The batteries suffer severely.]