Lord Milner's Work in South Africa Part 23

"GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.

_7 April, 1899._

TO VAN KRETSCHMAR VAN VEEN, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF THE N.Z.A. RY. CO.

HON'D. SIR,--With reference to a letter of his Excellency the Amba.s.sador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr.

Statham and the latter's request for an a.s.sistance of 300 for furniture and such like, I have the honour to inform you confidentially that the Executive Council has resolved to grant this gentleman Statham an amount of 150. As, according to previous agreement, a yearly allowance is paid to Mr.

Statham by your Company, I have the honour to request you kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted him. His Excellency the Amba.s.sador is likewise being informed of this decision of the Executive Council.--I have, etc.,

J. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."

(Q. 608.)

Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor to those Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer cause. His allowance, however, had ceased before the war broke out.]

Three months later President Kruger's telegram was laid before the two ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner which he appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr. Merriman himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To this letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately:

"This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of the cab which waits?..."

In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr.

Hargrove wrote:

"Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your name in this way: I told President Kruger of a conversation I had had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his att.i.tude would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their forces from colonial territory on the condition that their independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in those circ.u.mstances he would, in his personal capacity, most certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would do the same."

Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President Kruger's telegram is due to the circ.u.mstance that it was probably "dictated in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and contained a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk"

translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch.

Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr.

Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,[219] he had been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's "well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was immediately followed by the rebellion of that district."

[Footnote 219: In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For the circ.u.mstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the occasion mentioned see note, p. 287.]

[Sidenote: The Graaf Reinet congress.]

This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May 30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British Empire," he said,[220] "were not the Boers, but those who had set up the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not propose to rely exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It resolved to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple truth as they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland.

[Footnote 220: As reported in _The Cape Times_, Cd. 261.]

There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated absolutely President Kruger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come here [_i.e._ to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of _The South African News_--that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question _The South African News_ rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on parole; by publis.h.i.+ng stories of imaginary Boer victories; by eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the 1,000 from the Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent and vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr.

Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and condemned to a term of imprisonment.[221]

[Footnote 221: See p. 477.]

[Sidenote: Mischievous effects.]

The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a pa.s.sage in the despatch[222] which covers the transmission of the newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public demonstration of their opinions, he writes:

[Footnote 222: Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.]

"There was a truce of G.o.d on both sides. Then came the 'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would have been useless--and, as a matter of fact, I did not attempt--to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side.

Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to p.r.o.nounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of violent things have been said, and a certain amount of unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been the case."

That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave his adherence left him in no doubt on this point.

"The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress, "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in, Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged from generation to generation."

To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to invite rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of the Boers, and to embarra.s.s the British authorities, both civil and military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may be left to form his own judgment.

[Sidenote: Comrades or dupes.]

This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa, was the co-operation of these Englishmen--whether comrades or dupes--who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole.

"If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal, why should they make such furious efforts to keep it up at the present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations that the Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor acquiesce, seems to me to indicate a considerable and well-justified anxiety on their part lest these terrible things should, after all, happen."

But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th--May 1st), and subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal, considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of the republican invaders and re-establis.h.i.+ng British authority in the districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr.

Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still held the opinions of the Bond.

[Sidenote: The punishment of rebels.]

In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers to give formal expression to their views upon the subjects to which Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later Lord Milner reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which Mr. Schreiner and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for persons indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner wrote:

"Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the selection of a certain limited number of the princ.i.p.al offenders, whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to their avocations."[223]

[Footnote 223: Cd. 264.]

The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions, and the arguments by which they were supported--notably an appeal to the "Canadian precedent"--were telegraphed to the Home Government, and on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While the people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling against "those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's forces, whether enemies or rebels"--did, in fact, desire that all racial animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest possible moment after the war was over--the "sentiments of both sides" must be taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue from "the rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels were actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over than those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain "loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than the bad results to be antic.i.p.ated from any display of a revengeful policy on the part of the loyalists. He continued:

"Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful, it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious subjects are the mere tools of those who have deceived them, it is important that these should be made aware individually that, whatever their leaders may tell them, rebellion is a punishable offence.

[Sidenote: Clemency and justice.]

"Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and under martial law, the punishment of death might have been inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty, and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag, firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information or furnis.h.i.+ng provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible, drawn between these different cla.s.ses.

"Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion under the various heads indicated above. It would be necessary to decide beforehand how the different categories should then be dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of course, be brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by them. Might not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be thereupon either sentenced to a fine carrying with it disfranchis.e.m.e.nt, or released on recognisances, to come up for judgment when called upon (this also to involve disfranchis.e.m.e.nt), while 6 might be subjected to disfranchis.e.m.e.nt alone? Her Majesty's Government offer these as suggestions for the consideration of your ministers.

"In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that they are of a highly controversial character, and it is impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required.

Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the action to be taken in such cases depends upon circ.u.mstances which must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's authority, founded on grievances under const.i.tutional conditions which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has been adhesion to the Queen's enemies during war by those who have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who have for a generation enjoyed full const.i.tutional liberty. In Canada the insurrection was never a formidable one from a military point of view; in the Cape it has added very largely to the cost and difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and heavy loss to Her Majesty's troops."[224]

[Footnote 224: Cd. 264.]

[Sidenote: The ministry divided.]

This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels--moderate in the light of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the practice of foreign States--failed to commend itself to the Afrikander Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers'

minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the disfranchis.e.m.e.nt proposed was for life or for a period only; and further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May 4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June 10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as to the period of disfranchis.e.m.e.nt, he pointed out that--

"conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it disfranchis.e.m.e.nt for life, and if the offenders were spared the other and severer penalties of rebellion, justice seemed to demand that they should suffer the full political penalty.

Disfranchis.e.m.e.nt for life did not seem to Her Majesty's Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion."

[Sidenote: Mr. Schreiner resigns.]