The New World of Islam Part 2

The liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of course form the part of evolutionary progress in Islam. They are in the best sense of the word conservatives, receptive to healthy change, yet maintaining their hereditary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith in Islam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue to draw their spiritual sustenance.

There are, however, other groups in the Moslem world who have so far succ.u.mbed to Western influences that they have more or less lost touch with both their spiritual and cultural pasts. In all the more civilized portions of the Moslem world, especially in countries long under European control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there are many Moslems, Western educated and Western culture-veneered, who have drifted into an att.i.tude varying from easygoing religious indifference to avowed agnosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has entirely departed.

The Algerian Ismael Hamet well describes the att.i.tude of this cla.s.s of his fellow-countrymen when he writes: "European scepticism is not without influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have kept some attachment for the external forms of their religion, usually ignore the unhealthy excesses of the religious sentiment. They do not give up their religion, but they no longer dream of converting all those who do not practise it; they want to hand it on to their children, but they do not worry about other men's salvation. This is not belief; it is not even free thought; but it is lukewarmness."[21]

Beyond these tepid lat.i.tudinarians are still other groups of a very different character. Here we find combined the most contradictory sentiments: young men whose brains are seething with radical Western ideas--atheism, socialism, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet, curiously enough, these fanatic radicals tend to join hands with the fanatic reactionaries of Islam in a common hatred of the West. Considering themselves the born leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant ma.s.ses, the radicals hunger for political power and rage against that Western domination which vetoes their ambitious pretensions. Hence, they are mostly extreme "Nationalists," while they are also deep in Pan-Islamic reactionary schemes. Indeed, we often witness the strange spectacle of atheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a truly dervish zeal.

Mr. Bukhsh well describes this type when he writes: "I know a gentleman, a _Mohammedan by profession_, who owes his success in life to his faith.

Though, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of Islam and occasionally stands up in public as the champion and spokesman of his co-religionists; yet, to my utter horror, I found that he held opinions about his religion and its founder which even Voltaire would have rejected with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating contempt."[22]

Later on we shall examine more fully the activities of these gentry in the chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism and Nationalism. What I desire to emphasize here is their pernicious influence on the prospects of a genuine Mohammedan reformation as visualized by the true reformers whom I have described. Their malevolent desire to stir up the fanatic pa.s.sions of the ignorant ma.s.ses and their equally malevolent hatred of everything Western except military improvements are revealed by outbursts like the following from the pen of a prominent "Young Turk."

"Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in open hostility to all your world of progress. Learn, ye European observers, that a Christian, whatever his position, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our eyes a being devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning is simple and definitive. We say: the man whose judgment is so perverted as to deny the evidence of the One G.o.d and to fabricate G.o.ds of different kinds, cannot be other than the most ign.o.ble expression of human stupidity. To speak to him would be a humiliation to our reason and an offence to the grandeur of the Master of the Universe. The wors.h.i.+pper of false G.o.ds is a monster of ingrat.i.tude; he is the execration of the universe; to combat him, convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest task of the Faithful. These are the eternal commands of our One G.o.d. For us there are in this world only Believers and Misbelievers; love, charity, fraternity to Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers. Among Misbelievers, the most odious and criminal are those who, while recognizing G.o.d, create Him of earthly parents, give Him a son, a mother; so monstrous an aberration surpa.s.ses, in our eyes, all bounds of iniquity; the presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith; their contact a pollution for our bodies; any relation with them a torture for our souls.

"While detesting you, we have been studying your political inst.i.tutions and your military organizations. Besides the new arms which Providence procures for us by your own means, you yourselves have rekindled the inextinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, our Babis, our new fraternities, all are sects in their varied forms, are inspired by the same thought, the same purpose. Toward what end?

Christian civilization? Never!"[23]

Such harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among the Moslem ma.s.ses.

Although the liberal reformers are a growing power in Islam, it must not be forgotten that they are as yet only a minority, an elite, below whom lie the ignorant ma.s.ses, still suffering from the blight of age-long obscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own world, which they regard as the highest ideal of human existence, and fanatically hating everything outside as wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even when compelled to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it none the less. They rebel blindly against the spirit of change which is forcing them out of their old ruts, and their anger is still further heightened by that ubiquitous Western domination which is pressing upon them from all sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist leaders who mould the mult.i.tude to their own sinister ends.

Islam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of liberal reform and chauvinistic reaction. The liberals are not only the hope of an evolutionary reformation, they are also favoured by the trend of the times, since the Moslem world is being continually permeated by Western progress and must continue to be thus permeated unless Western civilization itself collapses in ruin. Yet, though the ultimate triumph of the liberals appears probable, what delays, what setbacks, what fresh barriers of warfare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionaries bring about! Neither the reform of Islam nor the relations between East and West are free from perils whose ominous possibilities we shall later discuss.

Meanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that throughout the Moslem world a numerous and powerful minority, composed not merely of Westernized persons but also of orthodox conservatives, are aware of Islam's decadence and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformation along liberal, progressive lines is at once a practical necessity and a sacred duty. Exactly how this reformation shall be legally effected has not yet been determined, nor is a detailed discussion of technical machinery necessary for our consideration.[24] History teaches us that where the will to reform is vitally present, reformation will somehow or other be accomplished.

One thing is certain: the reforming spirit, in its various manifestations, has already produced profound changes throughout Islam.

The Moslem world of to-day is vastly different from the Moslem world of a century ago. The Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindled a purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not been without moral compensations. The spread of liberal principles and Western progress goes on apace. If there is much to fear for the future, there is also much to hope.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] On the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern Questions_ (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, _Muslim Theology_ (London, 1903); J. L. Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys_ (2 vols., London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le Deisme des Wahhabis," _Journal Asiatique_, IV., Vol. II., pp. 168 _et seq._

[6] Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslem liberal of the mid-nineteenth century.

[7] For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North Indian Moslems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W.

W. Hunter, _The Indian Musalmans_ (London, 1872).

[8] For the Babbist movement, see Clement Huart, _La Religion de Bab_ (Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, 1867). A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan revival is found in Le Chatelier, _op. cit._

[9] _Mishkat-el-Masabih_, I., 46, 51.

[10] The best recent examples of this polemical literature are the writings of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well known missionary to the Arabs; especially his _Arabia, the Cradle of Islam_ (Edinburgh, 1900), and _The Reproach of Islam_ (London, 1915). Also see volume ent.i.tled _The Mohammedan World of To-day_, being a collection of the papers read at the Protestant Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906.

[11] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II., p. 229 (London, 1908). For Renan's att.i.tude, see his _L'Islamisme et la Science_ (Paris, 1883).

[12] In the year 1633.

[13] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_ (Paris, 1906).

[14] Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877).

[15] The Mollahs are the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactly correspond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anything like a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordained priestly cla.s.s or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, Brahmanism, and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conduct religious services. As time pa.s.sed, however, a cla.s.s of men developed who were learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately became practically priests, though theoretically they should be regarded as theological lawyers. There also developed religious orders of dervishes, etc.; but primitive Islam knew nothing of them.

[16] From the article by Leon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vol. XII., p. 498. This article gives an excellent general survey of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in the nineteenth century.

[17] Especially his best-known book, _The Spirit of Islam_ (London, 1891).

[18] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 20, 24, 284.

(London, 1912).

[19] 1856 to 1878.

[20] For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_ (London, 1906).

[21] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_, p. 268 (Paris, 1906).

[22] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _op. cit._, p. 241.

[23] Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, _Mecheroutiette_, of August, 1921. Quoted from A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, Constantine, Algeria, 1913.

[24] For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877); H. N.

Brailsford "Modernism in Islam," _The Fortnightly Review_, September, 1908; Sir Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed?" _The Nineteenth Century and After_, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique,"

_Revue Politique Internationale_, July, 1916; XX, "L'Islam apres la Guerre," _Revue de Paris_, 15 January, 1916.

CHAPTER II

PAN-ISLAMISM

Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival is highly complex.

Starting with the simple, puritan protest of Wahabism, it has developed many phases, widely diverse and sometimes almost ant.i.thetical. In the previous chapter we examined the phase looking toward an evolutionary reformation of Islam and a genuine a.s.similation of the progressive spirit as well as the external forms of Western civilization. At the same time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only a minority, an elite; while the Moslem ma.s.ses, still plunged in ignorance and imperfectly awakened from their age-long torpor, are influenced by other leaders of a very different character--men inclined to militant rather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than receptive to the West. These militant forces are, in their turn, complex. They may be grouped roughly under the general concepts known as "Pan-Islamism" and "Nationalism." It is to a consideration of the first of these two concepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter is devoted.

Pan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling of solidarity between all "True Believers," is as old as the Prophet, when Mohammed and his few followers were bound together by the tie of faith against their pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To Mohammed the principle of fraternal solidarity among Moslems was of transcendent importance, and he succeeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem hearts that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. The bond between Moslem and Moslem is to-day much stronger than that between Christian and Christian. Of course Moslems fight bitterly among themselves, but these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family quarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel aggression.

Islam's profound sense of solidarity probably explains in large part its extraordinary hold upon its followers. No other religion has such a grip on its votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christianity and Brahmanism,[25] and has driven Magism from the face of the earth;[26]

yet there has been no single instance where a people, once become Moslem, has ever abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been, like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy.

Islam's solidarity is powerfully b.u.t.tressed by two of its fundamental inst.i.tutions: the "Hajj," or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the caliphate.

Contrary to the general opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than the caliphate which has exerted the more consistently unifying influence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme act of faith, and every year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive, drawn from every quarter of the Moslem world. There, before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all races, tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstasy of common devotion, returning to their homes bearing the proud t.i.tle of "Hajjis,"

or Pilgrims--a t.i.tle which insures them the reverent homage of their fellow Moslems for all the rest of their days. The political implications of the Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial Pan-Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are discussed by delegates from every part of the Mohammedan world, and where plans are elaborated for Islam's defence and propagation. Here nearly all the militant leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, Mahommed ben Sennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani, and many more) felt the imperious summons to their task.[27]

As for the caliphate, it has played a great historic role, especially in its early days, and we have already studied its varying fortunes.

Reduced to a mere shadow after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was revived by the Turkish sultans, who a.s.sumed the t.i.tle and were recognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world.[28] However, these sultan-caliphs of Stambul[29] never succeeded in winning the religious homage accorded their predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes, especially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anachronism to which they could never be truly reconciled. Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure, made an ambitious attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness, but such success as he attained was due more to the general tide of Pan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency of the caliphal name.

The real leaders of modern Pan-Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely qualified allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. This was not realized in Europe, which came to fear Abdul Hamid as a sort of Mohammedan pope. Even to-day most Western observers seem to think that Pan-Islamism centres in the caliphate, and we see European publicists hopefully discussing whether the caliphate's retention by the discredited Turkish sultans, its transference to the Shereef of Mecca, or its total suppression, will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This, however, is a distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal inst.i.tution is still undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd leaders of the modern Pan-Islamic movement have long been working on a much broader basis. They realize that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day lies not in the caliphate but in inst.i.tutions like the Hajj and the great Pan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, of which I shall presently speak.[30]

Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. Its first stage was of course the Wahabi movement. The Wahabi state founded by Abd-el-Wahab in the Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the Meccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely disciple, Saud, loosed his fanatic hosts upon the holy cities, he dreamed that this was but the first step in a puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem world. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nevertheless, soon produced profound political disturbances in distant regions like northern India and Afghanistan, as I have already narrated. They were, however, all integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially protests against the political decadence of Moslem states and the moral decadence of Moslem rulers. These outbreaks were not inspired by any special fear or hatred of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously a.s.sailing Islam except in outlying regions like European Turkey or the Indies, and the impending peril was consequently not appreciated.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the situation had radically altered. The French conquest of Algeria, the Russian acquisition of Transcaucasia, and the English mastery of virtually all India, convinced thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly peril of falling under Western domination. It was at this time that Pan-Islamism a.s.sumed that essentially anti-Western character which it has ever since retained. At first resistance to Western encroachment was sporadic and unco-ordinated. Here and there heroic figures like Abd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the Caucasus fought brilliantly against the European invaders. But though these paladins of the faith were accorded widespread sympathy from Moslems, they received no tangible a.s.sistance and, unaided, fell.

Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew in intensity, and the seventies saw the Moslem world swept from end to end by a wave of militant fanaticism. In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of 1871, while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men" preaching holy wars, the greatest of these being the Mahdist insurrection in the Egyptian Sudan, which maintained itself against England's best efforts down to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of the century.

In Afghanistan there was an intense exacerbation of fanaticism awakening sympathetic echoes among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the British much trouble. In Central Asia there was a similar access of fanaticism, centring in the powerful Nakechabendiya fraternity, spreading eastward into Chinese territory and culminating in the great revolts of the Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and Yunnan.