The New World of Islam Part 9

Considering first the att.i.tude of those who do not believe the peoples of the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in the Western sense either now or in the immediate future, we find this thesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong to be overcome, at least in our time. "From the dawn of history," he a.s.serts, "Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity.

Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of despotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception of ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries.... Our primary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under the specious cloak of free inst.i.tutions, will enable a small minority of natives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which will enable the ma.s.s of the population to be governed according to the code of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposing such a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for the protection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no a.s.surance can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way, would not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit of presenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain anything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they will have to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought." And Lord Cromer concludes pessimistically: "It will probably never be possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear."[119]

In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writing after the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in their success, and ridiculed the current "faith in the sacramental virtue of const.i.tutional government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet manufactured, and no const.i.tution drafted by the sons of men, can do away with the foundations of national character. Flashy phrases and elegant declamations may persuade people that they have been trans.m.u.ted; but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utter incapacity for self-government." Referring to the Persian revolution, Doctor Dillon continues: "At bottom, only names of persons and things have been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on for ever.... Financial support of the new government is impossible. For foreign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibusters and irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appear on the surface and disappear at once."[120]

A high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians and other Moslem populations of French North Africa: "Our natives need to be governed. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We should guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers and agents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, direct them paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by the constant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vain humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of the natives themselves."[121]

Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointed with the way Orientals have used experimental first steps in self-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers; have used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power, instead of devoting themselves to the duties a.s.signed. As Lord Kitchener said in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: "Representative bodies can only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of performing adequately their present functions, and that there is good hope that they could undertake still more important and arduous responsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form, is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more useful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enough to consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unable to carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it should therefore be given a larger measure of power and control."[122]

These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upper cla.s.ses and Western-educated elites, however successful they may be in inflaming the ignorant ma.s.ses, who are often quite contented with the material benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is well brought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetime of experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: "The common people of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their government than they ever were before. It is the cla.s.ses, rather, who reveal the real spirit of discontent.... If the common people were let alone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earth than the people of India. But the educated cla.s.ses are certainly possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remain satisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts of emolument.... These people have little or no sympathy with the kind of government which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they do not ask for representative inst.i.tutions, which will give them a share in the government of their own land. What they really seek is absolute control. The Brahmin (only five per cent. of the community) believes that he has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withhold the franchise from all others. The Sudra--the Bourgeois of India--would no more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of the land than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that has introduced, and now maintains, the equality of rights and privileges for all the people of the land."[123]

The apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might be exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only by Western observers but also by mult.i.tudes of low-caste Hindus, known collectively as the "Depressed Cla.s.ses". These people oppose the Indian nationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection under the British "Raj." They believe that India still needs generations of education and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much less independence, and they have organized into a powerful a.s.sociation the "Namasudra," which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character.

The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair.

"Democracy as a catchword," he says, "has already reached India and is widely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, and will find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is strongly intrenched.... I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing the lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher castes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castes below him.... We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, however camouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy is established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say that we should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, having more trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympathetic oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us in the past and will do so again but for the British Government. Our att.i.tude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of self-preservation."[124]

Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe for self-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or in the immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasons expressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who remarks: "Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern Indian politics, and I have always held that we should devote more attention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less to politics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I am firmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leaving politics severely alone.... It is not a handful of men armed with the learning and culture of the West, but it is the ma.s.ses that must feel, understand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. The infinitesimal educated minority do not const.i.tute the population of India. It is the ma.s.ses, therefore, that must be trained, educated, brought to the level of una.s.sailable uprightness and devotion to their country. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we attain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile and illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off the swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above the illusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learn austerity of principle and rect.i.tude of conduct. Nor can we hope to raise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continue to subordinate the interest of our community and country to our own."[125]

Such p.r.o.nouncements as these from considerable portions of the native population give pause even to those liberal English students of Indian affairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When Indian Nationalists ask for freedom, they mean autonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner.

Our answer as given in the reforms is:[126] 'Yes, autonomy you shall have, but on one condition--that you have democracy as well. We will give up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which can control its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian oligarchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between those who say that India might have self-government immediately and those who say that India can only become capable of self-government with time. For the former, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly true that India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign control were withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group of governments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come into being in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would be the despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning."[127]

The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, both Western and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near and Middle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at least to-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of those who hold a more optimistic att.i.tude. Some observers stress strongly Islam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect political structures in the modern sense. Vambery says, "Islam is still the most democratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty and equality. If there ever was a const.i.tutional government, it was that of the first Caliphs."[128] A close English student of the Near East declares: "Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government, and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continues democratic--as many a would-be despot knows to his cost."[129]

Regarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks: "Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary inst.i.tutions as might at first sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation, and a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religious and the secular inst.i.tutions of Turkey involve precedents for a parliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of his companions. The Ulema[130] have taken counsel together up to the present time. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental law enables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a Const.i.tution." He points out that the early sultans had their "Divan,"

or a.s.semblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultan information and advice, while more recently there have been a Council of State and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of 1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidian absolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all this Professor Lybyer concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore be regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement and improvement of familiar inst.i.tutions."[131]

Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, whom the Persian Revolutionary Government called in to organize the country's finances, and who was ousted in less than a year by Rus...o...b..itish pressure, expresses an optimistic regard for the political capacities of the Persian people.

"I believe," he says, "that there has never been in the history of the world an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolute monarchy to a const.i.tutional or representative form of government and at once succeeded in displaying a high standard of political wisdom and knowledge of legislative procedure. Such a thing is inconceivable and not to be expected by any reasonable person. The members of the first Medjlis[132] were compelled to fight for their very existence from the day that the Parliament was const.i.tuted.... They had no time for serious legislative work, and but little hope that any measures which they might enact would be put into effect.

"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members I knew personally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be judged by the standards of the British Parliament or the American Congress. It would be strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried government in a land filled with the decay of ages should, from the outset, be able to conduct its business as well as governments with generations and even centuries of experience behind them. We should make allowances for lack of technical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is that the Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals and aspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men of more than average education; some displayed remarkable talent, character, and courage.... They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestion which was put before them. They themselves lacked any great knowledge of governmental finances, but they realized the situation and were both willing and anxious to put their full confidence in any foreign advisers who showed themselves capable of resisting political intrigues and bribery and working for the welfare of the Persian people.

"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent when it has the support of an entire people, when it recognizes its own limitations, and when its members are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's dignity and sovereign rights....

"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to generalize. The great ma.s.s of the population is composed of peasants and tribesmen, all densely ignorant. On the other hand, many thousands have been educated abroad, or have travelled after completing their education at home.

They, or at least certain elements among them which had had the support of the ma.s.ses, proved their capacity to a.s.similate Western civilization and ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the face of untold obstacles. Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man of ability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they showed during the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for education.

Hundreds of schools were established during the Const.i.tutional regime. A remarkable free press sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came forward to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within their country or without. The Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale the political, ethical, and business codes of the most modern and progressive nations. They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest which pervades India, which produced the 'Young-Turk' movement, and which has more recently manifested itself in the establishment of the Chinese Republic."[133]

Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle the East. This includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Western ideals _can_ hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to themselves. As a matter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal of race-pride and patriotism, are as strong in the East as in the West, though it does not lie so near the surface, and naturally the Oriental displays no great desire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only to the Westerner."[134]

Indeed, many Western liberals believe that European rule, however benevolent and efficient, will never prepare the Eastern peoples for true self-government; and that the only way they will learn is by trying it out themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the well-known British publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking of India, Mr. Curtis says that education and kindred benefits conferred by British rule will not, of themselves, "avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible government. On the contrary, education will prove a danger and positive mischief, unless accompanied by a definite instalment of political responsibility. It is in the workshops of actual experience alone that electorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highly educated they may be.

"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite powers on electorates.

The officers of Government[135] must give every possible help and advice to the new authorities, for which those authorities may ask. They must act as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if the new authorities are to learn the art of responsible government, they must be free from control from above. Not otherwise will they learn to feel themselves responsible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates themselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings rests in their own hands. Suffering there will be, and it is only by suffering, self-inflicted and perhaps long endured, that a people will learn the faculty of self-help, and genuine electorates be brought into being....

"I am proud to think that England has conferred immeasurable good on India by creating order and showing Indians what orderly government means. But, this having been done, I do not believe the system can now be continued as it is, without positive damage to the character of the people. The burden of trustees.h.i.+p must be transferred, piece by piece, from the shoulders of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able to bear it. Their strength and numbers must be developed. But that can be done by the exercise of actual responsibility steadily increased as they can bear it. It cannot be done by any system of school-teaching, though such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process.

"The goal now set by the recent announcement of the Secretary of State[136] will only be reached through trouble. Yet troublous as the times before us may be, we have at last reached that stage of our work in India which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The task is one worthy of this epoch in our history, if only because it calls for the effacement of ourselves."[137]

Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process which is to-day actually going on, not only in India but in other parts of the East as well. The Great War has so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations and has so weakened European power and prestige that a widespread relaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is taking place. This process may make for good or for ill, but it is apparently inevitable; and a generation (perhaps a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle East autonomous or even independent. Whether the liberated peoples will misuse their opportunities and fall into despotism or anarchy, or whether they succeed in establis.h.i.+ng orderly, progressive, const.i.tutional governments, remains to be seen. We have examined the factors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the only way in which to-day it can scientifically be left--on a note of interrogation.

FOOTNOTES:

[111] T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_, p. 43 (London, 1899).

[112] Quoted from Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, pp. 305-306 (London, 1906).

[113] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the American Political Science a.s.sociation_, Vol. VII., p. 67 (1910).

[114] Vambery, _op. cit._, p. 307.

[115] A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth century is found in Vambery, "Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischen Asien," _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1893; a shorter summary of Vambery's views is found in his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, especially chap. v. Also, see articles by Leon Cahun, previously noted, in Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vols. XI. and XII.

[116] Vambery, _supra_, p. 332.

[117] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 22 (Paris, 1898).

[118] W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, p. xxi (New York, 1912).

[119] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, pp. 25-28.

[120] E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self-Government," _Contemporary Review_, April, 1910.

[121] E. Mercier, _La Question indigene_, p. 220 (Paris, 1901).

[122] "Egypt," No. 1 (1914), p. 6.

[123] Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," _Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910.

[124] Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy," _Edinburgh Review_, October, 1918.

[125] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912).

[126] _I. e._, the increase of self-government granted India by Britain as a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.

[127] E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India," _The New Europe_, January 29, 1920.

[128] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.

58.

[129] G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919).

[130] The a.s.sembly of religious notables.

[131] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the American Political Science a.s.sociation_, Vol. VII., pp. 66-67 (1910).

[132] The name of the Persian Parliament.

[133] Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, pp. 240-246.

[134] _Ibid._, p. 333.