The Battle of Allatoona, October 5th, 1864 Part 2

Instead of one small redoubt on each side of the railroad cut, as he had been led to believe, he declares he saw no less than three on the west side and a "Star Fort" on the east, with outworks and approaches, defended to a great distance by abattis, and nearer the forts by stockades and other obstructions. It may have been the weariness of a long night march, or perhaps the too early morning air, that conjured these formidable defences to French's eyes, or possibly, it is the exterior aspect of these works that to a covetous and hostile apprehension enlarges their numbers and proportions.

It must be admitted that from the interior standpoint they shrunk mightily from French's description, and the defenders at least would have been hugely gratified could they have had the privilege of occupying what French thought he saw.

He rapidly made his dispositions for a.s.sault, sending Sear's Mississippi Brigade round by the left to gain the north flank of the works, while c.o.c.kerell's Missouri Brigade formed line across the ridge, with Young's Texas Brigade behind it to support and follow up the attack. Myrick had been ordered to open up with his guns and continue his fire until the attacking troops were so close up to the works as to prevent it. Sears, having the longer distance to traverse, was to begin the a.s.sault when c.o.c.kerell would immediately move forward. Sears was delayed by the ruggedness of his route to the north side of the works, and in fact for a time lost his bearings among the wooded hills, and was not in position until 9 a. m. by French's time. French says that when he sent his summons to surrender, the Federal officer entrusted with the missive was allowed 17 minutes within which to bring the answer, and this time expiring, Maj.

Sanders returned without any. Nothing is said in the report as to the firing upon him, noted in the endors.e.m.e.nt on the copy of the summons already mentioned.

THE a.s.sAULT.

c.o.c.kerell was at length ordered forward and the attack began. According to French's account, everything went as successfully as possible. He represents the triple lines of intrenchments and Redoubts on the west side as being captured one, after another, his troops resting but briefly at each to gather strength and survey the work before them, and again rus.h.i.+ng forward in murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with dead, until they were masters of the "Second Redoubt," and the "Third or Main Redoubt" was filled with those driven from the captured works and further crowded by the refugees from the eastern fort and its defences, who had been driven out by the attack of Sears. He represents the Federal forces, their fire almost silenced, as being herded into the one Redoubt on the west, of which French's troops occupied the ditch and were preparing for the final attack.

At this critical moment, with the garrison and the precious stores, as it were, in the hollow of his hand, French received word that General Sherman, who had been "repeatedly signalled during the battle," was close behind him with his whole army, and within two miles of the road he would have to take to rejoin his corps.

On this point of Sherman's proximity to French as his reason for leaving, we have not only full knowledge of the exact position and movement of our troops to show that such was really not the case, but a brief piece of testimony from the other side in the shape of a dispatch from Major Mason, Hood's adjudant-general, from which it is evident that French, becoming hopeless of success, had sought in advance to justify at headquarters the failure of his enterprise. The date and hour of this dispatch, which reads as follows, are of interest:

"CARLEY'S HOUSE, Oct. 5, 1864. 8:15 p. m.

_Lt. Gen'l Stewart, Com'd'g Corps._

General French's dispatch, forwarded by yourself, is just received.

Gen. Hood directs me to say that he does not know where a division could march at this time to give any a.s.sistance to Gen. French, but that you will endeavor to send some scouts to him, and direct him to leave the railroad and march to the West, to New Hope Church.

Gen. Hood does not understand how Gen. French could be _cut off_ at the point he designates in his dispatch, as he should have moved directly away from the railroad to the West, if he deemed his position precarious.

A. P. M."

It is of course obvious from the map that if French found Sherman approaching from the South, he had only to follow westward the road up which he had been charging at Allatoona all day and free himself from danger in an hour. It would be of interest to see this dispatch of French's and observe the hour when sent, but it is not forthcoming. The hour of the reply is significant. It need not have taken a mounted man three hours to get word to Stewart, then near a junction with Hood and to Hood himself, less than 15 miles away. The reply, made at once, is written at 8:15 p. m., and French's message must certainly have been sent later than 4 p. m. French had probably been gone from Allatoona an hour or more when he bethought him to send the request for a division to extricate him.

The facts are, that it was not until the night of Oct. 5th that the nearest troops of Sherman's went into camp at Brushy Mountain, 11 miles distant in an air line, and none reached Allatoona until the 7th.

But to return to French. It was really an immense pity that he should feel obliged to leave just when he had but to put forth his hand to s.n.a.t.c.h the prize; but then it would not do to have his division cut off from the army, and on the whole it might be well to start, and if so, why not at once?

So about 1:30 he says an order was sent to Sears and c.o.c.kerell to withdraw. The ground was too rough to carry badly wounded men over it, so that those who could not get away on their own feet had to be left.

The artillery, unable to operate effectively with the a.s.saulting column close up on the works, had already been in part ordered to take the road, and after the a.s.saulting troops had left, French went to the two regiments who had supported it, and sent a battery to the block house at the railway crossing of Allatoona Creek, fired fifty shots at it, knocked it about the ears of the garrison, and setting fire to it, smoked them out and marched them off as prisoners.

French's report of this affair, written a month later, from which the above is condensed, is very interesting and dramatic, and regarded as a literary composition, of no mean merit. He has certainly made the best of a bad business, and if his facts do not quite tally with those of his opponents, at least the discrepancies were not officially noticed at headquarters, nor probably would a gloomier account of the affair have been considered more inspiriting. Those rations would have been extremely convenient, could they, or even a part of them, have been hauled away for distribution among the hungry Confederates, and if that were impracticable, it would have been at least a n.o.ble stroke to have destroyed them. On this head French's report is silent; nor does he endeavor to explain how it happened that so vital a part of his own program was omitted. In effect, the play had been badly broken up by the attentions of the gallery, and Hamlet had slipped out of it.

French is without excuse for his fear of Sherman's approach, baseless as we know it to have been. Armstrong is responsible for despatches to him suggesting it. All the same, the evidence is conclusive that French was beaten, that he knew it, and that he had to withdraw quite independently of Sherman's movements.

A Confederate historian, K. S. Bevier, writes as follows on this point: "The men of French's Division had now become so much scattered that it was impossible to gather a sufficient number to give any hope of successful a.s.sault on the Fort."

What can wholly be pardoned to French is the unstinted commendation he bestows on the gallantry of his men.

These poor fellows, ragged and hungry, with but a handful or two of parched corn in their haversacks, had marched all day on the 3rd; had worked all that night destroying the railroad; had worked and marched all day on the 4th; had marched to Allatoona during that night, and had fought nearly all day on the 5th. Nor is it forbidden to those who felt the vigor of their das.h.i.+ng onset and the undaunted determination with which they rallied again and again to the a.s.sault of the intrenchments, or who witnessed the hand-to-hand encounters with sword and bayonet, with b.u.t.ts of guns, and even with loose pieces of rock, to appreciate the intrepidity and resolution with which they hung to their b.l.o.o.d.y and fruitless task.

Brave men may honor bravery the world over. We can in all sympathy and common brotherhood say: "They were of our blood and race. Peace to their ashes. Give us the like to stand side by side with us, and we could fear no quarrel, were it with the whole round world."

THE DEFENCE.

Having glanced at the situation from French's standpoint, let us step over to the other side, as we may safely do at this lapse of time, and see how it actually fared with the beleaguered garrison which we left in momentary expectation of attack; and since General French has been heard, it is no more than fair to quote from the graphic reports of the federal commander.

After narrating his preliminary movements, and the stations of the troops, he proceeds:

"I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the 39th Iowa and 7th Illinois were formed, * * * and taking two companies of the 93rd Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as possible. Three companies of the 93rd, which had been driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch South of the Redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the 93rd, under Major Fisher, lay between the Redoubt and Rowett's line, ready to reinforce wherever most needed.

"I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the 39th Iowa and 7th Illinois. Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the ridge and moved with great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a severe check, but undaunted came again and again. Rowett, reinforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope we were safe here, when I observed General Sears' brigade moving from the North, its left extending across the railroad (opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the 93rd Illinois, which were on the brink of the cut running north from the Redoubt, they having been reinforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the 39th Iowa in flank, threatening to engulf our little band without further ado.

Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the 50th Illinois over to reinforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied, and made their a.s.saults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the 39th Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never would have been able to get a man back inside the Redoubt; as it was, their hand-to-hand conflict and stubborn stand broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop and reform before undertaking the a.s.sault on the fort. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy, the 7th and 93rd Illinois, and what remained of the 39th Iowa, fell back into the fort.

"The fighting up to this time--about 11 a. m.--was of the most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west and from the south, these three regiments--39th Iowa and 7th and 93rd Illinois--held Young's and a portion of Sears' and c.o.c.kerell's brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col.

Redfield, of the 39th Iowa, fell, shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment, and of the 7th Illinois, saved to us Allatoona.

"So completely disorganized were the enemy, that no regular a.s.sault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The 12th and 50th Illinois arriving from the east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort.

We received their fire from the north, south and west of the Redoubt, completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by a.s.sault, but the battery (12th Wisconsin) was so ably manned and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible for a column to live within one hundred yards of the work.

Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertions, and almost all that were killed or wounded in the fort met their fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet and n.o.bly setting them the example.

"The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead or dying.

About 1 p. m. I was wounded by a rifle ball that rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry, 'Cease firing,' which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort.

"Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me, to renewed exertions, a.s.suring them that Sherman would soon be there with reinforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in face of the murderous fire of the enemy, now concentrated upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the railway cut which was under fire of the enemy and go to the fort on the east hill to procure ammunition.

Having executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30 p. m. the enemy were observed ma.s.sing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located distant northwest from the fort about 150 yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a heavy and continuous musketry fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time until near 4 p. m. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position and finally fled in confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field.

"The hill east of the cut was gallantly and successfully defended by Col. Tourtellotte, with the 4th Minnesota and a portion of the 18th Wisconsin (which was drawn from outpost duty towards the south about 10:30). * * * Col. Tourtellotte, though wounded in the early part of the action, remained with his men until the close, and rendered valuable aid in protecting my north front from the repeated attacks by Sears' brigade."

A notable struggle truly and stirringly told, even though the limitations of an official report forbid that amplification of incident that would make as thrilling a tale as tongue could utter. From start to finish, seven solid hours of as desperate fighting as ever was done under the sky of heaven, and with multiplied acts of individual heroism that would tax the pen of Homer to narrate.

With the exception of about 250 rounds, the supply of ammunition brought from Rome for the entire Division, had been expended by a portion of a single brigade.

Every one of the subordinate commanders' reports on both sides bears testimony to the unparalleled fierceness and concentration of the struggle, and the closeness and duration of the action, and the terrific slaughter; and these reports, it may be noted, are made by the ruggedest of Sherman's and French's veterans--men inured to war in every aspect, and as familiar with b.l.o.o.d.y battle-fields as we of to-day with the street we daily tread. In reading these scant records, one scarce knows whether to admire the more the daring vigor and persistence of the attack, or the spirit, valor and heroic determination of the defence. With both it was "To do or die," and each can feel that none, save his rival, can challenge supremacy in war-like exploit.

Corse's signal dispatch to Sherman after the fight can therefore well be excused, "I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but able to whip all h--l yet."

INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE.

It is a thousand pities that the many notable incidents of this fight are not on record; but, so far as I am aware, no one has sought to gather them in any complete and authentic form.

Corse caught his wound about 1 o'clock while scanning the movements and position of the enemy from the Redoubt. It was a close call for his life, the ball ploughing his cheek and splitting his ear, and, as might be imagined, dazing him. A surgeon took him in charge and ministered as well as the circ.u.mstances permitted. At intervals Corse was unconscious, but rallied from time to time, as though the spirit within him crowded itself up through the physical deadening of his senses. At one of these occasions he caught the words "Cease firing," and as mentioned in his report, feared some attempt to surrender. On this point, in a private letter, he speaks as follows: "Do you remember our losing a large number of Springfield rifled muskets that exploded near the muzzle after becoming foul from over-shooting? I saw some that had exploded, say about the shank of the bayonet. It was so phenomenal as to make a decided impression on my mind at the time. I think a large number of these must have been lost, and when the order was given to cease firing, it was under the impression that if the men were not given a chance to clean their guns, we would lose them all and be overwhelmed. My impression, you remember, at the time was that the order to cease firing meant surrender, but Rowett removed that impression in subsequent interviews, during and after the war."

Rowett's order to "Cease firing" had, of course, nothing to do with the cry of "Surrender." It is true that there were men in that Redoubt ready to surrender or to do anything else in order to get out of it alive.

Happily these were few, and most of them lay p.r.o.ne, close under the parapet, "playing dead," with the combatants and wounded standing and sitting upon them. If I mistake not, Corse himself, at least for a time, was holding down of these "living corpses" who preferred to endure all the pain and discomfort of his position rather than get up and face the deadly music that filled the air with leaden notes. It came about this way: The Redoubt was crowded, and as b.l.o.o.d.y as a slaughter pen. In its actual construction the parapet encircled a higher elevation in the center, which had not been sufficiently excavated, so that a man standing, or in fact, lying, in the middle of the work was exposed to bullets coming in close over the parapet. It was absolutely necessary to keep room for the fighting force along the parapet, so the wounded were drawn back, and in some cases were shot over and over again. The dead were disposed of in the same way, except that as the ground became covered with them they were let lie as they fell, and were stood or sat upon by the fighters. Several of the "skulkers" lay among these, but a few were in the ranks. The slaughter had been frightful. One of our guns was disabled from the jamming of a shot, and we were out of ammunition for the other two, thereby losing both the deterrent effect upon the enemy, and the moral encouragement that the friendly roar of cannon always gives to infantry in action. I recall distinctly the fact that a regimental flagstaff on the parapet, which had been several times shot away, fell again at a critical moment towards the end of the action. There was a mad yell from our friends outside and a few cries of "Surrender" among our own people, but a brave fellow leaped to the summit of the parapet, where it did not seem possible to live for a single second, grasped the flagstaff, waved it, drove the stump into the parapet, and dropped back again unhurt. Of course n.o.body knows the name of that man, but his action restored confidence, and a great Yankee cheer drowned the tumult, and no cry of "Surrender" was afterwards heard.

What saved us that day--among forty other things--was the fact that we had a number of Henry rifles (16-shooters), since improved and known as "Winchesters." These were new guns in those days, and Rowett, as I remember, had held in reserve a company of an Illinois Regiment that was armed with them until a final a.s.sault should be made. When the artillery reopened, after the incident related by Corse of the man crossing the cut and coming back with an armful of case shot, this company of 16-shooters sprang to the parapet and poured out such a multiplied, rapid, and deadly fire that no men could stay in front of it, and no serious effort was thereafter made to take the fort by a.s.sault.

It is not possible, within any reasonable limits, for a paper already too long for your patience, to undertake the recital of the numerous thrilling incidents. One may be mentioned: