Famous Sea Fights Part 16

"A sh.e.l.l struck the forward side of the pilot-house directly in the sight-hole or slit, and exploded, cracking the second iron log and partly lifting the top, leaving an opening. Worden was standing immediately behind this spot, and received in his face the force of the blow, which partly stunned him, and filling his eyes with powder, utterly blinded him. The injury was known only to those in the pilot-house and its immediate vicinity. The flood of light rus.h.i.+ng through the top of the pilot-house, now partly open, caused Worden, blind as he was, to believe that the pilot-house was seriously injured if not destroyed; he, therefore, gave orders to put the helm to starboard, and 'sheer off.' Thus the 'Monitor' retired temporarily from the action, in order to ascertain the extent of the injuries she had received.

At the same time Worden sent for me, and I went forward at once, and found him standing at the foot of the ladder leading to the pilot-house.

"He was a ghastly sight, with his eyes closed and the blood apparently rus.h.i.+ng from every pore in the upper part of his face. He told me that he was seriously wounded, and directed me to take command. I a.s.sisted in leading him to a sofa in his cabin, where he was tenderly cared for by Dr. Logue, and then I a.s.sumed command. Blind and suffering as he was, Worden's fort.i.tude never forsook him; he frequently asked from his bed of pain of the progress of affairs, and when told that the 'Minnesota' was saved, he said, 'Then I can die happy!'"[18]

[18] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," vol. i, pp. 726, 727. Worden recovered, and there was no permanent injury to his sight. He lived to be a distinguished admiral of the United States Navy.

In the confusion that followed the disablement of her commander, the "Monitor" had drifted away from the "Merrimac," but still in a position between her and the "Minnesota." The Confederate s.h.i.+p fired at the temporarily disabled turret-s.h.i.+p a few shots, to which there was no reply.

Commander Jones and his officers believed they had put their opponent out of action. But the "Merrimac" was not in a position to profit by her advantage. It was near 2 p.m. The tide was running out rapidly, and the risk of grounding was serious. Ammunition was beginning to be scarce. The crew was exhausted, and the s.h.i.+p's pumps had to be kept going, for under the strain of the heavy firing, and the repeated groundings during the two days, the hull was leaking badly. Jones judged the time had come to break off the action, and the "Merrimac" turned slowly, and began to steam into the Elizabeth River, on her way back to Norfolk.

The "Monitor," seeing her retiring, fired a few long-range shots after her.

They splashed harmlessly into the water. So the famous fight ended.

On board both s.h.i.+ps no life had been lost, and only a few men were wounded, Captain Worden's case being the most serious. In fact, there were fewer casualties than on the first day, when the loss of life in the wooden s.h.i.+ps had been serious, and the "Merrimac," despite her armour, had had twenty-one men killed and wounded by the lighter projectiles of the "c.u.mberland" and "Congress" finding their way into her casemate through the port-holes. Neither s.h.i.+p had suffered severe injury, though if the battle had continued, the damage done to the conning-tower of the "Monitor" might have had serious results. When the "Merrimac" was docked at Gosport Yard, Norfolk, to be overhauled and repaired, it was found that she had ninety-seven indentations on her armour. Twenty of these were judged to be the marks of the "Monitor's" 11-inch b.a.l.l.s. In these places the outer layer of armour-plating was cracked and badly damaged. The under layer and the wood backing were uninjured. The other seventy-seven marks were mere surface dents made by the lighter artillery of the wooden s.h.i.+ps. The "Monitor" had used reduced charges of 15 pounds of gunpowder, and it was believed that if the full charge of 30 pounds had been used, the results might have been more serious, but the Navy Department had ordered the reduced charge, as it was feared that with full charges the strain on the gun-mountings and turret-gear would be too severe. The "Merrimac's" funnel was riddled, and all outside fittings shot away. Two of her guns had been made unserviceable on the first day by shots striking their muzzles.

Both sides claimed the victory in the Sunday's battle. The Confederates claimed to have driven off the "Monitor," and stated that Jones had waited for some time for her to renew the fight, before he turned back to Norfolk.

The Federals argued that the object of the "Merrimac" was to destroy the "Minnesota," and the "Monitor" had prevented this, and was therefore the victor. The frigate was successfully floated next tide. Sometimes the fight is described as a drawn battle, but most writers on the subject accept the Federal contention, and give the honours of the day to the little turret-s.h.i.+p.

The battle of Hampton Roads was notable, however, not so much for its immediate results, as for its effect on naval opinion and policy. It finally closed the era of unarmoured s.h.i.+ps; it led to a perhaps exaggerated importance being attached to the ram as a weapon of attack; and it led to a very general adoption of the armoured turret, and for a while to the building of low-freeboard turret-s.h.i.+ps in various navies. It was not till long after that the story of the "Monitor's" perilous voyage from New York was told, and thus even in America it was not realized that the "Monitor"

type was fit only for smooth waters, and was ill adapted for sea-going s.h.i.+ps. On the Federal side there was a kind of enthusiasm for the "Monitor." Numbers of low-freeboard turret-s.h.i.+ps of somewhat larger size, and with improved details, were built for the United States, and even the failure of Admiral Dupont's "Monitor" fleet in the attack on the Charleston batteries did not convince the Navy Department that the type was defective. Ericsson's building of the "Monitor" to meet the emergency of 1862 was a stroke of genius, but its success had for a long time a misleading effect on the development of naval construction in the United States.

The "Merrimac" was abandoned and burned by the Confederates a few weeks later when they evacuated Norfolk and the neighbourhood. At the end of the year the "Monitor" was ordered to Charleston. She started in tow of a powerful tug, but the fate she had so narrowly escaped on her first voyage overtook her. She was caught in a gale off Cape Hatteras on the evening of 31 December, 1862. The tow-ropes had to be cut, and shortly after midnight the "Monitor" sank ten miles off the Cape. Several of her officers and men went down with her. The rest were rescued by the tug, with great difficulty.

Had the wind blown a little harder during the "Monitor's" first voyage from New York, or had the tow-rope to which she hung parted, there is no doubt she would have gone down in the same way. In that case the course of history would have been different, for the "Merrimac" would have been undisputed master of the Atlantic coast, and have driven off or destroyed every s.h.i.+p of the blockading squadrons. The fates of nations sometimes depend on trifles. That of the American Union depended for some hours on the soundness of the hawser by which the "Monitor" hung on to the tug-boat "Seth Low" of New York.

CHAPTER XI

LISSA

1866

In the American Civil War there had been no battle between ironclad fleets.

"Monitors" had engaged batteries. The "Merrimac" had had her duel with the first of the little turret-s.h.i.+ps. But experts were still wondering what would happen when fleets of armoured s.h.i.+ps, built in first-cla.s.s dockyards, met in battle on the sea.

The war between Austria and Italy in 1866 gave the first answer. The experiment was not a completely satisfactory one, and some of its lessons were misread. Others were soon made obsolete by new developments in naval armaments.

Still, Lissa will always count among the famous sea-fights of the world, for it was the first conflict in which the armoured sea-going s.h.i.+p took a leading part. But there is another reason: it proved in the most startling way--though neither for the first time nor the last--that men count for more than machines, that courage and enterprise can reverse in the actual fight the conditions that beforehand would seem to make defeat inevitable.

"Give me plenty of iron in the men, and I don't mind so much about iron in the s.h.i.+ps," was a pithy saying of the American Admiral Farragut. There was iron enough in the Austrian sailors, Tegethoff and Petz, to outweigh all the iron in the guns and armour of the Italian admirals, Persano and Albini, and the "iron in the men" gave victory to the fleet that on paper was doomed to destruction.

At the present time, when in our morning papers and in the monthly reviews we find such frequent comparisons between the fleets of the Powers, comparisons almost invariably based only on questions of s.h.i.+ps, armour, guns, and horse-power, and leaving the all-important human factor out of account, it will be interesting to compare the relative strength--on paper--of the Austrian and Italian fleets in 1866, before telling the story of Lissa.

Austria had only seven ironclads. All were of the earlier type of armour-clad s.h.i.+ps, modelled on the lines of the old steam frigates, built of wood, and plated with thin armour. The two largest--s.h.i.+ps of 5000 tons and 800 horse-power--mounted a battery of eighteen 48-pounder smooth bores.

They had not a single rifled gun in their weak broadsides. These were the "Ferdinand Max" and the "Hapsburg." The "Kaiser Max," the "Prinz Eugen,"

and "Don Juan de Austria" were smaller s.h.i.+ps of 3500 tons and 650 horse-power, but they had a slightly better armament, sixteen smooth-bore muzzle-loading 48-pounders, and fourteen rifled guns, light breech-loading 24-pounders. The "Salamander" and the "Drache" were s.h.i.+ps of 3000 tons and 500 horse-power. They mounted sixteen rifled 24-pounders and ten smooth-bore 48-pounders. These five smaller ironclads were the only s.h.i.+ps under the Austrian flag at all up to date. There were an old wooden screw line-of-battle s.h.i.+p and four wooden frigates, but these had neither rifled guns nor armour, and the naval critics of the day would doubtless refuse to take them into account. Then there were some wooden unarmoured gunboats and dispatch vessels.

Now turning to the Italian Navy List, we find that these six ironclads, two of them without a single rifled gun, would have to face no less than twelve armoured s.h.i.+ps, every one of them carrying rifled guns. One of them was a thoroughly up-to-date vessel, just commissioned from Armstrong's yard at Elswick, the armoured turret-ram "Affondatore" (i.e. "The Sinker"). A correspondent of "The Times" saw her when she put into Cherbourg on the way down Channel. He reported that she looked formidable enough to sink the whole Austrian ironclad fleet single-handed. She was a s.h.i.+p of 4000 tons and 750 horse-power, iron-built, heavily armoured, and with a spur-bow for ramming. She carried in her turret two 10-inch rifled Armstrong guns, throwing an armour-piercing sh.e.l.l of 295 pounds--say 300-pounders, and let us remember the heaviest rifled gun in the Austrian fleet was the little 24-pounder. Then there were two wooden ironclads of 5700 tons and 800 horse-power, the "Re d'Italia" and the "Re di Portogallo." The "Re di Portogallo" carried 28 rifled guns, two 300-pounders, twelve 100-pounders, and fourteen 74-pounders. The "Re d'Italia" mounted thirty-two rifled guns, two 150-pounders, sixteen 100-pounders, fourteen 74-pounders, and besides these four smooth-bore 50-pounders. On paper these three s.h.i.+ps, the two "Kings"[19] and the "Affondatore," ought to have blown the Austrian ironclads out of the sea or sent them to the bottom. Let us compare the number of rifled guns and the weight of metal. There is no need to count the smooth-bores, for the "Merrimac-Monitor" fight had proved how little they could do even against weak armour. Here is the balance-sheet:--

AUSTRIANS. | ITALIANS.

Rifled Projectile.| Rifled Projectile.

s.h.i.+ps. Guns. lbs. | s.h.i.+ps. Guns. lbs.

| _Ferdinand Max_ none -- | _Affondatore_ 2 300 _Hapsburg_ none -- | { 2 150 _Kaiser Max_ 14 24 | _Re d'Italia_ {16 100 _Prinz Eugen_ 14 24 | {14 74 _Don Juan_ 14 24 | { 2 300 _Drache_ 16 24 | _Re di Portogallo_ {12 100 _Salamander_ 16 24 | {14 74 ----------- | ------------ Total 74 guns | Total 62 guns throwing 1776 lbs. of metal. | throwing 6372 lbs. of metal.

[19] "Re d'Italia" (King of Italy); "Re di Portogallo"

(King of Portugal).

Even the "Affondatore" was supposed to be what the "Dreadnought" is to older s.h.i.+ps in these paper estimates. What would she be with the two "Kings" helping her? But this was not all; the Italians could place in line _nine more_ ironclads. Here is this further list:--

Weight of s.h.i.+p. Tonnage. Horse- Rifled Guns. Broadside.

power. lbs.

_Ancona_ 4250 700 {22 100-pounders} 2274 { 1 74-pounder }

_Maria Pia_ 4250 700 {18 100-pounders} 2096 { 4 74-pounders}

_Castelfidardo_ 4250 700 {22 100-pounders} 2274 { 1 74-pounder }

_San Martino_ 4250 700 {16 100-pounders} 2044 { 6 74-pounders}

_Principe di Carignano_[20] 4000 700 {12 100-pounders} 1644 { 6 74-pounders}

_Terribile_ 2700 400 {10 100-pounders} 1444 { 6 74-pounders}

_Formidabile_ 2700 400 {10 100-pounders} 1444 { 6 74-pounders}

_Palestro_ 2000 300 2 150-pounders 300

_Varese_ 2000 300 { 2 150-pounders} 500 { 2 100-pounders}

Total: nine s.h.i.+ps carrying 146 rifled guns throwing 14,020 lbs. of metal.

[20] The "Principe di Carignano" was wooden built; all the rest iron.

What could the seven Austrian ironclads with their 74 little guns throwing 1776 pounds of metal do against these nine s.h.i.+ps with double the number of guns and nearly ten times the weight of metal in their broadsides? But add in the three capital s.h.i.+ps before noted on the Italian side, and we have:--

12 ironclads against 7.

208 rifled guns against 74.

20,392 pounds of metal in the broadsides against only 1776.

Clearly it would be mad folly for the Austrian fleet to challenge a conflict! It would be swept from the Adriatic at the first encounter!

Here, then, are our calculations as to the command of the Adriatic at the outset of the war of 1866. They leave out of account only one element--the men, and the spirit of the men. Let us see how the grim realities of war can give the lie to paper estimates.

Wilhelm von Tegethoff, who commanded the Austrian fleet with the rank of rear-admiral, was one of the world's great sailors, and the man for the emergency. He had as a young officer taken part in the blockade of Venice during the revolution of 1848 and 1849; he had seen something of the naval operations in the Black Sea during the Crimean War, as the commander of a small Austrian steamer, and during the war of 1864 he had commanded the wooden steam frigate "Schwarzenberg" in the fight with the Danes off Heligoland. Besides these war services he had taken part in an exploring expedition in the Red Sea and Somaliland, and he had made more than one voyage as staff-captain to the Archduke Maximilian, whose favourite officer and close friend he had been for years. When the Archduke, an enthusiastic sailor, resigned his command of the Austrian fleet to embark for Mexico, where a short-lived reign as Emperor and a tragic death awaited him, he told his brother, the Emperor Francis Joseph, that Tegethoff was the hope of the Austrian navy.

The young admiral (he was not yet forty years of age) had concentrated his fleet at Pola, the Austrian naval port near Trieste. He had got together every available s.h.i.+p, not only the seven ironclads, but the old line-of-battle s.h.i.+p and the wooden frigates and gunboats. The Admiralty at Vienna had suggested that he should take only the ironclads to sea, but he had replied: "Give me every s.h.i.+p you have. You may depend on my finding some good use for them." He believed in his officers and men, and relied on them to make a good fight on board anything that would float, whether the naval experts considered it was out of date or not. Among his officers he had plenty of men who were worthy of their chief and inspired with his own dauntless spirit, and the crews were largely composed of excellent material, men from the wilderness of creek and island that extends along the Illyrian and Dalmatian sh.o.r.es, fishermen and coasting sailors, many of them so lately joined that instead of uniform they still wore their picturesque native costume. The crew looked a motley lot, but, to use Farragut's phrase, "there was iron in the men."